#its hard to form my own theories and opinions | Explore Tumblr Posts and Blogs

ftmtftm · 6 months

Note

something i wanted to ask, genuinely, is if you think the labels transmisogyny/misandry and the way theyre used can really be helpful

i personally think they can be but with how so many ppl try to frame it as "exclusive" forms of oppression just doesnt help at all. yes, transmisogyny does mainly happen to trans women/fems, but a lot of ppl refuse to believe it could also happen to trans men/mascs. and i believe it can go the same way with transmisandry as ive seen multiple ppl describe wut it is and see how it could be applied to trans women/fems. and that doesnt even acknowledge intersex ppl, whether theyre trans or not. i feel like labeling it in specific ways to say "this is an intersection of oppression" without going "this is an exclusive experience" is beneficial to all sides, but ppl try to gatekeep with labels like "tma" and "tme" and so on. its like saying a gay guy cant call themself a dyke bc "youre not a lesbian and therefore u cant reclaim that slur" even if theyve been called a dyke before. it really just feels like the labels of transmisogyny and transmisandry is used as a way to fuel the fires of oppression olympics by saying that "if ur a trans man u experience less oppression than a trans woman." and it seems to be mainly fueled by the idea of "woman (oppressed) + trans (oppressed) = really oppressed" whereas "man (not oppressed) + trans (oppressed) = not as oppressed" when its nothing like that.

its also incredibly hard to find Any information about transmisandry. i always see "trans men just have it/pass easier" and even other transphobic statements of how going on T makes trans men more aggressive and assertive. i feel like tumblr has been the only place ive seen any genuine discussion about transmisandry and even then its not great or very informative.

i believe that both transmisandry and transmisogyny should be acknowledged as real forms of oppression rather than being used as a way to oppress ppl further.

i dont wish to cause an argument as these r just my thoughts and i genuinely want to hear yours on it too

So the TL;DR my opinion sort of boils down to "Yes, I think they can be incredibly useful terms when used with intention and clarity of purpose" but there's a lot of nuance to that opinion. Basically though - I mostly agree with you on a conceptual level anon. I just wanted to write an essay.

(and also I don't fully address some things in this ask because frankly I'm burnt out and don't want to talk about them at the moment and I made this blog to talk about my special interests anyway. Sue me ‪¯\_(ツ)_/¯‬)

Something I've been noticing in my reading of Intersectional/trans-inclusive Feminist literature, combined with my engagement with trans activism, over the last few years is: We're all very, very afraid of talking about sexism right now and it absolutely makes sense why.

It makes sense because the conversation has been ground to dirt by TERFs constantly yelling about "sex-based oppression" as a means to be transmisogynist and degrade the womanhood of trans women. However the response to this has been deeply flawed in my opinion.

Instead of actually addressing sexism as it's own distinct form of oppression under an Intersectional lense, we've simply made a hard left into only discussing gender informed oppression and only legitimizing gender informed oppression in the form of misogyny. It's a very uninformed response in my opinion actually - but that also makes sense because it's currently very hard to be informed on general feminist theory and politics at the moment because Radical Feminism is a fucking plague.

In reality though, sexism and misogyny are two different forms of oppression that often overlap because gender and sex are different classes of identity that often overlap.

This degradation of language - both from TERFs conflating sex and gender and from Intersectionals/progressives separating the two so hard they don't even acknowledge sex - is what I think is part of the cause of this problem that is leaving trans men / trans mascs with a massive hole in our ability to discuss our experiences. And not just trans men either!!! It's also nonbinary and intersex people as well who are harmed by this void.

So that begs the question: How do we actually talk about sexism in an Intersectional Feminist, trans inclusive, capacity that combats Radical Feminist rhetoric on sexism?

And the answer? Is carefully, consciously, and in a manner that is aware of several different experiences within the nebulous concept of female identity.

I will actually be using the word "female" as a term a decent amount throughout this post. For the sake of this discussion I am defining "female" as anyone anyone who presently identifies as female due to their assigned sex as well as anyone who is socially treated/viewed as female due to their gender, legal, and/or medical statuses. In this post "female" is an umbrella term that includes cis women, trans men, trans women, nonbinary people, and intersex people who feel that definition applies to them in relation to their sex.

Because the fact of the matter is that Patriarchy and our society at large hate women and they hate people who are assigned female and they hate people who are female and those are distinct categories of people with a lot of overlap and a lot of differences.

Female identity is like venn diagram of sex informed experiences that cis women, trans women, trans men, nonbinary people, and intersex people all have a place in for various different reasons. It's a diverse category of experiences and this should be a touchstone for solidarity, not division in my opinion. The experiences and needs of one group don't inherently negate the experiences and needs of another similar group, even if they conflict, you know?

It's a concept I've actually adopted from disability activists, who often talk about the ways in which disability activism often has to address conflicting needs because sometimes some disabled people's needs are in direct conflict with each other!! Conflicting needs are not something unique to disability activism though.

Most groups and classes people have conflicting needs within themselves and I think there's a lot to be learned in gendered activism from disability activists in this regard. I think often in activist discussions a lot of people stop when situations stop impacting them directly instead of trying to find commonality and empathy with similar experiences. It's easy to have knee jerk reactions, it's harder to pause and contemplate.

So, let's actually contemplate transmisogyny and transandrophobia/transmisandry as terms for a moment.

Transmisogyny was coined as a term by Julia Serano in 2007 in her book The Whipping Girl and I do think it's incredibly useful for describing the ways in which transphobia (the broader oppression of trans individuals) intersects with misogyny (the broader oppression of women) in specific ways wrapped up into a specific term.

I've engaged in a lot of criticism of The Whipping Girl because, well, I think for just about every excellent idea Serano posits about the trans feminine experience she undercuts it with White Feminist rhetoric and simple "cis men and women are opposites therefore trans men and women are opposites" type rhetoric that harms her arguments more than helps them. HOWEVER! Serano herself even articulates that misogyny and transphobia may intersect in ways that impact nonbinary and trans masculine individuals differently from trans feminine individuals, and that additional language may be required to fill that gap in The Whipping Girl!!

So now there's a bit of a linguistically philosophical discussion to be had here on the function of language and what language we can actually use to fill the hole trans men experience with our language - which is also where we dive back into talking about concepts like conflicting needs and sexism.

When creating terminology (or jargon), one must take into account several things like clarity and context, which is why personally - I do not like the term "transmisandry" at all. I use it as a tag because I know some people prefer it as a term and I'd like my posts to reach that audience as well. Generally speaking though - I think any inclusion of "misandry" as a term will always be a nonstarter in most discussions on gender. It's much too loaded of a word because of it's association with the misogynistic actions of MRAs among several other semantic reasons.

An argument could, I think, be made for a term like "transsexism" which would describe the intersection of transphobia (the broader oppression of trans individuals) and sexism (the broader oppression of female individuals) but I think that is still too broad if we want to talk about trans masculine experiences specifically. (Though I do still think it may have contextual use as a term quite frankly - that's just beyond the scope of this post).

So? Then we come to transandrophobia and a conversation on misogynistic, sexist responses to masculinity in people society forcibly identified as "female women" under patriarchy.

I want to state that off the bat that I take a lot of issue with the way people dismiss trans men's experiences as just "general transphobia" or "default transphobia" because... Why are you automatically treating a man's experiences as the universal default? Especially when there are things based on the intersection of his manhood and marginalization that he experiences that women of the same marginalization don't?

I have this issue with most other conversations about the intersection of marginalized identity and manhood honestly. It actually really reeks of unconscious misogynist bias to me. But I digress, that's not the subject of this post.

I think a lot about Brandon Teena and the motivations for his murder. I think a lot about Lou Sullivan's diary entries about his loneliness and isolation with regard to being around trans women and lesbians - as well as his history fighting for his right to medical transition. I think about P. Carl's musings about the ways in which his entire community abandoned him once he came out as a trans man as opposed to a lesbian woman. I think about Irreversible Damage by Abigal Shrier and the way she manipulated - if I'm remembering correctly - YouTuber, Chase Ross into misleading interviews that skewed his words and stories to attempt to "prove" her points about how "our girls" are being manipulated into transgenderism via social contagion spread through platforms like YouTube.

I think about the ways in which trans mascs - particularly those on HRT - actively avoid medical care because of the deeply gendered nature of gynecological care and also because we are treated like medical freaks and abominations when we do try to seek that care. I think about the ways our bodies are inherently, deeply impacted by the overturning of Roe V. Wade and how our decisions to not carry children via abortion or hysterectomy - or our desire to carry children - are met with the phenomenon of medical misogyny like any other woman or female individual but in a way that also explicitly intersects with our transness.

I think about the ways in which Patriarchal society sees my "female" body in direct opposition to my identity as a "man" and how that is something that needs to be "corrected" back into "female womanhood" via rape and assault. I think about my own corrective assault a lot. I think about how the 2015 National Trans Survey actually found higher self reported instances with sexual assault in trans men than in trans women. I think about how I personally see that as a touchstone of solidarity with my lesbian siblings and especially with my other butch siblings who also have their expressions of masculinity treated as deviancy that deserves corrective action.

I apologize for diverting into less of an academic musing into prose and also for diverging from the subject of this ask directly into a much larger essay - but I am simply so tired of trying to say that I and other trans masculine people are people worthy of having our own language for our own experiences instead of just being dismissed as a privileged class - quite literally on the basis of our own oppression.

Especially when people use the words of someone like Julia Serano to say we don't deserve that language when she herself posited that maybe we should have it. Especially when Kimberlé Crenshaw - the woman who created the theory of Intersectionality that Serano is attempting to engage with in The Whipping Girl - has stated that one of the goals of Intersectionality is to create language for and give voice to marginalized identities that otherwise are not given language and voice.

So - What do you call it when trans masculine people are explicitly targeted on the basis of their trans masculinity? What do you call that intersection of sexism, misogyny, and transphobia that misgenders and attacks trans masculinity explicitly? Because that isn't "general transphobia" - that is transphobia motivated by a Patriarchal desire for control over the broader "female identity" that society is seeing as "too masculine".

