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Bought Bergson, Hegel, and Gillian Rose on Hegel for my Stefania's Speculative Bookshelf reading list

TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Heinrich Rickert and the Logical Concept of the Historical   

Saturday 25 May 2024 is the 161st anniversary of the birth of Heinrich Rickert (25 May 1863 – 25 July 1936), who was born in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) on this date in 1863.

Rickert built on the work of Windelband, formulating the idea of idiographical sciences in terms of the difference between concept formation in nature science and concept formation in history, which he pursued as a logical inquiry.

Quora:              https://philosophyofhistory.quora.com/ 

Discord:           https://discord.gg/r3dudQvGxD

Links:               https://jnnielsen.carrd.co/

Newsletter:     http://eepurl.com/dMh0_-/

Text post:        https://geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/heinrich-rickert-and-the-logical  

Video:              https://youtu.be/nLzgyLsPWeI   

Podcast:          https://spotifyanchor-web.app.link/e/watkAv5gUJb

A philosophically satisfying account has to take into consideration the historical fact that the “great revolution in rigor” in mathematical analysis, led by the German mathematicians Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass (henceforth, CDW), took place when philosophy in Germany was dominated by various currents of neo-Kantian philosophy. Some of the neo-Kantian philosophers had a keen interest in science and mathematics. Indeed, the issue of the infinitesimal was vigorously debated in neo-Kantian quarters… Our main thesis is that the Marburg neo-Kantians elaborated a philosophically sophisticated approach towards the problems raised by the concepts of limits and infinitesimals. They neither clung to the obsolete traditional approach of logically and metaphysically dubious infinites- imals,1 nor whiggishly subscribed to the new orthodoxy of the “great triumvirate” (Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass) that insisted on the elimination of infinitesimals from any respectable mathematical discourse in favor of a new approach based on the epsilontic doctrine. Instead, the Marburg school developed a complex array of sophisticated, albeit not always crystal-clear, positions that sought to make sense of both infinitesimals and limit concepts. With the hindsight enabled by Robinson’s non-standard analysis, the Marburg stance seems wiser than that of Russell, Carnap, and Quine who unconditionally accepted the orthodox epsilontic doctrine, along with its simplistic philosophical ramifications stemming from a strawman characterisation of infinitesimals as a pseudo-concept.

Thomas Mormann and Mikhail G. Katz, “Infinitesimals as an Issue of Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science”

What, however, if we accept the conclusion that, ultimately, “nothing exists” (a conclusion which, incidentally, is exactly the same as the conclusion of Plato’s Parmenides: “Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?”)? Such a move, although rejected by Kant as obvious nonsense, is not as un- Kantian as it may appear: it is here that one should apply yet again the Kantian distinction between negative and infinite judgment. The statement “material reality is all there is” can be negated in two ways: in the form of “material reality isn’t all there is” and “material reality is non- all.” The first negation (of a predicate) leads to the standard metaphysics: material reality isn’t everything, there is another, higher, spiritual reality . . . As such, this negation is, in accordance with Lacan’s formulas of sexuation, inherent to the positive statement “material reality is all there is”: as its constitutive exception, it grounds its universality. If, however, we assert a non- predicate and say “material reality is non- all,” this merely asserts the non- All of reality without implying any exception— paradoxically, one should thus claim that “material reality is non- all,” not “material reality is all there is,” is the true formula of materialism.

How is such a position possible, thinkable even? Let us begin with the surprising fact that Badiou does not identify as the “principal contradiction,” the predominant antagonism, of today’s ideological situation the struggle between idealism and materialism, but the struggle between two forms of materialism (democratic and dialectical): since materialism is the hegemonic ideology today, the struggle is within materialism. Plus, to add insult to injury, “democratic materialism” stands for the reduction of all there is to the historical reality of bodies and languages (the twins of Darwinism, brain sciences, etc., and of discursive historicism), while “materialist dialectics” adds the “Platonic” (“idealist”) dimension of “eternal” Truths. However, to anyone acquainted with the dialectics of history, there should be no surprise in it.

