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Pierre Bourdieu et al., Richard Nice - The Logic of Practice-Stanford University Press (1992)
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Fredric Jameson - Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism -Duke University Press (1991)
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36 Critique of theoretical reason
principle, in the different areas of practice. Sometimes the anthropologist
presents as the objective principle of practice that �hich is obtained and
constructed through the work of objectification, projecting into reality
what only exists on paper; sometimes he interprets actions which, like rites
and myths, aim to act on the natural world and the social world, as if
they were operations designed to interpret them. 5 Here too, the so-called
objective relation to the object, which implies distance and externality,
comes into contradiction in a quite practical way with the practical
relationship which it has to deny in order to constitute itself and by the
same token to constitute the objective representation of practice :
'His vision [that of a simple participant in a rite] is circumscribed by
his occupancy of a particular position, or even of a set of situationally
conflicting positions, both in the persisting structure of his society, and
also in the role structure of the given ritual. Moreover, the participant is
likely to be governed in his actions by a number of interests, purposes,
and sentiments, dependent upon his specific position, which impair his
understanding of the total situation. An even more serious obstacle against
his achieving objectivity is the fact that he tends to regard as axiomatic
and primary the ideals, values, and norms that are overtly expressed or
symbolized in the ritual. . . . What is meaningless for an actor playing a
specific role may well be highly significant for an observer and analyst of
the total system' (V. Turner 1967: 67).
Only by means of a break with the theoretical vision, which is experienced
as a break with ordinary vision, can the observer take account, in his
description of ritual practice, of the fact of participation (and consequently
of his own separation from this) ; only a critical awareness of the limits
implied in the conditions of production of theory can enable him to include
in the complete theory of ritual practice properties as essential to it as the
partial, self-interested character of practical knowledge or the discrepancy
between the practically experienced reasons and the 'objective' reasons of
practice. But the triumphaliJill of theoretical reason is paid for in its
inability, from the very beg�nning, to move beyond simple recording of
the duality of the paths of knowledge, the path of appearances and the
path of truth, doxa and episteme, common sense and science, and its
incapacity to win for science the truth of what science is constructed
against.
Projecting into the perception of the social world the unthought content
inherent in his position in that world, that is, the monopoly of 'thought'
which he is granted de facto by the social division of labour and which
leads him to identify the work of thought with an effort of expression and
verbalization in speech or writing - 'thought and expression are constituted
simultaneously', said Merleau-Ponty - the 'thinker' betrays his secret
conviction that action is fully performed only when it is understood,
interpreted, expressed, by identifying the implicit with the unthought and
by denying the status of authentic thought to the tacit and practical thought
that is inherent in all 'sensible' action.6 Language spontaneously becomes
the accomplice of this hermeneutic philosophy which leads one to conceive
Objectification objectified 37
action as something to be deciphered, when it leads one to say, for example,
that a gesture or ritual act expresses something, rather than saying, quite
simply, that it is 'sensible' (sense) or, as in English, that it 'makes' sense.
No doubt because they know and recognize no other thought than the
thought of the 'thinker', and cannot grant human dignity without granting
what seems to be constitutive of that dignity, anthropologists have never
known how to rescue the people they were studying from the barbarism
of pre-logic except by identifying them with the most prestigious of their
colleagues - logicians or philosophers (I am thinking of the famous title,
'The primitive as philosopher'). As Hocart (1970, 32) puts it, 'Long ago
[man] ceased merely to live and started to think how he lived; he ceased
merely to feel life : he conceived it. Out of all the phenomena contributing
to life he formed a concept of life, fertility, prosperity, and vitality. ' Claude
Levi-Strauss does just the same when he confers on myth the task of
resolving logical problems, of expressing, mediating and masking social
contradictions - mainly in some earlier analyses, such 'La geste d' Asdiwal'
(1958) - or when he makes it one of the sites where, like Reason in history
according to Hegel, the universal Mind thinks itself, 7 thereby offering for
observation 'the universal laws which govern the unconscious activities of
the mind' (1951).
The indeterminacy surrounding the relationship between the observer's
viewpoint and that of the agents is reflected in the indeterminacy of the
relationship between the constructs (diagrams or discourses) that the
observer produces to account for practices, and these practices themselves.