It's trans-andro-phobia. Transphobia targeted at a particular group of trans individuals on the basis of their masculinity in a way that intersects with a sexist, misogynist, Patriarchal desire to control perceived/forced female identity and the subsequent interpersonal and social ramifications that come alongside that systemic abuse.

Focus, intention, and clarity of purpose.

---

I do want to add that there is absolutely something to be said about the fact that these conversations are all extremely White at the moment.

Radical Feminism is a deeply White (and White Supremacist) movement. Conversations on Trans Feminist theory in general are still deeply White as well. Julia Serano is very much a White Trans Feminist, and as such most responses to her work by other White trans people tend to be, well, very White.

I myself am even contributing to the prevalence of Whiteness in the conversation because even though I am Ashkenazi I am also still White. I might be informed by and am actively using concepts formed by Black Women and Ethnic Minority Women as the basis of my own theories, but that doesn't erase the context of my own race in this conversation either.

I really do not want that to be lost upon people, especially other White people. A racialized context matters in this conversation because Race and Gender really cannot be fully separated from each other in conversations about power and systemic oppression.

Bonus TL;DR - Read The Will to Change and Feminism is for Everybody by bell hooks. Read Audre Lorde. Read Kimberlé Crenshaw. Read Leslie Feinberg and Judith Butler. Read María Lugones. Learn the concepts they are presenting and then also learn how to apply those concepts in a consciousness and self aware manner.

#this isn't perfectly everything i wanted to articulate but i'm tired of this sitting in my drafts #especially when i'm getting really burnt out on offering this kind of essay for free with my main responses to them being sui bait anons #or parasocial bullshit #transmisandry #anti transmasculinity #transandrophobia #transmisogyny #intersectional feminism #feminism #anon #long post /#asks

82 notes · View notes

stinkrascal · 1 year

Note

I wasnt attempting to offend anyone with my opinion but I guess thats not hard to do here. I personally do not see stories as an art. I think its very cool but to make it bigger than it is seems a tad egoistical,,, it’s not that deep simblr

why wouldnt it be an art? people are writing, setting up scenes, developing character motivations, symbolisms, themes, learning camera angles, playing w color theory, creating their own meshes in blender... just to post on simblr. like what part of that process excludes it from being art. a lot of those steps r the same steps one would take to write a novel for example, or film a movie, which im assuming you consider those to be valid artforms. like it's just a different medium, that's all

idek why calling something art is considered egotistical. like that doesn't even make sense to me. creating art is the best thing u can do for your soul imo, it gives you the opportunity to express yourself in authentic ways you wouldn't be able to otherwise. and that form of artistic expression can come from anywhere, and show itself in almost any way... dancing, writing, drawing, singing, painting, making sculptures, creating video games, animations, just to name a few... it isn't about being egotistical! calling art art isn't egotistical!! it's about expressing urself! so yeah this whole ask makes no sense to me and i think you should just keep your opinion to yourself next time bc i have made it pretty clear at this point that i don't agree with you

#jade answers #anonymous

131 notes · View notes

multifunctionalnitroglycerin · 1 month

Text

Heaven is not entirely on the wrong – a hazbin hotel theory #3 SERA

I know, you hate her. The Seraphim that is all high and mighty, and has ordered the slaughter of countless souls. (I am not going to say innocent or not, but they were souls).

But let us try to see things from her perspective for a bit. She is responsible for all the souls up in heaven, and has a little sister, mentee, daughter idk, that she cares about very much. Perhaps even too much, in the sense that to me she comes off as so overprotective she didn’t; tell Emily what she needed to know. She tried to protect her innocence and paid for her decision of keeping Emily in he dark with losing Emily’s trust. It’s a barrier that overprotective guardians often cross with their charges. They make the decisions for them, keep them in the dark, because they think they know better, and don’t really acknowledge that said charge (child, sister etc) has grown up, is their own person, can make their own decisions and form their own opinions.

Back to the point, you have an overprotective Sera responsible for the countless souls up in heaven, the hell in turmoil with a supposed uprising, lead by Lilith? (We don’t really know much abt her to be sure) that could threaten the order you are trying to maintain.

And let us not kid ourselves, heaven loves order. And rules. It’s a really hierarchical and disciplined society, but it is fallible to failings because of that. Because rules don’t predict everything, laws are not always right. Moral and lawful are not always on the same page. Heaven in Hazbin is meant to enunciate the failings of such a system that religiously follows rules, unbendingly and relentlessly. It’s a bit like how morally correct and lawfully correct do not overlap, and people who are applauded for the morality of their decisions might find themselves facing legal repercussions. (And it’s why I’d make a terrible lawyer, sorry mom).

So she has to do something. She needs to protect order and all that’s good. She is desperate. And then comes in with the “masterplan”, that serves his own sadism and entertainment but ultimately makes him and unwitting hero. And “you have to listen it was such a hard decision” and I believe that. It’s also a decision that she made in tandem with Adam and Lucifer. But it burdens on her so much because genocide goes against what she stands for.

And I’d like to take the hellfire that’s reflected in her eyes in the song and give it another spin. One that is unlikely, but still. I’d like to propose that the fire, reflects exactly that inner turmoil, that fire of consequences that burns within Sera herself, reflects the hellishness of her decision and that it makes her less than holy. Not necessarily that she is bad and has an agenda against hell, but she made a hellish decision that redacts from her holiness, and that is reflected in the hellfire that burnt in her eyes on that moment.

Ofc that doesn’t make the decision correct or a moral one. And we do see her struggle with it. It’s also a burden she is unwilling to share with anyone. “I though since I m older, that its my load to shoulder.” She is not happy abt that decision, that load that burdens her, but she doesn’t want Emily to bear that same burden, that probably eats away at her bit by bit. Which could be why she is so disgruntled when Pentious arrives. Because she has burdened herself, doused her hands in sin and the blood of countless souls, only to learn that it’s redundant. She made a sacrifice only to learn that it was not needed. And ofc her initial sentiments abt it won’t be positive.

Because it gives you solace, thinking that the decision is necessary. It calms your conscience thinking, I couldn’t do anything else. It’s probably what had her sanity hanging by a thread as far as the exterminations go. And then she learns that, she didn’t have to do it. There was no reason for restless sleepless nights, for breaking heavens rules, for going against what she believed in. She sinned when she didn’t have to. And it’s not sth anyone would have positive feelings about at least initially.

I don’t think the show will go that way, because so much it has been anti heaven, and well Sera’s portrayal does allude to sth more sinister going on behind the scenes. And Sera could be in on that, vengeful and anti-hell or she could be merely a pawn in a larger scheme.

Sera is also ancient. And has witnessed many of the marvels that humanity has achieved. Both the good and terrible ones. And well, you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. She has formed her opinions already, and there are little chances she’ll change her mind. That’s a big issue with immortal characters, that needs to be leaned into correctly, to make their immortality and all that experience play as either a vice or a virtue. So, she is ofc going to be skeptical abt redemption. Perhaps she has seen other attempts before, perhaps she has seen schemes parading around as redemption that only aimed in disorder and chaos.

And something that annoys me a bit abt various character portrayals, is how they get positively or negatively seen regardless of the actual weight of their decisions. Adam is a fan favorite, and he is a prick. Carmilla was willing to let all of hell burn to save just her daughters. (I love her soooo much though. And she did help in the end.) It’s a bit of a case that the hero would sacrifice you to save the world, and the villain would let the world burn if it meant it would keep you safe.

And Sera sacrifices souls that have already been condemned by divine judgement – again I think that the worthy ones if there had been any, probably popped up in heaven’s doors with amnesia or sth and thus the whole thing went under their noses – to save those that she is charged to protect. It burdens her, but she does it all the same. Protecting countless people that in her eyes, have already proved their worthiness of being saved.

Again this introduces the faults and struggles with power, oppression discipline and rules, and how they can limit one’s view of the truth. Heaven is the one presented with the struggles of corrupt power, more so than hell in hazbin, because it’s more subtle. It’s the day to day struggle with laws and rules that give enough leeway to Adam to be an asshole and be up there but condemn Vaggie for sparing a hell born child.

All in all yes we are talking about flawed characters. Nuanced and with their own struggles, but that needed to be considered in another light as well. This was a really fun exercise to try and distance these characters from the lighting that the show already paints them with and give them a bit of a spin from an outsiders perspective. Ofc this doesn’t erase their flaws but we need to see them as the multidimensional characters that they are, and all the different levels of struggle they deal with. It’s not all black and white after all.

#Hazbin Hotel #hazbin hotel fandom #hazbin hotel theory #hazbin spoilers #sera hazbin hotel #sera seraphim #seraphim emily #emily #emily the seraphim #hazbin hotel text post #Sera might not be as bad is she is being portrayed #extermination hazbin hotel

13 notes · View notes

altargarden · 1 month

Note

hello! we hope this is ok to ask, it's totally fine if you don't answer- but we've recently become interested in satanism and demon work, but we know exactly nothing about it or where to start. we did some basic research with academic sources like wikipedia but have no idea where to go from there. we're hesitant to just dive in on our own because we know there are a lot of bad sources and groups to avoid but don't actually know what those things are.

anyways, we trust your opinion and recommendations so we wanted to ask if you had any suggestions on how to go about researching and learning about theistic satanism for an absolute beginner! recommended books or articles, groups to avoid, red flags, anything like that would be very appreciated 💚 thank you so much!

okay so, this may be a controversial opinion but in my opinion (KEY WORD OPINION) you actually shouldn't only stick to unproblematic and valid uwu authors, because i'll be honest (in terms of satanism and demonolatry), there ARE no pure and good authors out there. every author out there, especially if you're reading a text from a long time ago, is going to have something you disagree with. you need to practice some form of critical engagement, additionally, because engaging with a text critically and understanding why it is wrong is way more important than just shutting out the information altogether. you will not learn anything if you pretend that problematic texts do not exist. i'm not saying this to be harsh, but there is a reason we research a variety of texts and perspectives in high school english class. you need to continue that kind of method when researching anything.