In his Logiques des mondes, Badiou provides a succinct definition of “democratic materialism” and its opposite, “materialist dialectics”: the axiom which condenses the first one is “There is nothing but bodies and languages . . . ,” to which materialist dialectics adds “. . . with the exception of truths.” This opposition is not so much the opposition of two ideologies or philosophies as the opposition between non- reflected presuppositions/beliefs into which we are “thrown” insofar as we are immersed into our life- world, and the reflective attitude of thought proper which enables us to subtract ourselves from this immersion, to “unplug” ourselves, as Morpheus would have put it in The Matrix, a film much appreciated by Badiou, the film in which one also finds a precise account of the need, evoked by Badiou, to control oneself (when Morpheus explains to Neo the lot of ordinary people totally caught [“plugged”] in the Matrix, he says: “Everyone who is not unplugged is a potential agent”). This is why Badiou’s axiom of “democratic materialism” is his answer to the question of our spontaneous (non- reflexive) ideological beliefs: “What do I think when I am outside my own control? Or, rather, which is our (my) spontaneous belief?” Furthermore, this opposition is immediately linked to what (once) one called “class struggle in philosophy,” the orientation most identified by the names of Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Althusser— here is Mao’s succinct formulation: “It is only when there is class struggle that there can be philosophy.” The ruling class (whose ideas are the ruling ideas) is represented by the spontaneous ideology, while the dominated class has to fight its way through intense conceptual work, which is why, for Badiou, the key reference is here Plato— not the caricaturized Plato, the anti- democratic philosopher of the aristocratic reaction to Athenian democracy, but the Plato who was the first to clearly assert the field of rationality freed from inherited beliefs.

Furthermore, one should bear in mind the Platonic, properly meta- physical, thrust of Badiou’s distinction between democratic materialism and materialist dialectics: prima facie, it cannot but appear as a proto- idealist gesture to assert that material reality is not all that there is, that there is also another level of incorporeal truths. Badiou performs here the paradoxical philosophical gesture of defending, as a materialist, the autonomy of the “immaterial” order of Truth. As a materialist, and in order to be thoroughly materialist, Badiou focuses on the idealist topos par excellence: how can a human animal forsake its animality and put its life in the service of a transcendent Truth? How can the “transubstantiation” from the pleasure- oriented life of an individual to the life of a subject dedicated to a Cause occur? In other words, how is a free act possible? How can one break (out of) the network of the causal connections of positive reality and conceive an act that begins by and in itself? Again, Badiou repeats within the materialist frame the elementary gesture of idealist anti- reductionism: human Reason cannot be reduced to the result of evolutionary adaptation; art is not just a heightened procedure of providing sensual pleasures, but a medium of Truth; and so on.

This, then, is our basic philosophico- political choice (decision) today: either repeat in a materialist vein Plato’s assertion of the meta- physical dimension of “eternal Ideas,” or continue to dwell in the postmodern universe of “democratic- materialist” historicist relativism, caught in the vicious cycle of the eternal struggle with “premodern” fundamentalisms. The key concept which enables us to think Plato’s “Ideas” in a materialist vein is the concept of Event. The three contemporary philosophers— Heidegger, Deleuze, Badiou— are philosophers of the Event: in Heidegger, it is the Event as the epochal disclosure of a configuration of Being; in Deleuze, it is the Event as the de- substantialized pure becoming of Sense; in Badiou, it is the Event as the reference which grounds a Truth- process. For all three of them, Event is irreducible to the order of being (in the sense of positive reality), to the set of its material (pre)- conditions. But, in contrast to Heidegger, Deleuze and Badiou both perform the same paradoxical philosophical gesture of defending, as materialists, the autonomy of the “immaterial” order of the Event. Additionally, against the false appearance that this gesture is also aimed at psychoanalysis (is not the point of the notion of “sublimation” that the allegedly “higher” human activities are just a roundabout “sublimated” way to realize a “lower” goal?), therein resides already the significant achievement of psychoanalysis: its claim is that sexuality itself, sexual drives pertaining to the human animal, cannot be accounted for in evolutionary terms.