This uncertainty is intensified by the interferences of the native discourse
aimed at expressing or regulating practice - customary rules, official
theories, sayings, proverbs, etc. - and by the effects of the mode of thought
that is expressed in it. Simply by leaving untouched the question of the
principle of production of the regularities that he records and giving free
rein to the 'mythopoeic' power of language, which, as Wittgenstein pointed
out, constantly slips from the substantive to the substance, objectivist
discourse tends to constitute the model constructed to account for practices
as a power really capable of determining them. Reifying abstractions (in
sentences like 'culture determines the age of weaning'), it treats its
. ' 1 " " ' 1 1 " d f d constructions - cu ture , structures , socia c asses or mo es 0 pro uc-
tion' - as realities endowed with a social efficacy. Alternatively, giving
concepts the power to act in history as the words that designate them act
in the sentences of historical narrative, it personifies collectives and makes
them subjects responsible for historical actions (in sentences like 'the
bourgeoisie thinks that . . . ' or 'the working class refuses to accept
. . . ') . 8 And, when the question cannot be avoided, it preserves appearances
by resorting to systematically ambiguous notions, as linguists say of
sentences whose representative content varies systematically with the
context of use.
Thus the notion of the rule which can refer indifferently to the regularity
immanent in practices (a statistical correlation, for ex amp-Ie ), the model
constructed by science to account for it, or the norm consciously posited
38 Critique of theoretical reason
and respected by the agents, allows a fictitious reconciliation of mutually
contradictory theories of action. I am thinking, of course, of Chomsky,
who (in different contexts) describes grammatical rules as instruments of
description of language ; as systems of norms of which speakers have a
certain knowledge; and finally as neuro-physiological mechanisms ('A
person who knows a language has represented in his brain some very
abstract system of underlying structures along with an abstract system of
rules that determine, by free iteration, an infinite range of sound-meaning
correspondences' ( 1 967)). But it is also instructive to re-read a paragraph
from the preface to the second edition of The Elementary Structures of
Kinship, in which one may assume that particular care has been taken with
the vocabulary of norms, models or rules, since the passage deals with the
distinction between 'preferential systems' and 'prescriptive systems' :
'Conversely, a system which recommends marriage with the mother's
brother's daughter may be called prescriptive even if the rule is seldom
observed, since it says what must be done. The question of how far and
in what proportion the members of a given society respect the norm is
very interesting, but a different question to that of where this society
should properly be placed in a typology. It is sufficient to acknowledge
the likelihood that awareness of the rule inflects choices ever so little in
the prescribed directions, and that the percentage of conventional marriages
is higher than would be the case if marriages "jere made at random, to be
able to recognize what might be called a maH'ilateral operator at work in
this society and acting as a pilot: certain alliances at least follow the path
which- it charts out for them, and this suffices to imprint a specific curve
in the genealogical space. No doubt there will be not j ust one curve but
a great number of local curves, merely incipient for the most part, however,
and forming closed cycles only in rare and exceptional cases. But the
structural outlines which emerge here and there will be enough for the
system to be used in making a probabilistic version of more rigid systems,
the notion of which is completely theoretical and in which marriage would
conform rigorously to any rule the social group pleases to enunciate' (Levi
Strauss 1969 : 33, my italics).
The dominant tonality in this passage, as in the wh()le preface, is that
of the norm, whereas Structural Anthropology is written in the language
of the model or structure ; not that such terms are entirely absent here,
since the metaphors organizing the central passage (,operator', 'curve' in
'genealogical space', 'structural outlines') imply the logic of the theoretical
model and the equivalence (which is both professed and repudiated) of the
model and the norm : 'A preferential system is prescriptive when envisaged
at the level of the model, a prescriptive system can only be preferential
when envisaged at the level of reality' ( 1 969 : 33).
But for the reader who remembers the passages in Structural A nthropology
on the relationship between language and kinship (for example, "'Kinship
systems", like "phonemic systems", are built up by the mind on the level
of unconscious thought' [Levi-Strauss 1968 : 34]) and the imperious way
in which 'cultural norms' and all the 'rationalizations' or ' secondary
Objectification objectified 39
arguments' produced by the natives were rejected in favour of the
'unconscious structures', not to mention the texts asserting the universality
of the fundamental rule of exogamy, the concessions made here to
'awareness of the rule' and the dissociation from rigid systems 'the notion
of which is entirely theoretical', may come as a surprise, as may this
further passage from the same preface : 'It is nonetheless true that the
empirical reality of so-called prescriptive systems only takes on its full
meaning when related to a theoretical model worked out by th e natives
themselves prior to ethnologists' ( 1 969: 32, my italics) ; or again :
'Those who practise them know full well that the spirit of such systems
cannot be reduced to the tautological proposition that each group obtains
its women from 'givers' and gives its women to 'takers'. They are also
aware that marriage with the matrilateral cross cousin (mother's brother's
daughter) provides the simplest illustration of the rule, the form most
likely to guarantee its survival. On the other hand, marriage with the
patrilateral cross cousin (father's sister's daughter) would violate it
irrevocably' ( 1 969 : 32, my italics).