now that is covered, i'll tell you what i have read personally. taking the above into consideration, there are no authors here that don't have something deeply wrong about their texts. i did read their works, and i came to my own conclusions on whether i'm going to dub them an authority on satanism, and i suggest you do the same. satanism is about knowledge and drawing your own, unique conclusions. just make sure what you do adopt doesn't throw any groups of people under the bus, because we're not here to read books and thoughtlessly believe whatever the book says, especially when the book can have misinformation, or offensive content. this is very common in satanism; as much as people love to treat it like it's revolutionary and all-accepting, it can be just as, or even more, discriminatory or outright hateful as christianity, especially in the texts.

the most easy-to-find material:

ars goetia > pretty basic info, but very handy and simple to read

the infernal gospel > probably my favourite book on this list

the complete book of demonolatry > i don't agree with the author, but i got this one in my early days before i knew anything about said author. it's got some useful information, but there's a lot of misinfo

book of the fallen > useful rituals if i remember correctly, i sold this book so i can't recheck

at satan's altar > also an interesting book

the goetia devils > has a lot of what i assume is upg... seems to conflict with what i've seen from other practitioners

the goetic hymns > second favourite book

the satanic philosopher > i found this one hard to read personally

esoterica > youtube channel with amazing information on demonolatry and its history, i suggest getting into this before doing anything else.

all of these websites.

and lastly, i also got like 50+ older texts i got as a bundle off etsy that i can't remember the names of. i wish i could give them to you, but i genuinely have lost every single text i got in the bundle due to me changing computers. i suggest looking on etsy for similar bundles on satanism and demonolatry if you want to get into the historical meat of things.

that being said, my actual last thing i want to say is not to get too entrenched into the theory. the texts are handy, sure! but the one thing i have found the most useful is by engaging with the community. most of my wealth of knowledge did NOT come from texts or media, it came from those around me talking about their experiences. if you want to learn, and i mean REALLY learn about demons and satan, get into the community hardcore and you will learn something new every day. talk to people, make friends, don't do this alone.

edit: okay one more thing. this does go against what i was saying to some degree but i do have a limit to that logic. avoid joy of satan. they're n/eonazis and come on this website regularly. avoid them, avoid them, avoid them.

#bun talks #theistic satanism #demonolatry #satanism #i wanted to write more but i'm admittedly on a time crunch :(

19 notes · View notes

sunkissedchld · 7 months

Text

𝐍𝐢𝐤𝐨𝐥𝐚'𝐬 𝐃𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞 𝐓𝐡𝐞𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐢𝐧 𝐌𝐲 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐭

Nikola Stojanovic is a Serbian astrologer known for sharing his theory that each degree of the zodiac circle corresponds to the zodiac signs. @bratz-kitten has the best post on overall correspondents and specific degrees that Stojanovic focused on, and I used said post to apply the theory to my chart. i also used forensicastrolger’s post on their site because i felt it added even more information.

this intepretation is obviously specific to my chart, but if you have similar placements you may find it helpful. you might also find it helpful if you want an idea of how to start applying this theory to your chart. i hope you all find this helpful!

Leo Ascendant at 11°

the first house correlates to our appearance, first impressions, and our natural tendencies/disposition. with my ascendant in leo, my hair is a very noticable part of me. people may view me as a confident person who is a natural leader. i’m likely easily recognizable and have influence over others due to my charisma and prestige/high status.

the eleventh degree is an aquarius degree. according to nikola, this degree is connected to suicide. others say it’s connected to divorce. in my opinion, these two subjects connect in that appearances don’t match what’s under the surface. this is only heightened as this degree is on my ascendant, which directly correlates to literal appearances. aquarian degrees also have ties to technology, innovation, networking, intelligence, and humanitarianism.

to me, this manifests in my chart in that fact that i have a hard time connecting my own view of myself to the view others have of me. what i project does not match what’s inside - or at least, i don’t feel that it does. this probably also manifests in the greatness/potential others see in me that i also have a hard time seeing in myself. this might lastly manifest in a “suicide” of my reputation where i ruin people’s expectations of me because i cause my own downfall.

3H Scorpio Moon at 2°

the third house relates to the mind, communication/language, and people we find roots with before our mother (ie. siblings). the moon details our inner bearings - our emotions and instinctual desires and actions. it’s important to note the moon is in its fall in scorpio, meaning the planet is uncomfortable and debilitated in its bearings. with that said, my scorpio moon makes for an intense placement. i tend to be overly introspective to the point of isolation when it comes to my thoughts, as they’re often intense. when going through internal turmoil, i often look to drastic transformative actions in order to feel more in control.

the second degree is a taurean one. nikola believed this degree was linked to high achievements and greatness - often in the public eye. taurean degrees can also be indicators of luxury, stability, and one’s voice.

i feel this degree and planet placement seem to go against one another. my emotions are almost inherently blocked from the public due to the scorpio influence, but the second degree makes for a situation where my emotions are likely to be exposed to the general public in a large way. with the connection to one’s voice, i feel this manifests in my chart in that i have a way of achieving greatness as a result of my emotions in the way i communicate them. oftentimes, it’s hard for me to express my emotions verbally, but i have a way with displaying them in my writings and other art forms. i may be able to gain greatness, attention, and luxury because of the way i learn to express my emotions to the collective.

5H Sagittarius Mercury at 22°

the fifth house corresponds to life’s pleasures - artistic talents, entertainment, romance, and the inclination and want to be in the spotlight. mercury handles communication, education, and short travels. my sagittarius placement enables me to have a way with words, as explained when talking about my moon sign. i am able to entertain and educate others in a way that is mesmerizing and engaging but also friendly and relatable rather than condescending and confusing. my ideas and words tend to be more all-encompassing and abstract but well thought out, so people feel drawn to it.

the twenty-second degree is connected to capricorn. nikola proposed this degree to be one that indicates one who is “to kill or be killed”. he explains this in a literal sense, but it doesn’t have to entail actual murder. i personally believe the twenty-second degree operates similarly to leo degrees in that one is likely to gain recognition due to the capricorn influence (capricorn rules over the tenth house, which deals with fame, public recognition, legacy, etc.). i also believe it has more karmic ties due to its closeness to the twenty-ninth degree. in my opinion, the twenty-second degree could indicate an area of life where can gain and/or lose a ton. it could indicate a possible fall from grace.

looking at this placement along with my scorpio moon interpretation leads me to believe my words and writings could be my biggest advantage and my biggest downfall. i could gain public recognition as result of my words (ie. writing a book or music), but if i were to go into the deep end a lose myself by becoming too arrogant or forgetting my original reasonings for sharing my words i could leave a smeared legacy. this could technically be seen in what i do on this platform! i share my ideas and such relating to astro content and have gained many people’s trust, but that trust can easily be lost if i’m rude, don’t keep my word, or (going back to the leo interpretation) mar the image people have of me.

5H Sagittarius Pluto at 15°

pluto rules over transformations, death & rebirth, power, sexuality, and mystery. this planet is generational, and i was born while it was in sagittarius (1995 - 2008). with this placement in my fifth house, i experience and understand Pluto’s traits best within a creative arena. my power lies within my creative abilities (and is enhanced due to my fifth house and sagittarius stellium). for others, discovering the hidden parts of me is like a cat-and-mouse chase that they often enjoy. personally, i explore the hidden parts of me utilizing the art of creation.

the fifteenth degree is associated with gemini. nikola asserts it as an “assination” or “kill”/murder degree, and says that it could indicate accidental death if in the sign of gemini. gemini degrees are also associated with double happenings and geometric patterns.

the concept of a degree associated with “assisination”, murder, and/or accidental death connected to a pluto placement makes me believe the effects of pluto are heightened in my life - and this is even more so true as the planet conjuncts both my sun (representing my ego, my core beliefs and ideals; essentially who i am) and my venus (what i love and attach myself to; what draws me in).

in one way, this degree and the aspects i have to the planet could be one explanation as to why the concepts of death and rebirth have always been a focal point in my life. where the fifteenth degree is associated with accidental deaths in gemini, one could argue it means intentional deaths in the sign of sagittarius since the two are sister signs. taking this argument into account and remembering the association of patterns with the degree makes me believe that my encounters with death and are intentional in order to aid in my growth and ultimate transformation. the concept of rebirth is one that i am to become comfortable with because it’s important to my being and goals (see sun-pluto aspect).

this also goes back to my interpretation of my mercury degree with the concept of killing coming back. i also think this, again, plays into the aspect of me having a bigger purpose that could connect to public recognition - so much so that the recognition is generational. this reminds me of the idea of someone completely tearing themselves down and almost re-creating themselves in order to become their best person - not only for themselves but also for the collective. in all, it makes me believe i need to be willing to tear down my ego and wants in order to become more.

5H Sagittarius Chiron at 29°

chiron represents one’s deepest wounds - the traumas from childhood that leave deep impressions on someone for long period of time. my fifth house placement makes for an even closer emphasis on the wounds’ impact and presence on my childhood. this in combination with the sagittarius placement means i have long term wound relating to self-expression. with my fifth house stellium, i have a need to be creative and unique in my thoughts and actions, but early life experiences lead to self-doubt and possible repression.

the twenty-ninth degree is an indicator of clairvoyance and strong intuition. nikola proposed that those with placements in the twenty-ninth degree could predict the future; he also had this degree in his own chart. it should also be noted the twenty-ninth degree is a leo degree, which deals with attention, fame, expression, and creativity. this degree could indicate the person has a knowing feeling of future success.

in astrology, it’s naturally assumed that chiron is meant to be healed. with this, the degree of the asteroid could explain the severity of the wound. the fact that chiron is connected to my fifth house sagittarius stellium (which includes my sun sign) could explain why i often feel confused about whether or not fifth house activities like singing, performing, writing, etc. are really for me. it also explains why i doubt the beauty of the art i create.

additionally, the twenty-ninth degree could further indicate that my future is linked to fame and attention. it could also mean that i am already aware of the fame present in my future. so, despite my current doubting of my art and my hobbies, my deeper conscious is likely aware of the true final outcome.

