#undisposable
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SONGS THAT MAKE ME EMO ABOUT ELVIS
(a continuously updating list)
(was on a road trip driving with others and I decided to skip one of El's songs because I didn't want to annoy the people in the car with too much Elvis...so have decided to retaliate by making me sad. I don't think he was mad about it, but it really hit. A favorite song part of the tapestry of childhood memories El has reconnected me to.)
(such a lovely song, I think the lyrics say it all and the live version resonates so much more with those lyrics and the story they tell)
(several points in this song made me think of Elvis, then towards the end he's mentioned by name and I was shook. I cannot tell you the amount of times I've listened and sang along with this song. Sang those lyrics and never really stopped to feel their meaning.)
(I can't not cry at this song. It breaks my heart and crushes all the pieces thinking of Chester, my brother whose favorite band growing up was LP, and now Elvis. Beyond the song and the lyrics and the story, this to me is a reminder of the endless connections of commonality all of us share no matter the time or place we were born, or the life we led.)
#ok thats enough emo for today#i just woke up its too early for this#but these songs were haunting me during the ladt leg of the drive after i stopped playing elvis#hes given me space during this trip and whole holiday w my family. and i respect him for it. but i miss him.#and even just a few hrs not listening to him my anxiety started climbing. hes really made himself undisposable to me 😅#elvis#elvis presley#elvis music#sad elvis hours#music#music playlist#sad music#emo hours#emo about elvis#Spotify
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❛❛ you could actually initiate. ❜❜ the first son of the united states challenges, ignoring that she had in her own way. ❛❛ so, should i be wearing a return to callie if found sign? because that can be very much arranged, sweetheart. ❜❜ alexander’s teasing tongue runs on its own accord, expertly hiding the warmth that had enveloped his being. he had been to a plethora of these events, yet, his heart still raced like it had the first time. he felt judged and exposed, as if everyone was waiting for him to screw up. he flexes his fingers, lifting his hand to take hers. an exhale leaves him, as if he had been holding his breath, and now he is finally allowed to breathe. going big instead of home, alex threads his fingers through callie’s; a pleased sound escapes him as his brain slows down, brown eyes lifting to lock on her features as he falls into step beside her. he has his own person, does he not? yes, he has june and nora, but they always chose each other.
‹ ♥ › @undispose: hold my hand, i don’t want to lose track of you.
and now he has his own person. he pulls callie closer into his side, mumbling, ❛❛ maybe i don’t want to lose track of you either. ❜❜ as if holding hands was not enough! he purposefully and successfully ignores the warning in his head: this would show up all over the news the next morning. the public would be speculating and inquiring — was agcd seeing someone new? a radiant smile, eyebrow arching as he continues to look at callie. ❛❛ you know, this is giving them a lot to talk about. ❜❜ and alex fails to care, instead, squeezing her hand in reassurance. ❛❛ maybe we really should consider that sign. ❜❜
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Firefighter! Steve
Or
Personal Trainer! Clark
🤭
Looks like I deserved this one.
Work It Out
Warnings: allusions to non/dubcon, slow creep, fitness ineptitude.
Trainer!Clark Kent x short!chubby!reader
To those who read, I'd love a thot or two of what you think!
You feel ridiculous. Any regular could likely tell that your leggings were fresh off the rack, that you're chafing in your sports bra, and that the mesh top isn't exactly typical of your wardrobe. The sharp squeak of your sneakers on the mats betray their newness as you cross your arms and look around, trying to shield yourself from judgement.
You untuck your phone from the top of your leggings and see the notification you left undisposed. 'Your trainer will meet you in Area 2B.' You look up and reread the large white letters stenciled onto the painted cement. Yeah, where the hell is she? You want to get this done and over with.
You keep one arm over your middle as you scratch your neck, already sweating. The anxiety alone has your heart pumping. You could just stay home and find some Youtube video to follow along with. Or maybe you should just invest in a Peleton.
You turn listlessly as you grip your phone, eyeing the racks of weight from baby-sized to shoulder-dislocating. What kind of masochist lifts those blocky atrocities? You'll stick to the small ones. Maybe they have something less than a pound.
A pert blonde grips the rails of a step machine as she climbs, her pony tail wagging back and forth with her efforts. Her cheeks are flushed but she's not slowing down. You can't imagine you could do it for more than a minute. Exactly why you wanted a trainer to act as a safety net between you and your own ignorance.
You shift on your heel as you sense movement but disappointment once more has you looking away. It's not your trainer. The guy could probably show you a thing or two, given his bulging arms and the weight belt around his stomach, but no, Melody is late and you're starting to get annoyed. You paid extra just so you didn't die in a treadmill accident and now you're here, eyes popping like a deranged bird as you quork at every noise.
"Excuse me," the deep voice startles you as you consider hitting cancel on the app and fleeing for your life.
You turn and face the man. He's even bigger closer up. His dark hair curls are swiped away from his forehead, and his bright eyes beam down at you as he holds a large reuseable water bottle from a single finger. The cleft in his chin makes it seem that even his face is padded with muscle.
"Oh, am I in your way?" You realise you're hanging out in front of the dumb bells.
"No, uh, you don't happen to be..." he says your name and you frown.
"Yeah, that's me," you answer dumbly, "do I know you?"
"Didn't you get the notification? Melody's got an emergency so we were paired up," he says, "beginner, right?"
"That easy to guess?" You scoff, "uh, no I didn't see the message," you drop your shoulders.
"Ah, not what you expected," he gives a light chuckle, "sorry, I know I'm not as pretty as Mel--"
"Look, I don't want to make this awkward, but I requested a female trainer," you wet your lips with your tongue as the heat gathers in your face, "not that I don't think you know what you're doing but it's more a... comfort thing, you know?"