It is tempting to quote in reply a passage in which Wittgenstein effortlessly
brings together all the questions evaded by structural anthropology and,
no doubt, more generally by all intellectualism, which transfers the objective
truth established by science into a practice that by its very essence rules
out the theoretical stance which makes it possible to establish that truth :
'What do I call ' the rule by which he proceeds'? - The hypothesis that
satifactorily describes his use of words, which we observe ; or the rule
which he looks up when he uses signs ; or the one which he gives us in
reply when we ask what his rule is ? - But if observation does not enable
us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light ? - For he
did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he understood by
'N', but he was prepared to withdraw and alter it. So how am I to
determine the rule according to which he is playing? He does not know
it himself. - Or, to ask a better question : What meaning is the expression
'the rule by which he proceeds' supposed to have left to it here ?' ( 1 963 :
38-9).
To slip from regularity, i.e. from what recurs with a certain statistically
measurable frequency and from the formula which describes it, to a
consciously laid down and consciously respected ruling (reglement), or to
unconscious regulating by a mysterious cerebral or social mechanism, are
the two commonest ways of sliding from the model of reality to the
reality of the model. In the first case, one moves from a rule which, to
take up Quine's distinction ( 1 972) between to fit and to guide, fits the
observed regularity in a purely descriptive way, to a rule that governs,
directs or orients behaviour - which presupposes that it is known and
recognized, and can therefore be stated - thereby succumbing to the most
elementary form of legalism, that variety of finalism which is perhaps the
most widespread of the spontaneous theories of practice and which consists
in proceeding as if practices had as their principle conscious obedience to
consciously devised and sanctioned rules. As Ziff puts it :
40 Critique of theoretical reason
'Consider the difference between saying "The train is regularly two
minutes late" and "As a rule, the train is two minutes late" . . . There is
the suggestion in the latter case that that the train be two minutes late is
as it were in accordance with some policy or plan . . . Rules connect with
plans or policies in a way that regularities do not . . . To argue that there
must be rules in the natural language is like arguing that roads must be
red if they correspond to red lines on a map' ( 1 960 : 38).
In the second case, one acquires the means of proceeding as if the
principle (if not the end) of the action were the theoretical model one has
to construct in order to account for it, without however falling into the
most flagrant naiveties of legalism, by setting up as the principle of practices
or institutions objectively governed by rules unknown to the agents -
significations without a signifying intention, finalities without consciously
posited ends, which are so many challenges to the old dilemma of
mechanism and finalism - an unconscious defined as a mechanical operator
of finality. Thus, discussing Durkheim's attempts to 'explain the genesis
of symbolic thought', Levi-Strauss writes :
'Modern sociologists and psychologists resolve such problems by
appealing to the unconscious activity of the mind ; but when Durkheim
was writing, psychology and modern linguistics had not yet reached their
main conclusions. This explains why Durkheim foundered in what he
regarded as an irreducible antinomy (in itself a considerable progress over
late nineteenth-century thought as exemplifi� by Spencer) : the blindness
of history and the finalism of consciousness. Between the two there is of
course the unconscious finality of the mind' ( 1 947: 527, my italics).
It is easy to imagine how minds trained to reject the naivety of finalist
explanations and the triviality of causal explanations (particularly 'vulgar'
when they invoke economic and social factors) could be fascinated by all
the mysterious teleological mechanisms, meaningful and apparently willed
products without a producer, which structuralism brought into being by
sweeping away the social conditions of production, reproduction and use
of symbolic objects in the very process in which it revealed immanent
logic. And it is also easy to understand the credit given in advance to Levi
Strauss 's attempt to move beyond the antinomy of action consciously
oriented towards rational ends and mechanical reaction to determinations
by locating finality in mechanism, with the notion of the unconscious, a
kind of Deus ex machina which is also a God in the machine. The
naturalization of finality implied in forgetting historical action, which leads
one to inscribe the ends of history in the mysteries of a Nature, through
the notion of the unconscious, no doubt enabled structural anthropology
to appear as the most natural of the social sciences and the most scientific
of the metaphysics of nature. 'As the mind is also a thing, the functioning
of this thing teaches us something about the nature of things ; even pure
reflexion is in the last analysis an internalization of the cosmos' (Levi
Strauss 1 966: 248, my italics).