1H Leo Juno at 29°

juno is an asteroid connected to the roman goddess that rules over marriage and family and who is also known as the protector of women. this roman goddess is also known as hera in greek beliefs. hera is also connected to the former topics of juno, but is also known for her fierce love for her husband - zeus. her love for zeus was so prominent that even when he would cheat on her, hera would instead punish and blame the mistresses rather than zeus himself. with that, asteroid juno is known to be connected to marriage and represents what one often looks for in a long-term significant other.

with this sign in leo and the first house, i desire someone who is fiercely protective and loyal. i may prefer being by the person often and may even engage in PDA. this placement also gives me trophy wife/husband vibes. there’s a want to be shown off and doted on. the first house placement makes me think of love at first sight. regardless, there is a want for love to be grand and immediate yet long lasting.

as stated before, the twenty-ninth degree is associated with both psychic abilities and leo traits including fame, attention, expression, and fun. i also mentioned a knowing feeling of success.

with this clairvoyance aspect present, i propose that juno in the twenty-ninth degree could be an indicator of a soulmate and/or twin flame connection, and this is likely intensified with the first house placement. this could tell of a love from a past life or a love that even those beyond this life know about. this could be a love where my future spouse and i already know about one another before meeting; it could even mean that we’re able to speak to one another without being together. this would explain why sometimes i feel as if i learn small bits of information about then through my dreams.

the leo traits could mean that i gain fame, success, or public recognition from my long term significant other. the leo and first house placements could also mean that i’m likely to learn more about myself due my future spouse. i might open up more and become more confident in myself due to their presence.

#about sun #astrology #nikola's degree theory #degree theory #ascendant: leo #planet: moon #planet: mercury #planet: pluto #house: v #house: iii #asteroids #asteroid: juno

23 notes · View notes

hornyhornyhimbos · 1 year

Text

"Somethin' In The Way You Make Me Move" ~ E. Munson

Summary: When Eddie catches his producer singing a rather sensual song, he wonders if she has anyone in mind as she's singing. Turns out, she did—Eddie.

Pairing: Modern!Rockstar!Eddie Munson x Fem!Producer!Reader

Word Count: 2,683

Content Warning: MINORS DNI (18+ content) slightly protected piv sex (pls wrap b4 u tap or u'll die), Reader is on the pill tho, creampie, mentions of handjobs, mentions of oral both!receiving, NICKNAMES OUT THE WAZOO (princess, doll, baby doll, pretty girl), lots of teasing from both parties but mainly Eddie because he's an ass, lmk if i missed anything!!!

Extra Notes: having to repost because i found out the link is broken 🤪

Based On: a conversation me and @rupsmorge had

Originally Written: 02/04/2023 through 02/05/2023

Beta Read By: @writer-in-theory

"Alright, boys. I think we're good!" you said into the microphone. "If we need any more takes, I'll call you."

The four men emerged from the recording booth, sweat dripping down their foreheads from the precision they'd put into playing their respective instruments the best they ever had. Eddie, the oldest and prettiest (in your opinion), had been playing the hardest, and you couldn't say you didn't notice.

You constantly noticed him. How could you not? From the way he called you "doll" to the way he was constantly finding reasons to brush against you, he made it well known that he noticed you, so how could you not do the same?

The four muttered some form of a goodbye (Eddie's accompanied by a wink) before making their way out of the studio. You stood from your seat, making sure you were alone before sliding one Airpod in and beginning to clean up your equipment.

You'd almost finished cleaning up all your things during the first song, but when Spotify decided to play "move!" by NIKI, you worked a little slower, wanting to savor your favorite song.

"Maybe it's the way that," you sang along, swaying your hips as you continued to gather your things. You waltzed into the recording booth, feeling every word you sang, "you make me wanna lay back."

You had barely finished the first verse when you heard someone clear their throat behind you. Oh, God, please don't be my boss.

"I was just coming to retrieve my jacket but I see you're singin' about me again," an all-too-familiar, deep voice said behind you.

You slid your Airpod out of your ear and into its case before clearing your own throat. "Eddie…" you managed to say, swallowing down a hard lump in the back of your throat.

He grabbed his coat from the chair where he'd left it, shaking his head with a chuckle. "Who were you singing about, anyway? You got a boyfriend I don't know about?" he smirked as he stepped into the recording room.

You swallowed again, shaking your head.

His hands landed on his hips. "So you were singing about me?"

With the roll of your eyes, you scoffed. "In your dreams, Munson. Just because you're a big, popular rockstar now doesn't mean I want you too."

His hand flew to your wrist, pulling you closer. You can't say it didn't make your stomach turn, in a good way of course. He eyed you up and down, a sly smile tugging at the corners of his mouth. "You think I don't notice the way you bat your eyelashes when you compliment my guitar skills? Or when I hit certain notes when I'm singing?"

He pulled away, chuckling deep. "I bet those are notes you wish only you could make me hit."

Your breathing hitched, and he smirked again. "I'm not too far off, am I?"

You tried to find some way to discreetly cover how your thighs were starting to clamp together. But Eddie being Eddie, he noticed immediately. "I knew it," was all he said, watching as your thighs clenched around nothing.

You slowly shook your head in response to his previous question. "I bet you say the same things about me," you uttered, slightly impressed by your sudden boldness. "I bet there's so many sounds you wish I'd make only for you."

He chuckled, brushing a loose hair away from your cheek. "I'd love to hear them. If you ever wanted to show me, that is."

You casually glanced down, noticing the tent forming in the front of his jeans. You placed a hand on his chest, toying with the collar of his black flannel. "No, I think I wanna hear all the noises you can make first."

His lips crashed into yours, and almost habitually, your legs wrapped around his waist. He carried you to the wall, your back arching away from it as his lips moved to the crook of your neck.

He chuckled as he sucked hard on your neck, a bruise was sure to appear the next morning. He pulled away for a beat, smirking. "I think I wanna hear your noises first."

"Too bad," you sighed, sliding your hand down to the bulge in his pants, "you're gonna make all those handsome noises for me first."

He sucked in a groan, his pride overcoming him. "What was that first line of that song you were singing?" he said, diving back into your neck. You bit your lip, hiding a moan, and he rolled his eyes. "Somethin' about laying back?"

"Uh-huh," you managed. "The way that you make me wanna lay back," you corrected him.

"Is that what you want? Or were you just singing along?"

You nodded before placing your lips back on his. An opened mouth kiss, leading to your tongue slipping into his mouth, savoring the taste of the peppermint tea he'd been drinking earlier.

He picked you up once again before turning and crouching down to his knees, lying you flat on the floor of the studio. His hands moved to his buckle, but you stopped him with a, "Wait…"

You took a moment to savor him like this: those brown eyes you loved so much looking down at you with lust, his arms flexed in that tight, red flannel he wore all the damn time, his hand that had moved from his belt to grip the fat of your waist. You gave him a small smile, and he knew. It was your way of saying, "I wish we could stay like this forever."

Your attention went back to the buckle of his black, leather belt. "Can I?" you practically begged, hooking a finger through one of his belt loops.

He nodded slowly, and you were a little too eager to reach for the metal fastening. He toyed at your pants' button as you slid down his jeans, your eyes widening at how pretty the thatch of his happy trail was. You hooked a finger into his boxers, pulling him out promptly, sighing deeply at how nice he felt in your hand. You ran a thumb over the tip, going glassy-eyed at the sight of how pretty and pink and big he was.

"Shit, princess," he grunted, and you smirked. You'd won. "Putting those fingers to good use. Good to know they're good for more than just hitting buttons on a computer."

You stroked down the length of it, letting out a short breath. "Oh, I can't wait to show you all the things these fingers can do."

"Next time, princess," he told you, pulling your pants down the rest of the way. "Need to be in you right now."

His hands made quick work of your blouse, tossing it aside and pulling your tits out of your bra. One of your hands was still settled on his dick while the other tugged at his flannel. "Take it off, please?" you nearly whined. But you couldn't help yourself. You needed a perfect view of the white tee shirt beneath it and how it clung to his inked biceps. Needed it, like air to breathe.

He slid it off agonizingly slow before moving his palms back to your chest. His thumbs massaged small circles on the buds, finally eliciting a mewl from your lips.

"That's it, pretty girl," he whispered. "Make all those sweet noises you've been saving for me."

Your attention moved back to his cock, pulling him toward your entrance. You slid the mushroom tip against your folds, biting down on your lip to hide a moan.

He took control, moving your hands away from his cock. He slid in easily, prompting him to groan, "Oh, shit. You always this wet?"

You shook your head, managing to whimper out a weak, "Only for you." Your teeth clamped down your bottom lip, you were surprised you didn't taste the metallic tang of blood. Your hands flew to his biceps, digging crescent moons into the rose tattoo inked on his left arm. He slid further in, the stretch already feeling so nice that your lips had fallen into an open "o" shape.

"Fuck, Eddie, please," you whimpered, "need a sec to adjust."

He chuckled, causing his cock to move inside you, and eliciting a moan from your lips. "Aww, is it too big for your greedy, little hole?" he faked a pout, his bottom lip puckering outward.

Your hips bucked slightly, catching him off guard. "You're a dick, Eddie Munson."

"No, but I have one. And from the looks of it," he paused, grinding further down, causing your lips to fall back to their previous "o" state, "you're looking forward to milking it dry, hmm? Aren't you, pretty girl?"

You didn't move, you weren't sure you could. He pushed down further, finally reaching the hilt. When you didn't answer, one of his hands moved to your cheek, pulling your face to look at him. "You should probably answer me, doll. I could just as easily pull out and finish this myself as I pushed in."

You nodded weakly, earning you a scoff from the man above you. "Use your words, baby," he instructed, slightly pulling himself out of you.

You whimpered from the friction and the small, empty feeling of him not completely filling you up anymore. You nodded again with a whine, your eyes squeezing shut as he slid almost the entire way out.

He continued pulling out, which finally got you to form words. "Yesyesyes, Eddie," you cried out, your hips lifting from the floor, in search of that full feeling again. "Can't wait to be cock-drunk on y-"

"Eddie!" Jeff and Gareth called out as they entered the building again.