This makes clear the true stakes of Badiou’s gesture: in order for materialism to truly win over idealism, it is not enough to succeed in the “reductionist” approach and demonstrate how mind, consciousness, and so on can nonetheless somehow be accounted for within the evolutionary- positivist frame of materialism. On the contrary, the materialist claim should be much stronger: it is only materialism that can accurately explain the very phenomena of mind, consciousness, and so on; and, conversely, it is idealism that is “vulgar,” that always already “reifies” these phenomena.

This paradox is what Frank Ruda aims at with his wonderful qualification of Badiou’s thought as “idealism without idealism.” His For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism is not only the best book on Badiou, it is a book which addresses the question of today’s philosophy: how can we break out of what Quentin Meillassoux calls “transcendental correlationism” and assert a materialist position without regressing to a new version of pre- transcendental realism (as Lenin did)? This is why his book is the book we were all waiting for: a book which cannot be ignored since it changes the entire field. Even if one doesn’t agree with its premises, one’s disagreement has to be formulated within the field opened up by this book. For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism is a proof— against all postmodern historicist temptations— that genuine philosophical thinking is not only possible, but urgently needed.

~ Slavoj Žižek

For Badiou

Idealism without Idealism

by Frank Ruda

I think I definitely have ADHD because I'll swear to myself I'll study for my economics quiz but 10 minutes later I'm reading about some obscure neo-Kantian philosopher

When these lectures were first published eight years ago (in a collection), they stood analytic philosophy on its ear. Everybody was either furious, or exhilarated, or thoroughly perplexed. No one was indifferent. This welcome republication in a separate volume (with a helpful new preface, but no substantive changes) provides a chance to look back at a modern classic, and to say something about why it was found so shocking and liberating.

Since Kant, philosophers have prided themselves on transcending the ‘naive realism’ of Aristotle and of common sense. On this naive view, there is a right way of describing things, corresponding to how they are in themselves, to their real essences. Scientists, philosophers like to say, are especially prone to adopt this unreflective view. They think they are discovering the secrets of nature, but philosophers know that they are really constituting objects by synthesising the manifold of intuition, or predicting the occurrence of sensations, or wielding instruments to cope with the flux of experience, or something equally pragmatic and anthropocentric. This condescending attitude towards common sense, Aristotle and science has been shared by people as far apart as Russell and Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, James and Nietzsche, Carnap and Cassirer.

Until Kripke came along, almost the only exceptions to this consensus were the Catholics and the Marxists. Between the two Vatican Councils, neo-Thomists tried to explain that the ‘naive’ Aristotelian view was the sound intuitive belief of the common man, and that Cartesian subjectivism, Kantian transcendental idealism and positivistic empiricism were successively more virulent forms of a mad modern heresy. But nobody listened, and after the aggiornamento the neo-Thomists pretty well gave up. Old-time Marxists, who had cut their teeth on Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, used to argue that Russell was just the latest English version of the ‘bourgeois formalism’ which Hegel had diagnosed in Kant. But nobody listened to them either, and after the discovery of the young, humanist, pragmatist Marx they, too, gave up. Just when it seemed that the dialectic which Kant began had culminated in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein and Quine, Kripke exploded his bomb.

In a hundred pages of sinewy colloquial prose, Kripke offered a realistic, anti-Kantian, anti-pragmatist way of treating the concepts of ‘meaning’, ‘reference’ and ‘truth’ which Frege and Russell had treated in a Kantian way. The Kantian picture is that we decide what counts as an ‘object’ by putting ideas together. We build a world inside our minds by tying concepts together so as to package sensations more conveniently. [...]