One sees the oscillation, in the same sentence, between two contradictory
explanations of the postulated identity of mind and nature : an essential
i I
I
J
Objectification objectified 4 1
identity - the mind i s a thing - o r a n identity acquired through learning
- the mind is the internalization of the cosmos. The two theses, which are
merged with the help of the ambiguity of another formulation, 'an image
of the world inscribed in the architecture of the mind' ( 1 964 : 346), in any
case both exclude individual and collective history. Beneath its air of radical
materialism, this philosophy of nature is a philosophy of mind which
amounts to a form of idealism. Asserting the universality and eternity of
the logical categories that govern 'the unconscious activity of the mind',
it ignores the dialectic of social structures and structured, structuring
dispositions through which schemes of thought are formed and transformed.
These schemes - either logical categories, principles of division which,
through the principles of the division of labour, correspond to the structure
of the social world (and not the natural world), or temporal structures,
imperceptibly inculcated by 'the dull pressure of economic relations' as
Marx puts it, that is, by the system of economic and symbolic sanctions
associated with a particular position in the economic structures - are one
of the mediations through which the objective structures ultimately structure
all experience, starting with economic experience, without following the
paths of either mechanical determination or adequate consciousness.
If the dialectic of objective structures and incorporated structures which
operates in every practical action is ignored, then one necessarily falls into
the canonical dilemma, endlessly recurring in new forms in the history of
social thought, which condemns those who seek to reject subjectivism, like
the present-day structuralist readers of Marx, to fall into the fetishism of
social laws. To make transcendent entities, which are to practices as essence
to existence, out of the constructions that science resorts to in order to
give an account of the structure and meaningful products of the accumulation
of innumerable historical actions, is to reduce history to a 'process without
a subject', simply replacing the 'creative subject' of subj ectivism with an
automaton driven by the dead laws of a history of nature. This emanatist
vision, which makes a structure - Capital or a Mode of production - into
an entelechy developing itself in a process of self-realization, reduces
historical agents to the role of 'supports' (Trager) of the structure and
reduces their actions to mere epiphenomenal manifestations of the structure's
own power to develop itself and to determine and overdetermine other
structures.
2
The Imaginary Anthropology of
Subjectivism
J ean-Paul Sartre deserves credit for having given an ultra-consistent
formulation of the philosophy of action that is accepted, usually implicitly,
by those who describe practices as strategies explicitly oriented by reference
to ends explicitly defined by a free project or even, with some interactionists,
by reference to the anticipated reactions of other agents. Thus, refusing to
recognize anything resembling durable dispositions or probable eventualit
ies, Sartre makes each action a kind of antecedent-less confrontation
between the subject and the world. This is seen clearly in the passages in
Being and Nothingness where he on the awakening of revolutionary
consciousness - a 'conversion' of consciousness p roduced by a sort of
imaginary variation - the power to create the sense of the present by
creating the revolutionary future that denies it:
'It is necessary to reverse the common opinion and acknowledge that it
is not the harshness of a situation or the sufferings i t imposes that lead
people to conceive of another state of afftirs in which things would be
better for everybody. It is on the day tJiat we are able to conceive of
another state of affairs, that a new light is cast on our trouble and our
suffering and we decide that they are unbearable' (1 957: 434-5, my italics ;
cf. also 1 953).
If the world of action is nothing other than this imaginary universe of
interchangeable possibles, entirely dependent on the decrees of the
consciousness that creates it, and therefore entirely devoid of objectivity,
if it is moving because the subj ect chooses to be moved , revolting because
he chooses to be revolted, then emotions, p assions, and also actions, are
merely games of bad faith:
'It is no accident that materialism is serious ; it is no accident that it is
found at all times and places as the favourite doctrine of the revolutionary.
This is because revolutionaries are serious. They come to know themselves
fi rst in terms of the world which oppresses them . . . The serious man is
'of the world' and has no resource in himself. He does not even imagine
any longer the possibility of getting out of the world . . . he is in bad
faith' ( 1 957: 580).
The same incapacity to encounter 'seriousness' other than in the
disapproved form of the 'spirit of seriousness
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