Eddie's hand flew to your mouth, giving you an expression of seriousness. He bent down, leaving a ghost of a kiss on the shell of your ear. "Wouldn't want anyone to hear those noises you reserved for me, now, would we?" he whispered.

Your eyes widened, but you nodded in response. Your hands landed on his chest, softly running your fingertips over his nipples. Two can play at that game, Munson. His head fell back as he let out a silent, deep breath, his grasp on your hip tightening.

"Where the hell is he?" Gareth asked.

Eddie hips ground into yours, a chuckle threatening to fall from his lips. You let out a soft mmm behind his palm, your eyes nearly rolling to the back of their sockets as he wriggled inside you.

"Guys, his jacket's gone. He's probably just already left for the restaurant," Grant said, sounding the most level-headed of the three.

Eddie slammed down hard, his balls slapping against your ass, your eyes widening and your teeth grinding together. He thrusted again, hitting your G-spot, and it took all the willpower you had to not scream with pleasure.

After a moment, you heard the door close again and you waited a good thirty seconds before removing his hand from your mouth. "I hate you."

"Yeah, but you love my dick, don't you?"

He thrusted again, and he knew you were close by the way you gasped when his balls hit your ass again.

One of his hands flew to your mound, rubbing quick circles at your clit. "Come on, you know you need to."

"N-Never," you told him. "G-Gonna make you c-cum first."

"When did this become a competition, baby doll?" He quirked a brow, rubbing your clit harder.

"The second you walked in here and said you wanted to hear all the noises I could make for you."

Your veins burned with every movement, your eyes screwing tightly shut as his other hand played with your nipple. "Come on, pretty baby," he whispered. "Need to see those beautiful eyes."

You forced your eyes open as the coil in your stomach started to snap. Your pussy clenched around him, causing his dick to twitch.

"Fuck, princess," he moaned, slamming into you, "I might cum first if you keep that up."

"That's the plan," you smirked, pulling his hand away from your mound and up to your mouth, sliding his index finger through your lips. You tasted sweet on your tongue, but not nearly as sweet as you imagined he would taste.

"Uh-uh," he tutted in disapproval, removing his opposite hand from your boob and down to your clit to replace the other one.

The sounds of skin slapping against skin filled the recording booth, and you were the snap of a finger away from your orgasm. You clenched around his length again, making him groan gutturally.

"Fuck- OK, do I need to pull out?" he asked.

Your eyes widened, both from the twitch of his dick and his question. "And have my boss asking why there's a mysterious stain on the floor? I'd rather take my chances."

"Are you-"

"I'm on the pill, scout's honor."

One last roll of your hips and you both came undone. Ropes of thick cum shot through you as your walls spasmed around him, your chest heaving and dripping sweat as you chased your high.

The air was a mixture of Eddie's "fuckfuckfuck!" and your "hhnnnngggh, Eddie!" as you both came down from your highs. He slowly pulled out of you, and whimper after whimper escaped your lips. You both lay there, limp, side-by-side, the air becoming thick with heavy breaths.

After a minute or two, Eddie reached for his flannel, cleaning you up with soft circles on your core so as to not overstimulate you. When you started to wince, he cooed, "I'm sorry, doll. Gotta make sure you get all cleaned up though."

You reached down, swiping up a stray drop of his cum that had landed on your stomach. You licked it off your thumb, savoring the tiniest taste of his essence.

"Shit, you trying to make me hard all over again?" he chuckled, pulling your pants back up to your hips.

"Needed to at least see what you taste like. Since you won't let me suck you off," you pouted, eyelashes batting just like he'd talked about earlier.

"In due time, princess," he smiled, pulling his jacket on. "But I wanna taste you first."

"No fair! Why do you get to go first?" you asked, pulling your shirt back on.

He helped you up out of the floor before pulling you in for a soft, distracting kiss. His hands rested lightly on your butt, giving it a small squeeze, earning him a soft squeak from you. When he pulled away, a grin appeared on his lips, a cheeky grin. "Because I made you cum first. It's only fair I get to taste you first too. Think of it as my reward."

You rolled your eyes and scoffed, slapping a hand across his chest. "Yeah, you keep telling yourself that, Munson. But the way I saw it, it was definitely the other way around."

"Oh, you little-"

Suddenly, the door burst open again. Gareth and Jeff stood with expressions of aggravation wiped across their faces. "Where the hell have you been, Eddie?" Gareth asked, his hands tight on his waist.

Eddie grabbed your laptop bag before turning to face only you, giving you a wink. He turned back to the boys, a mischievous tone settling on his tongue. "I was just helping her move."

You swallowed hard, thinking of a cover up. Sure, that may have not sounded like an innuendo to anyone else, but it did to you. You racked your brain, searched and searched and-

"She's moving offices so I offered to help her carry some things upstairs," he said, his tone calm and even.

"Well, we've been waiting for you for like fifteen minutes. We're starving."

"You two are so stupid. You could've just grabbed something to eat without me."

With an eye roll (and some under-their-breath mutters), the two walked out of the studio for a final time, leaving you alone with Eddie once again.

"You know, doll," he said with a wink, "I'd be happy to help you move again any time you need it."

-> taglist: @rupsmorge @dungeons-are-too-cold @esoltis280 @crazyworldofsiani @mybeautifulbrowneyedboy @myosotisa

58 notes · View notes

desultory-novice · 5 months

Note

What is your opinion on the theory that void is related to kirby.

I know it's sort of an old theory, but I want to know your take/opinion on it.

Is it weird? I've found that as time goes on, I'm slightly less interested in the whole Void - Kirby connection mystery! Everyone already has their theories on it. I find I care more about Kirby and what he's doing than his origins or his species or where he came from.

I find myself hoping we never find out "where" Kirby came from, ya know? How is it supposed to change things, anyway? If we did have a single origin story for Kirby, that wouldn't answer MORE questions. That would just tell a number of people with differing theories, "Oops! We've decided to lock one of THE most flexible characters in gaming (1) down to a single identity. That means your concept of Kirby is now officially WRONG!" and my goodness, that sounds like the most un-Kirby statement I can think of!

(1) Gender, personal identity, physical form, language, even age! All these things are heavily debatable with Kirby! Anyone and everyone are supposed to be able to see themselves in Kirby. The more Kirby's existence is defined by his relationship to other characters, even Void and super popular ones like Meta Knight, the less we are able to be Kirby. (Unless you make your own custom puffball based on you, I suppose. But "having an OC" shouldn't be a necessary corollary to that statement either! You should always be able to be "Kirby.")

That tangent aside...

I did re-re-review the Void Termina pause screen lore, and when it talks about the 'countless numbers of Voids in the sky, twinkling like stars,' it is easy to imagine those as a species of Kirbys.

It's hard to be definite about it, because we have two depictions of Void post-game. One as Void as we know them. The glowing marble. The other being the fan theory that Void incarnated into Classic Kirby. Which, while a great theory, doesn't really make sense? It's not like Void goes back in time to Kirby's Dream Land...

:8-bit Green Greens starts playing: :Dess passionately ignores this:

...Okay, listen, you! Magolor being implied to have gone back in time to Kirby's Adventure for the sole purpose of watching King Deded throw bombs at Kirby so he can copy that idea for his theme park and then hop dimensions to one in which Meta Knight decides to not fail his initiative roll and single-handedly take down the HWC, facing a computer generated clone of Dark Matter just so that he can make a party favor is bad enough! Do you really want to induce a closed time-loop grandfather pardox into Kirby?!

So I tend to stick with the interpretation that post-Star Allies Void is just Void as we know them. In which case, it DOESN'T become a Kirby, it just takes after Kirby. Which is what Void does. Takes after people. Void is an emotionless mass of emotions that copies the traits of those who have the greatest influence on its awakening. It's possible the Dark Matter forms have more to do with the kind of stuff Hyness was messing around with. And didn't that one interview state that Void's similarities to Kirby are specifically a result of Kirby being there IN THAT MOMENT? Not that it was always a Kirby-like, but that Kirby arrived just in time to have a strong influence on it.

I mean, if we're going to compare Void to Kirby and say that those similarities are heavy indicators they are the same species, what about allllllllllll the other last bosses Void takes after?

It's true that Void's emulation abilities and Kirby's copy abilities do seem to pair up naturally. And they're both round. But...

Tbh, I don't know. But I am a little tired of it being treated as a given that "Kirby is Void but happy." Rather than Kirby being a member of those countless Voids in the sty, I like to think of Kirby as the progenitor of (post-game) Void and not the other way around! I think I like the idea that Kirby is the important one in this equation!

...Having said that, I will inevitably bring about The Curse (of Dess Always Being Proven Wrong About the Lore) and next game will come out proving that Kirby IS the same species as Void XD

Despite what I said above about the tired thing, I did recently look up the Pokemon Puffy Pink hack (You can find the link for it on the resulting Youtube video. Sorry, I'm in a rush or I'd get you all the link) and I thought the idea of "Void" evolving into "Kirby" when they had a maxed out happiness stat was, in fact, adorable!

Dess is not completely jaded!/lh

#Kirby #Dess Quick Ask #Dess Ramble #Void Termina #I am a little tired of the bias people show to Void and the Knights as if Star Allies was the only game in Kirby #But if you want to make your own Kirby/Knight-sona...#...I can see why hashing out the details of their species...#...is suddenly very important. My priorities are just different.

12 notes · View notes

religion-is-a-mental-illness · 4 months

Text

By: Rona Dinur

Published: Mar 20, 2023

Intersectionality is everywhere. Once inhabiting an obscure niche of legal scholarship, the claims of Kimberlé Crenshaw and other intersectional theorists about the ever-present imperative to consider the “intersecting” or “interlocking” nature of various group-based “systems of oppression” now permeates almost every policy discussion. Notions associated with intersectionality and its modes of thinking are routinely invoked by activists and politicians, who implore people to consider their “intersectional positionalities” before voicing, or even forming an opinion, about social or political matters. Even more worryingly, intersectionality has slowly but confidently expanded into the hard sciences and medicine, where it purports to provide a framework for evaluating the social impacts of scientific inquiry.