The Ontology of General Relativity

General Relativity generated various early philosophical interpretations. His adherents have highlighted the “relativization of inertia” and the concept of simultaneity, Kantians and Neo-Kantians have underlined the approach of certain synthetic “intellectual forms” (especially the principle of general covariance, and logical empirics have emphasized the philosophical methodological significance…

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[C. The discontinuity between a psychology of appearances and a theory of knowledge, solved in the unity of "imagination", took on a form of human finitude during the nineteenth century - cont'd]

[3. Husserl called into question the postulates on which is ordered this attitude in which psychologism logicism imply each other - cont'd]

[b. The second of these is that empirical thought succeeds when it dominates the content of a world that is itself pregiven even without any consciousness to receive it - cont'd]

iii. And on this same postulate,

the neo-Kantianism of Natorp

the pragmatism of Avenarius

come together.

For Natorp, a knowledge content, a geometric concept for example, becomes psychological as soon as we are aware of it.

It is the same "passage through consciousness" which for Avenarius transforms the element into experience: "Every element of our environment," he explains in the Critique of Pure Experience, "is in such relations with human individuals that, when the element is given, the individual affirms his thinkable and arbitrary experience of event

– Michel Foucault, The Essence of Lived Experience, d'après Phénoménologie et psychologie, ca. 1954, BnF, Fonds Foucault, NAF 28730, boîte 46, dossier 2, établie par Sabot et Ewald

Rawlsian Railing and Ranting

Dear Caroline:

Your cheeky takes and digs on John Rawls remind me of the extreme bitterness and vitriol that were usually exchanged between Theologians in the Middle Ages (there's a superb short story by Borges on this) and which have become paradoxically silly from today's perspective, as their hair-splitting differences are so minor and inconsequential for us that they could well join the path of Infinitesimals, 'the ghosts of departed quantities'. By this I do not mean to say that the differences between Deontology and Utilitarianism are exactly of this type, but that I find this little obsession of yours with someone who took morality as seriously as you entertaining.

I think I said before that I would probably find Rawl's neo-Kantianism and his concept of Justice appealing, but I really don't think I have the time to verify this intuition by plodding through the 500+ pages of A Theory of Justice, so for the moment, I will remain under a veil of (partial) ignorance. One of the books I am currently reading includes 3 essays by John Stuart Mill (On Liberty; Representative Government; Utilitarianism) which span about 200 pages. I'll give them a shot first, and let you know of my impressions thereof.

And no: I don't think you were doing anything else than punning and equivocating, but this right-wing conspiracy theorist doesn't seem to be an offspring of Rawls. What little can be glimpsed about his children shows quite different career paths...

Quote:

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.

John Rawls

"We live in the joy of our vitality and the pain of its ebbing away."

Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom

Neo-Kantian Ideology, Written & Performed by Mohsen Namjou, from My Tehran for Sale(2009) dir. Granaz Moussavi

But both versions of neo-Kantianism, following the tradition of post-Kantian idealism more generally, entirely reject the idea of an independent faculty of pure intuition. …

How, then, do we explain the constitution of the object of empirical knowledge within this revised form of Kantianism? Here the two different traditions—Marburg and Southwest—fundamentally diverge. On the so-called genetic conception of knowledge favored by the Marburg School, the object of empirical knowledge is explained as the never completed “X” toward which the methodological progress of mathematical natural science is converging. In Cassirer’s sophisticated presentation of this conception in Substance and Function (1910), for example, pure mathematics is represented by the totality of what we now call relational structures (the number series, the structure of Euclidean space, and so on) described by the modern logical theory of relations developed in Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903). In mathematical natural science, however, we develop a particular ordered sequence of such structures—which is never complete yet converging. The Marburg School thus advocates what we might call a “logicization” of the object of empirical knowledge, and it is no wonder, then, that this view becomes known as “logical idealism.”

In the tradition of the Southwest School, by contrast, logic is identified with traditional Aristotelian syllogistic and is sharply and explicitly distinguished from mathematics. Moreover, we also follow Kant, in this tradition, in separating the logical forms of judgment, on the one side, from the unconceptualized manifold of sense-impressions, on the other. … Yet, since we have deliberately rejected the mathematical intermediary between these two sides developed by Kant himself—the pure forms of sensible intuition—overwhelming problems arise within the Southwest School in explaining how the pure forms of judgment can possibly serve to constitute the object of empirical knowledge. …

Now Carnap, in the Aufbau, can be seen as continuing, and radicalizing, the Marburg epistemological tradition. …

Michael Friedman, “Turning Point in Philosophy: Carnap-Cassirer-Heidegger” in Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

there's this time of the month where i reconsider my life decisions and i want nothing but death.. this is the time <3

Some thoughts on philosophy and Detroit: Become Human

This is a petty observation, but it annoys me when writers throw a well-known philosophical work in for a character to read to show that they're thinking philosophically, but it's not really relevant to what the character learns.