It is a curious question what led to this overwhelming success and rapid spread of intersectionality to such wide-ranging and diverse fields. Many have pointed to the religious or ritualistic character of invocations of intersectionality and other notions associated with “Critical Theories” (such as Critical Race Theory). The usefulness of such “theories”1 for various political actors—specifically, the conveniently oversimplifying framework they provide for any policy and political discussion, practically absolving policymakers of responsibility to subject their positions to nuanced evaluation—is yet another feature that has probably contributed to their intentional perpetuation. My own broader thoughts on the matter are that similar to other Marxist-oriented “Critical Theories”, what intersectionality essentially does is hijack mechanisms of social cognition that we routinely use to navigate political and social reality, making it appear much more plausible and useful than it actually is, and helping it spread unchecked in many areas.

These broader sociological and psychological stories are, however, only a part of the picture. For intersectionality often fashions itself as offering a nuanced and insightful critique of legal arrangements designed to address group-based discrimination and inequality, and exposing overlooked and underappreciated failures of the legal system on that front. Specifically, Crenshaw’s original introduction of intersectionality into legal scholarship, in the now seminal 1989 law review article, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics“, purported to offer a useful critique of the way American anti-discrimination doctrine addresses claims of discrimination brought by those that “fall at the intersections” of various social categories—most notably, Black women. Discrimination perpetrated against Black women, Crenshaw claims, does not fall neatly into either the category of race-based discrimination or into the category of gender- or sex-based discrimination employed in anti-discrimination jurisprudence. As a result of the “intersectional” nature of discrimination perpetrated against them specifically as Black women, the injustices they are subjected to remain invisible to the legal system. In Crenshaw’s own words:

“[D]ominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis. […] this single-axis framework erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination […] This [….] marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination.” (p. 140)

Of course, intersectionality doesn’t stop at this narrow legal thesis. As can be gathered even from this short quote, already in Crenshaw’s ’89 article, and even more so in the decades following its publication, intersectionality has put forward a much broader theoretical apparatus, advancing a plethora of interconnected claims about what social and political reality consists in, how it operates, and how people should engage with it to implement intersectionality in real life (“praxis”, in critical-theoretical terminology). Critics of this broader theoretical and practical agenda often shy away from examining intersectionality’s supposedly more technical-legal parts; and so, this multiply-headed structure often leads to a situation where, in a move now familiar from other areas, intersectionality is parachuted into the public realm by a battery of “experts”, giving the wider public the impression that at least some of its claims and policy recommendations are a settled matter of legal analysis or theory. In short, while it seems transparent to many commentators and members of the public that intersectionality’s broader claim cannot withstand scrutiny, it remains the popular perception that it is comfortably grounded in a valuable critique of legal matters pertaining to discrimination and inequality.

Unfortunately, this perhaps last standing bubble of credibility will have to be burst as well. Contrary to the image delivered to the public by various advocates of intersectionality, it does not have much to offer by way of a serious critique of anti-discrimination law. In fact, I’ll show that Crenshaw’s claims about the failures of anti-discrimination doctrine in addressing what she might characterize as “intersectional discrimination” cannot be substantiated, and are in some cases undermined, by the very legal cases she uses in her ’89 article to support these claims. Ipso facto, all of intersectionality’s broader theoretical claims, for instance, about the inherently “intersecting” or “interlocking” nature of “systems of oppression”, cannot be legitimately claimed to be supported by this legal critique either. More specifically, we will see that contrary to Crenshaw’s claims, courts did adequately address cases of “intersectional” discrimination (and specifically those perpetrated against Black women)—including in the legal cases she specifically mentions in the ’89 article; and that a cursory examination of the details of these cases undermines the larger thesis about the “intersecting” or “interlocking” nature of various forms of oppression.

To see all of this, we’ll have to have a brief introduction to anti-discrimination law, after which I’ll examine the cases discussed in Crenshaw’s ’89 law review article.

Background about anti-discrimination law

Anti-discrimination laws were initially developed and implemented in the United States during the 60s and 70s. Back then, the main concern of this new body of jurisprudence was eliminating discrimination against African-Americans, and expanding opportunities for the group’s members in various domains where they had been previously excluded, including employment, education, housing, and the provision of goods and services. Generally, then, legislators, policymakers, and legal practitioners had a pretty straightforward image of what wrongful discrimination looks like when anti-discrimination laws were initially introduced: employers refusing to hire African-Americans, educational institutions refusing to admit members of the group, and so on—simply because of their skin color or racial identity.

In the decades following its initial introduction, anti-discrimination jurisprudence has significantly expanded in its purview, and the doctrinal and institutional arrangements it consists in became much more extensive and complex. Its main norms (which I briefly describe below) also emigrated to many other countries and jurisdictions, where the general apparatus of anti-discrimination jurisprudence remains similar to that of the United States. All of these later developments gave rise to a host of controversies over the legitimacy and appropriate interpretation of many parts of anti-discrimination law. Luckily, however, all of these can be set aside for present purposes, as the cases discussed in Crenshaw’s article fall squarely within the bounds of traditional anti-discrimination doctrine.

Here is a description of the main norms of anti-discrimination doctrine—those that are commonly used by courts to adjudicate legal claims of discrimination. I’ll illustrate using examples from typical employment discrimination lawsuits.

In order to prevail in an employment discrimination lawsuit, claimants or plaintiffs, that is, purported victims of workplace discrimination, have to show that they have been discriminated against by the defendant—their employer or potential employer, which could be a private company, a governmental entity, etc.—by proving in court that the conditions specified by either of the following rules are satisfied.

First, claimants can show that the employer has engaged in ‘disparate treatment’ (or, outside of the U.S., direct discrimination): roughly, that the employer intentionally or explicitly treated them differently (and disadvantageously), relative to other employees, because of their membership in, say, a certain racial, ethnic, or gender-based group. A straightforward example here would be not hiring a candidate based on their skin color, not promoting members of a certain community (or allowing them only into some low-level positions), and firing someone based on their group identity. Showing this often, but not necessarily, aligns with showing that the employer is prejudiced (or a racist/sexist etc.), or that they have engaged in the intentional exclusion of members of certain groups because of things such as racial animosity. In any event, proving that the conditions specified by the “disparate treatment” rule are satisfied is often difficult, because plaintiffs don’t have direct access to the considerations that the employer acted on (or their attitudes, mental states, etc.), and those might not be transparent even after legal discovery or disclosure procedures.

A second route that claimants can take is showing discrimination based on a “disparate impact” rule (or, outside of the U.S., indirect discrimination). There is still much controversy and political turmoil surrounding this supposedly more permissive rule/route, its underlying rationales, and its legitimacy. It seems rather clear, however, that it was initially at least partially based on an evidentiary rationale, and designed to help plaintiffs overcome the difficulties with proving their complaint under the “disparate treatment” rule. The “disparate impact” rule thus maintains that, at least in some circumstances, it is enough for plaintiffs to show that a certain employment policy or practice has a disparate negative (or adverse/disadvantageous) impact on members of a certain group (relative to other groups), or that it disproportionately negatively influences them. This was meant to target those employers that, in order to avoid legal liability under the “disparate treatment” rule, refrained from openly discriminating—but instead came up with policies that, despite not containing any reference to people’s group identity, resulted in the exclusion of members of a particular group. Another general rationale underlying this rule was that of eliminating the lingering effects of past discriminatory practices (for instance, by prohibiting “last hired first fired” costumes and word-of-mouth hiring practices in certain circumstances).2

Just a few points to notice here are the following. First, anti-discrimination laws in the United States and elsewhere typically mention certain categories, many of which are commonly considered to correspond to certain social categories, or categories that are socially important in some way (whatever that means precisely): race, color, gender, ethnicity, national origin, etc. Thus, anti-discrimination norms typically prohibit discrimination—disadvantageous, differential treatment—which is based on, or somehow related to, certain types of social categorization; American anti-discrimination law also prohibits classifications that are based on such categories. So, for instance, employers can’t select employees or fire them based on their race, and can’t introduce race-based classifications into their promotion policies.

While it isn’t precisely clear what is the ground and justification for including certain categories and not others in anti-discrimination prohibitions, it seems reasonable and straightforward to suppose that those should correspond to the social categories around which there is, well, a lot of wrongful discrimination (or especially pernicious or persistent discrimination). These may differ, of course, from one society to another: in society X race may be an important category in that regard, in society Y it would be ethnicity, or culture, or language, in society Z age or marital status, and so on. Put simply, in order for anti-discrimination laws to be effective, the categories included in them should be responsive to the “social axes” along which wrongful discrimination tends to take place. To that extent, a given society’s anti-discrimination jurisprudence typically reflects the social categories or types of groupings that are significant with regard to patterns of discrimination and inequality in that particular society.

All of this highlighting is important because, as readers familiar with intersectional thought have probably already noticed, what Crenshaw makes of the categories found in anti-discrimination laws far, far exceeds their actual pragmatic role. Particularly, she supposes (without evidence) that these categories reflect some underlying, deep-seated (“dominant”) views about the nature of the corresponding social categories and groups, and the nature of social reality more broadly; on the other hand (and in a somewhat self-contradictory manner), she suggests that these categories, and the way they are employed in anti-discrimination jurisprudence, hugely influence social reality—including the way society is organized group-wise, the relationship between different social groups, and the dynamics of various social and political conflicts they are involved in (that is, way beyond what would be expected from the law’s role in preventing or mitigating discrimination). Thus, the overall trend of Crenshaw’s discussion is supposed to show that the purported lack of “intersectional analysis” in anti-discrimination law, or lack of proper appreciation of the fact that categories sometimes “intersect” to create various classificatory combinations and sub-categories, stems from the control that “dominant” ways of thinking exert over our understanding of social reality; and that the same absence of “intersectional analysis” in anti-discrimination law somehow hugely negatively influences the lives of “intersectional” groups, and is a general destructive force in the various legal, social, and political struggles that are meant to improve their situation relative to the “intersecting” or “interlocking” oppressions they are supposedly subjected to.3

But it’s important to get things straight: legal categories, including those that are used in anti-discrimination laws, are just that—pragmatic tools that are meant to achieve certain aims. Of course, these can have all kinds of connections to reality, and to people’s beliefs, attitudes, or cultures (dominant or otherwise); similarly, the way certain categories are used in the adjudication of legal matters can influence people’s lives in all kinds of ways. However, the presupposition that legal categories are solely a reflection of the “dominant culture”, and that they, in turn, “structure” both the (immensely complex and highly distributed!) legal practice and the extra-legal reality in some unmediated way is, of course, just a tenet of the intersectional critical-theoretical dogma that no one should feel compelled to accept. In reality, there is no reason to suppose that the categories included in anti-discrimination laws, and the way they are employed in the adjudication of various legal matters, reflect anything particularly profound other than the need to address certain forms of discrimination. Neither there is a reason to presuppose a tight relationship between these categories—and whether or not they do, or should, “intersect”—and the nature of social reality; particularly, whether or not different forms of oppression “intersect” or “interlock” to generate more severe forms of oppression.4

Setting aside these various implausible presuppositions, and the article’s conflation of legal categories, social categories, social groups, and things such as oppression and disadvantage—and what it would mean for any of these different things to “intersect” or “interlock”—we can now examine Crenshaw’s more narrow legal claims, and the legal cases she uses to support them.

Intersectionality’s claims about anti-discrimination law, and the legal cases used to support them

Here is, in some more detail, what Crenshaw says about anti-discrimination law.

First, she assumes that there is a “tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”5 (p. 139)

She then says:

“[…] I want to examine how this tendency is perpetuated by a single-axis framework that is dominant in antidiscrimination law […] I will […] contrast the multidimensionality of Black women’s experience with the single-axis analysis that distorts these experiences. […] this juxtaposition reveal[s] how Black women are theoretically erased […] this single-axis framework erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification, and remediation of race and sex discrimination” (pp. 139-140; emphases mine).

She then turns to examine the “doctrinal manifestations of this single-axis framework” (140), that is, the legal cases where the supposed lack of “intersectional” analysis is manifested, and unfairly influences courts’ evaluation of discrimination claims brought by Black female plaintiffs. She concludes this investigation with the following remarks:

“[…] the continued insistence that Black women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be addressed. […] DeGraffenreid, Moore and Travenol [the legal cases discussed below] are doctrinal manifestations of a common political approach to discrimination which operates to marginalize Black women. […] Notions of what constitutes race and sex discrimination are […] narrowly tailored to embrace only a small set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against Black women.” (pp. 149-151; emphases mine).

Based on these legal-doctrinal points, she also argues that the tendency to conceptualize discrimination as a “single-axis” phenomenon blinds us to the nature and mechanisms of social injustices that black women suffer from:

“[…] dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis. […] Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated. […] Unable to grasp the importance of Black women’s intersectional experiences, not only courts, but feminist and civil rights thinkers as well have treated Black women in ways that deny […] the unique compoundedeness of their situation […] [A]cceptance of the dominant framework of discrimination […] not only marginalizes Black women within the very movements that claim them as part of their constituency but it also makes the illusive goal of ending racism and patriarchy even more difficult to attain.” (pp. 140, 150, 152; emphases mine).

Roughly, what can be gathered from this are the following claims:

Anti-discrimination jurisprudence operates within a rigid framework, that systematically ignores justified discrimination claims brought by claimants who have been discriminated against on account of their membership in some group that is defined “intersectionally”: for instance, on account of being a black female (as opposed to on account of being black alone, and as opposed to on account of being female alone).(To clarify: one can obviously bring separate legal claims, according to which they have been discriminated against—by two or more separate policies, or by a single policy—based on their race alone, and based on their gender/sex alone. Crenshaw’s complaint is that one can’t bring a claim that they have been discriminated against on account of being, for instance, a Black female in particular, that is, based on the intersection of one’s racial and gender/sex categories. However, these two separate things are not always clearly distinguished throughout the article).

From this particular “intersecting” nature of categories of discrimination, or from the need to acknowledge discrimination claims brought by victims of discrimination that is based on the intersection of two or more categories (for instance, Black females), we can conclude that patterns of discrimination, oppression, subordination, or disadvantage always “intersect” or “interlock” to generate qualitatively different and more severe (“compounded”) forms of discrimination, oppression, subordination, or disadvantage against those occupying the “intersection” of social categories.(As noted above, this jump from the doctrinal critique to those broader claims doesn’t make much sense anyway. But in line with this essay’s purpose, I’ll focus here on showing that these broader claims can’t be supported by the legal analysis offered in the paper).

So, can any of these claims be supported by an examination of the actual legal analysis conducted in the legal cases Crenshaw mentions in the article? Let’s check each of them separately.

Lack of adequate “intersectional” analysis (or treating race and sex as “mutually exclusive categories”) in anti-discrimination law? Lack of acknowledgment of claimants that have been discriminated against as Black females in particular?

Crenshaw directly examines three legal cases in the article. Most of the discrimination claims discussed in those cases were brought by black women, and directed at an employer’s general policies (and not at a single action or decision the employer made). These claims were evaluated, for the most part, based on the “disparate impact” rule discussed above, where plaintiffs have to show that the employer’s policies have a disproportionate disadvantageous impact on members of a certain group. Plaintiffs commonly attempt to show that by presenting data (statistical and otherwise) pertaining to the demographic makeup of a company’s employees, employment candidates, and so on, which indicates serious disproportionality between relevant comparison groups—for instance, indicating that a disproportionate number of Black employment candidates were rejected relative to the makeup of the general candidate pool, or that a disproportionate number of women were laid-off, relative to their share among the company’s employees (some other examples are discussed below).6

Introducing “intersectional” discrimination claims into this typical legal structure has several important implications, some of which are quite complex (and, accordingly, courts’ discussion in some of the cases is quite long and complex). What’s most important to notice is that lawsuits that are structured along these lines typically bring out (at least!) three distinct legal matters or questions where intersectionality may potentially be invoked, or where it appears relevant. Let’s briefly brush over them, so readers can get a sense of the complexity of the topic.

The first matter is the most basic: what is the nature of the legal discrimination claim? Is it a “single-axis” claim (e.g., I have been discriminated against on account of being a woman, or on account of being black), or a “multiple-axes”, “intersectional” claim (e.g., I have been discriminated against on account of being a black woman in particular)? Should plaintiffs be allowed to bring both types of claims in a single proceeding, and pick-and-choose the type of claim that best promotes their interests? (It is not necessarily the case that an “intersectional” claim is the stronger or more beneficial one for the plaintiff. This would vary depending on the circumstances).

Second, how should the data about the company’s demographic makeup be used when the claim is “intersectional”? That is, should the data be used or evaluated “intersectionally”, and in what way? The many questions that may arise here include, for instance, should the court evaluate a discrimination claim based on a “single-axis” breakdown of the relevant data? Or should it evaluate the data based on a breakdown that pertains also to a combination of identity factors, e.g., use separate statistics about black women, black men, white women, and white men? If a plaintiff advances an “intersectional” claim, is it okay to use both types of breakdowns—or are the two probative tactics mutually exclusive? What happens if the myriad of ways in which a certain data set may be broken down don’t align with the same legal conclusion, especially when several of the employer’s policies are evaluated?

Third, as we will see below, in claims directed at an employer’s general policies, that is, ones that influence a large number of the company’s employees or employment candidates, the trial is sometimes conducted as a class action, where one or several claimants/plaintiffs are officially certified to represent the larger group (or class) of the policy’s purported victims/plaintiffs. This raises a slew of serious legal questions and difficulties, because there are many potentially conflicting interests within the group of plaintiffs (and specifically between different sub-groups), as well as between the group and the class representative; also, anyone who is included in the officially certified class of plaintiffs is bound by the court’s decision, and so it is imperative to ensure that their interests are duly represented in the proceeding. Particularly relevant for examining “intersectional” discrimination claims are the following difficulties: can/should a plaintiff accusing an employer of “intersectional” discrimination be a representative of the classes of employees defined by the constituents of the plaintiff’s intersectional identity? For example, should a black woman suing for discrimination on account of being a black woman be allowed to represent all blacks, and all women, even those who are not “intersectional”? Or, alternatively, just all blacks but not all women? What happens, for instance, if some of the employer’s policies affect all women, but others affect only black women? And so on.7

These are all important and complex legal questions, with potentially major and wide-ranging consequences for the protection of people’s legal rights against discrimination (especially those of disadvantaged and multiply-disadvantaged groups!). More generally, it is apparent even upon a superficial examination that introducing “intersectionality” into anti-discrimination doctrine will have different manifestations or applications with regard to each of the three legal matters mentioned above (and there are probably other legal matters where an “intersectional analysis” might have yet other implications).

Nevertheless, Crenshaw doesn’t even explicitly make the distinction between these different legal matters, and does not attempt to address the many difficulties and open questions that would arise with regard to each of them. Instead, she simply mounts the general accusation that the legal system exhibits a complete lack of “intersectional analysis”. A brief examination of two of the three cases mentioned in the ’89 article reveals, however, that contrary to this blanket accusation, courts did engage in an “intersectional analysis” (and quite a nuanced one) across all of the legal matters mentioned above (I’ll get to the third case below8).

In Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,9 a black female employee of a large helicopter manufacturer claimed that the company had discriminated against black females in particular (and not white females or black males, p. 480) in promotions and selection for supervisory and upper-level positions, and filed her complaint on behalf of black female employees (not all blacks or all female employees; p. 478). In the evidence educed to support her claims, she provided an “intersectional” breakdown of the percentages of white males, white females, black males, and black females at every level of employment (higher and supervisory levels vs. lower levels), and the Court discusses at length whether the higher concentration of Black females at lower-level positions indicates discrimination. Moore’s claims were ultimately rejected, because she failed to show that the black women employed at the company qualified for promotion, or that the company’s hiring practices had a disparate impact on black women (pp. 479, 484-486, and footnote 9 of the Court’s decision).