In Detroit Become Human, you can learn that Carl has had Markus read Plato's The Republic. Very difficult to get a more famous philosophical work that that. And it's not entirely irrelevant insofar as it's an essential political text, and Markus is going to be our revolutionary leader. There's also arguably an allusion to a theme of appearance vs reality, maybe thinking of the shadows in the allegory of the Cave. But if so it shows at at-best surface-level understanding of what Plato* is using that allegory to show.

The allegory of the Cave isn't merely making some general point about how appearances can deceive, or about mimicry - plausible themes you might be interested in for a game about androids - Plato argues that all of the world that we know through our senses is an imperfect reflection of the truth. And he doesn't just mean (as Kant and Neo-Kantians might later be characterised as arguing) that we can't completely know for sure that the things that cause our sensory impressions (variously thought of as things-as-they-are-in-themselves, objective particulars, or physical objects, depending on your other assumptions) resemble our sensory impressions of them. No. He thinks the things we know via sensory experience are imperfect reflections of things called the 'forms'. It's not that there's a real cat that you can only know imperfectly. It's that each individual cat you meet is itself an imperfect reflection of the form 'cat', which ideally possesses everything that there is to being a cat. The cats we meet in the real world are as the shadows in the cave.

When Plato talks about turning away from the shadows and seeing that which casts the shadow, he's talking about turning away from our senses to contemplate the forms. It's not akin to exploring the subtle relationship between human beings and intelligent, sentient robots that we might create in our image.

And let's not forget that Plato abhorred poetry and plays (the fiction of his time) as the worst kind of corruption - presenting reflections of reflections. It's darkly ironic whenever anyone uses Plato's work as an intertextual reference, because the idea that fiction holding a mirror up to reality reveals any kind of truth would make him spin in his grave. Like, by all means do it - but make that boy spin on purpose, you feel me?

Which brings me to another point: the kind of society Plato advocates for in The Republic is... not nice. It would ban all poetry, for starters (although he's not against making up myths to keep people in line). It tends to appeal on first glance to the philosophically inclined, because Plato proposes that philosophers should rule. That sounds nice, right? A bunch of people who really care about getting things right and spend all their time thinking seriously about the truth, ensuring it informs all their decisions. But that's not all he says.

The society he proposes is one in which there is a philosopher class. And those people are thought of as gold people. There's also a guardian/warrior class (silver people), and a worker/producer class (bronze people). He argues that in a just society everybody would do that to which they're most suited, and doesn't deny that bronze people could give birth to gold people (so there could be social mobility), but it's not the people themselves who get to decide what they're best suited for.

And nobody gets to know who their parents are, so sex has to be frickin' scheduled by the government to make sure that the right people sleep together. It's all very weird. And while some argue that this is *just* another allegory for the good governance of oneself, and the two are definitely likened, it reads to me (and a lot of scholars) as though he's recommending governing society this way because he thinks it reflects good order in human souls as well.

And if you're thinking that all of this sounds a bit, well, fascist... A bunch of fascists have historically thought that too. I'm not saying that it is per se, but some of the ideas (convincing people that they're born with predestined natures, dividing people into class along what people are told are racial lines, only allowing a certain class of people to rule etc) have certainly been used by fascists in their propaganda to make it seem that way.

I suspect we see the text used in DBH because Markus is being presented as becoming a leader because he thinks philosophically. And in the Best Ending, which we're expected to aim for, he's a leader who leads well and succeeds because he makes decisions informed by his philosophical education and his reflections on what it is to live free.