In a second case, Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,10 three black women filed a complaint against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, claiming that the company’s educational requirements in hiring, its layoff policies, and its various methods of assigning employees to different types of positions led to both race- and sex-discrimination (pp. 251-253 of the Trial Court’s decision). Here, then, the complaint itself was not put forward as an “intersectional” one. However, as in Moore, the plaintiffs were certified to represent only black female employees and applicants for employment at the company, indicating that the question at hand was whether and how the company’s policies influenced them in particular (p. 253). When it came to evaluating the complaint, this was at least partially done in a way that aligns with an “intersectional” analysis. Thus, at several points where this is relevant, the Court evaluates the effects of the company’s educational requirements on hiring black females in particular, by examining statistics relating to the educational attainments of the general population in the relevant geographical area, broken down by the combination of sex and race (e.g., the percentages of black females, black males, white males, and white females in the area who have completed 9 or 12 years of education). The Court also compares figures relating to the demographic makeup of the company’s personnel at various positions, again broken down by the combination of race and sex (pp. 255, 257-260, 264 of the Trial Court’s decision). Similarly, the Court of Appeals11 reviews the relevant data, broken down in the same way (820-821, and 828, footnote 41 of the Court of Appeals decision). It was ultimately found that the company’s policies led to widespread discrimination, based in part on this “intersectional” evaluation of the data.

Further, in reviewing the Trial Court’s decision in the same case, the Court of Appeals devotes special attention to the question of class representation arising in connection with “intersectional” discrimination claims. It notes that various “intersectional” groups of claimants may have conflicting interests in pursuing such lawsuits, and determines that in this particular case there is such a conflict between black males and black females, and so that the black female class representative should not be certified to represent black males (pp. 809-812, 832-833; essentially, the two groups were competing for the same positions). In its general discussion of this point, the Court of Appeals engages in quite a sophisticated analysis of the inter-group dynamics that might accompany “intersectional” discrimination proceedings, and the legal difficulties this might create:

“[T]he court must examine the interlacing allegations of race and sex discrimination to determine whether an actual conflict exists. For example, if a black female argues that the employer favors white males to the detriment of both females and blacks, there is no inherent obstacle to her representation of both groups. […] In this case, however, the district court found an actual conflict of interests […] Black males are entitled to a class representative who is free from a desire to prove a claim that will impair their interests.” (p. 811 of the Court of Appeal’s decision).

Ignoring this straightforwardly “intersectional” analysis, Crenshaw doesn’t acknowledge the legal difficulties noted here and the Court’s attempt to address them—difficulties which are, in some circumstances, inherent to the “intersectional” nature of the claim. Instead, she rebukes the courts for not allowing black women, who claim that discrimination has been perpetrated against them as such, to represent black men as well—hence suggesting, in effect, to expose the latter to a variety of potential risks to their legal rights stemming from lack of proper legal representation.12

Let’s now turn to the third case, DeGraffenreid v. General Motors,13 where several black female employees of General Motors claimed that the company’s “last hired-first fired” layoff policies discriminated against black women. This case is mentioned first in Crenshaw’s discussion, and the article’s legacy is often associated with its critique. Here are some quotes from the Court’s decision, which are most commonly identified with Crenshaw’s claims about lack of “intersectional analysis”:

“The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have been discriminated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new ‘super-remedy’ which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both […] The prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora’s box.” (pp. 143, 145 of the Court’s decision; pp. 141-142 of the article).

The Court here explicitly rejects the legal possibility of submitting “intersectional” discrimination claims (in evaluating that decision, readers should keep in mind the various complexities and difficulties briefly discussed above14). However, as we have seen, courts in the two other legal cases mentioned in the article did not explicitly reject this possibility, and much of the legal analysis in these cases amounts, in effect, to its implicit endorsement.

Moreover, putting forth the DeGraffenreid decision as representative of the “dominant” view in anti-discrimination doctrine is highly misleading. In fact, at the time of writing the article, another decision—in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Association15—had already explicitly endorsed “intersectional” discrimination claims brought specifically by black women, acknowledging that they can be discriminated against particularly as black women. The ruling is mentioned by the Payne v. Travenol court as the controlling precedent, and by Crenshaw in a footnote (footnote 13, p. 143). Here is the Court of Appeals in Payne v. Travenol:

“In Jefferies we held that a black female plaintiff is entitled to prove that she suffered discrimination as a black female, even if the employer did not discriminate against either blacks as a class or females as a class.” (pp. 822-823 of the Court of Appeal’s decision; emphasis mine).

Furthermore, contrary to Crenshaw’s claims, the Jefferies court notes that special attention should be devoted to understanding and evaluating the specific mechanisms and dynamics that such discrimination may involve, and to finding adequate ways of addressing them. Here are some quotes (“Title VII” refers to the part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employment discrimination):

“The essence of Jefferies’ argument is that an employer should not escape from liability for discrimination against black females by a showing that it does not discriminate against blacks and that it does not discriminate against females. We agree that discrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.”

“Black females represent a significant percentage of the active or potentially active labor force. In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide protection against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate and distinct from the class of women and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result which leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.”

“It is clear from the foregoing cases that an employer may not single out black women for discriminatory treatment. […] Recognition of black females as a distinct protected subgroup […] is the only way to identify and remedy discrimination directed toward black females. Therefore, we hold that when a Title VII plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against black females, the fact that black males and white females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant […].”

(pp. 1032-1034; emphases mine).

It is worth contrasting these quotes with some of Crenshaw’s sweeping allegations:

“[…] the boundaries of sex and race discrimination doctrine are defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences. Under this view, Black women are protected only to the extent that their experiences coincide with those of either of the two groups. Where their experiences are distinct, Black women can expect little protection […]” (p. 143 of the article; emphasis mine).

And, again:

“Notions of what constitutes race and sex discrimination are […] narrowly tailored to embrace only a small set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against Black women.” (151; emphasis mine)

As readers can now fully appreciate, these allegations are patently false.

Intersecting oppressions, subordination, or disadvantage?

As mentioned above, there is no reason to suppose that claims about the way legal categories intersect, or should intersect, to create various “multiple-axes” categories—even if those are useful for the pragmatic aim of adequately adjudicating claims of discrimination in legal proceedings—should tell us much about the nature of things such as social groups (specifically, whether and how they “intersect” to create new socially significant subgroups), the experiences of group members (for instance, whether the experiences of black women are systematically different to those of black men), and the nature of things such as oppression or subordination.

Specifically, it is important to highlight that despite the general trend of Crenshaw’s article—where broad claims about the nature of oppression, disadvantage, etc., are made largely based on (purported) observations about anti-discrimination doctrine—investigating what things such as oppression are, and whether or not different forms of oppression “intersect” or “interlock” to generate qualitatively different and worse (“compounded”) forms of oppression, would have to involve a substantial empirical component. And, of course, the answers to these questions could be much more nuanced than what is suggested in Crenshaw’s discussion: for instance, an “intersectional” group may be more disadvantaged relative to “non-intersectional” groups in one domain (e.g., employment), but less so in another domain (e.g., education), and so forth.

Precisely because of the nuanced and evidence-based character that such discussions should take, it is important to notice that Crenshaw’s broad claims are at least partially undermined, again, by some of the facts presented in the legal proceedings discussed above.

At a minimum, we’ve seen that one of the reasons a new “intersectional” legal claim was needed in Jefferies and DeGraffenreid—that is, the claim that black women were discriminated against as such—was precisely the fact that black men and white women were not discriminated against in these cases. In other words, the setup of the legal claim itself shows that the injustices involved (as opposed to the legal categories) did not tend to “intersect” in those cases, and the claim that discrimination directed against black women is always a “compounded” form of discrimination against blacks and against women does not sit well with them.

The assumption that disadvantages suffered by “intersectional” groups are qualitatively different and worse relative to those suffered by “non-intersectional” groups is undermined by the facts presented in Payne v. Travenol as well. One would assume that if oppression, subordination, or disadvantage necessarily compounded in the way the article suggests, black women would be more disadvantaged, or more discriminated against, relative to black men. But the statistics brought by the plaintiffs in Payne v. Travenol indicate otherwise: while black women suffered more discrimination (relative to black men) in the internal assignment policies of the company, they suffered (slightly) less discrimination as a result of the employer’s candidate screening policy. This stemmed from the fact that the company’s candidate selection criteria were based on educational attainments, and black women were (slightly) less disadvantaged (relative to black men) in that domain (pp. 259-260 of the Trial Court’s decision). Similarly, the Court of Appeals in the same case discusses findings showing that some of the company’s discriminatory policies were less disadvantageous for Black females, compared to Black males (820-821 of the Court of Appeals decision).

Conclusion

Adequately addressing problems of discrimination, inequality, and disadvantage requires a nuanced discussion of complex ethical, legal, and philosophical questions, and a sober evaluation of relevant empirical data. This is not what intersectionality has to offer. Instead, it is a display of legal megalomania: sweeping, unsubstantiated accusations relating to the entire legal system are made based on a tenuous examination of legal materials; broad, all-encompassing theoretical assertions are then put forward based on this flawed legal analysis. All the while, important legal difficulties and questions—careful examination of which is crucial for developing effective anti-discrimination measures, and for protecting people’s most cherished rights—are either ignored or misrepresented. Victims of discrimination, especially those belonging to disadvantaged and multiply-disadvantaged groups, deserve better than that.

References:

[ Linked: https://ronadinur.substack.com/i/109388855/conclusion ]

It's interesting when you find out something like this. I had understood that, for all the chaos and insanity that had ensued, intersectionality was legally a legitimate and useful legal argument. It just didn't belong being applied to the entire world, to either view everything through it or restructure everything to counter it.

And then you find out it was bogus the entire time, unnecessary, an ideological trojan horse from the very beginning and that, in effect, Kimberlé Crenshaw wasn't just an inadvertent progenitor of the current social insanity, but a liar who deliberately struck the match to set the world ablaze.

#Rona Dinur #intersectionality #Kimberle Crenshaw #Kimberlé Crenshaw #legal arguments #discrimination #megalomania #oppression #oppressed #oppressor #identity politics #woke #wokeness #wokeism #cult of woke #wokeness as religion #religion is a mental illness

5 notes · View notes