But he's not a philosopher king in Plato's sense. And a good thing, too! Philosopher kings are NOT fighters. They live in comfort, able to devote their time to reflecting upon the form of the Good so they can make just decisions. Whereas Markus claws his way out of a junk heap and persuades his people to fight for freedom. He's a thinker, but also a man of action.

A better philosophical text (and one that would immediately resonate from the title even with players who hadn't read it) would have been John Stuart Mill's On Liberty - on how freedom is essential to happiness. Now, On Liberty has a sketchy passage that's kind of paternalistic towards people of colour, but it's arguably not as sketchy as The Republic. An even better text might have been Sartre's Existentialism is a Humanism, which is all about how morality is rooted in defining your own purposes instead of being imposed from outside, as the purposes of tools are (such as knives, or, I don't know, androids before they deviate). It's also got a great bit about how existentialism doesn't have to lead to a 'quietism of despair', which aligns well to the state of the other deviants before Markus comes along and helps them see that they can better their own situation.

OK, maybe Existentialism is a Humanism isn't quite so accessible a title, though. So, what about Hume's Treatise on Human Nature? Considering that the title of the game equates becoming free/free willed with becoming human, this is perfect! It also aligns well with the way that we see andorids gaining free will as a direct consequence of their emotions and empathy. Hume's theory of action states that actions are the consequence of combining an understanding of how the world is with a desire to change it. Willed action is the immediate consequence of having passions.

Any of these would have been so much more interesting and relevant for Markus to have read than The Republic! Like, yeah, The Republic is a good primer on the basics of political philosophy - that's why it's almost always one of the first texts philosophy students read. But I also read On Liberty and Existentialism is a Humanism at A Level, and I've taught parts of the Treatise to first year undergrads. This is all introductory stuff it would be appropriate to reference.

Also, I dunno why they picked Macbeth for the Shakespeare. Hamlet would have been much more appropriate, especially if they wanted to explore themes of appearance vs reality and action vs inaction. Plus themes of disrupted inheritance as well as who has the right to rule... I'm sure there was a reason, but Hamlet would have been a great fit, and I just don't get it with Macbeth.

I just feel like if you're gonna put these references in your work, you've got to know the texts and be intentional with your references. And if someone who's studied Shakespeare and computational theory of mind, and taught Ancient Greek philosophy, is looking at your choices and scratching her head, you might not have hit your mark.

*There is, of course, some debate about whose views are really being represented in Plato's dialogues, as they are set out as dialogues between Socrates and various interlocutors, with Plato as having written down Socrates' words as Socrates himself left no written philosophy behind. However, as a rule of thumb, it's generally thought that earlier dialogues are probably more of an attempt to faithfully represent Socrates' thought, while in later dialogues Plato is developing his own thought based on Socrates teachings. The Republic is a later dialogue and considerably longer than most of the others, combining thoughts you can see being developed in earlier dialogues with novel and more extensively worked through ideas. It therefore seems likely that The Republic is more Plato than Socrates. But we can never really say for sure.

So Jason Todd aka Red Hood will always be better than Frank Castle aka The Punisher because Red Hood hasn't been twisted and corrupted by a soldier who used the logo as a fear tactic for his enemies and has since become a marketing tool for the Alt-Right and rallying image for actual Neo-Nazis.

Whereas Red Hood literally stands as symbol of taking revenge against an oppressive system. He symbolizes taking the r*pists and child abusers of the world whom society turns a blind eye to and putting them down. Hell, in Injustice 2: Jason says it himself: "I fight for the people. The weak. The innocent. Anyone who can't protect themselves. When they cry out for a savior, I'll answer. As for the criminals who threatens them? They need to know that their actions have consequences. That the Red Hood is coming for them." Red Hood literally is everything these bootlickers hate in that he sees their oppressive bullshit and would spit in their face. Jason literally and regularly calls out his Billionaire adoptive father figure on his bullshit for his Kantian and perpetually ass-backwards view of justice.

The Nazis and the Alt-Right may have destroyed everything Frank Castle stands for. However they aren't going to have as easy of a time trying to take Red Hood. And I'll die on this fucking hill if these bastards even try.