"Sure, I get it," He looks down at you with an easy smile. Jesus Christ, you didn't think they built people this big. "No hard feelings. You can reschedule on the app with Mel and I won't even charge the cancel fee."
You nod and lift your phone. A pang of guilt tickles your stomach and you sigh as you drop your hand. You tilt your chin up to look at him, "I'm here, alright? If I don't start today, I don't think I'll come back and I spent too much on this get-up."
"So you're up for it?" He arches a brow.
"I can try," you shrug, "but no promises."
"Alright, uh," he glances around then his eyes crawl up and down your body. You take a step back and try to hide your stomach behind your arms, "you got any water handy? You gotta stay hydrated."
"Oh, shit," you cringe as you let out the profanity, "I left it in the change room, can I--" You nod past him.
"Sure thing, I'll wait here," he says.
You quickly brush by him and hurry past the weight racks and treadmills. It feels like it takes forever to get to the locker room and by the time you return with your neon yellow bottle, you're already out of breath. Clark waits patiently as stands on the mats, his bottle a few feet away from his treads.
You set yours down and move stiffly to stand across from him, "okay, ready."
"Right, stretches," he claps his large hand and you can't help but watch his large fingers. It's like a joke, they replaced Melody with this behemoth, as if to remind you of how pathetic you are, "arms."
He guides you in the motions, one you recognise from gym class all those years ago. You didn't like it then and you definitely don't like it now as you put on a show for the whole gym. As you touch your toes you groan and your leg shakes as the burning zap pings through your hip. You hiss and make yourself stand straight, bracing your lower back.
"You okay?" He asks, moving easily as you hunch slightly.
"Yeah, my hip--" You gasp as your leg buckles and you nearly collapse, "fuck."
"Hey, take a seat," he grabs your elbow gently and leads you over to an empty weight bench. You sit before you can wilt entirely and he steps back to look down at you with hands at the top of his shorts. "You got hip problems?"
"Yeah, sort of," you sigh, "I put it on my profile. Locks up and all that."
"Gee, I must have missed that," he says as he turns and marches over to retrieve your bottle, then his. He squats down as he offers you yours, meeting your eye level as you accept it, "last minute change and all."
"It's fine, I know my limits and they're not very far," you untwist the cap of your bottle as his cheek dimples, "what?"
"Nothing," he shakes his head and stands, turning to sit beside you. "I tend to push limits, you know, so you lucked out."
"Great," you grumble, "well, I think the term is 'throw in the towel', the towel's tossed. It's on the floor."
"Come on," he nudges you and mindlessly rubs the top of his tank, his fingers grazing the tuft of hair peeking out above his broad pecks, "we'll take it easy, work up to it. But your hip, that looks like a therapy issue."
"Oh?"
"Oh," he counters, "lucky again," he smirks, "I do therapeutic work. If you don't mind, I can do some proper exercises and see if that helps out. No extra charge."
"I don't know, that's... too nice."
"We'll make a deal of it," he says, "I'll do the therapy and you show up every week."
"Hmm, well..."
"Unless you prefer Melody," he shows his palm, "your choice but I know she's only really does cardio and yoga and with your hip, you won't keep up."
"I can't keep up with standing," you mutter and he laughs. "For how long?"
"Well, you should make it a permanent thing," he advises gently, "but I'll settle for six months. For now."
You look up at him and lean back, rubbing your hip as you grimace, "I don't think I have a choice."
🏋♂️
The weeks go by but not easily. As much as your body needs to adjust to your new regimen, you need to adjust to your trainer. Clark is exactly as he promised, relentless. Your weekly sessions have become two or three a week. He made 'no' the only impossibility.
The persistent pain in your hips is mostly subsided, though new aches form in your muscles after each session. If this is what it costs to be healthy, you're not sure it's worth it. Still, he uses the app to its complete potential, sending you reminders to stretch and get in your steps, even going so far as to have you track your meals. Yeah, he wasn't impressed with your late night kitkats.
That day, you puff out as you finish your last rep and fall back on the mat, catching yourself on the hell of your hands. You try to catch your breath as Clark pulls up his shirt to wipe the sweat from his brow, exposing the muscles above the vee of his pelvis, his shorts low on his hips. You can't help a glance at your own pudgy tummy and the extra jiggle on your thighs. After all this and you're still a troll.
"Well," you sit forward and reach for your water, "this was hell. Thank you."
"You're doing good," he offers his hand and lifts you to your feet, so easily you nearly leave the mat entirely, "lookin' better by the day."
"You don't have to lie," you fan yourself.
"And you don't have to shoot down every compliment," he chides, "go on, cool down. You earned it… and you can treat yourself to a carb."
"Thanks," you shake your head and begin your usual routine. He steps away and takes his phone from his arm band, "you got someone else after this?"
"No," he furrows his brows at his phone, "just canceled."
"Damn," you bend forward into a fan and grunt.
"Be careful," he's near you in a flash, "go slow." He frames your hips with his hands and you flinch, holding back a gasp. "You're gonna ruin all my hard work."
He squeezes before he lets go and you mumble an apology before pushing yourself up. You go into a lunge and peek over at him as he walks a circle around you, taking measure of your form.
"You sure your hip's okay?" He asks.
"Yeah, I feel fine," you squint at him, "what's up? Am I doing something wrong?"
"I mean, I think there's something off," he taps his chin and stops, looking around your butt with crooked grin, "a tear maybe."
"What are you?" You reach back as you feel along your hip and you notice how the fabric feels slacker along your ass. You reach further and follow the rip in the seam at the center of your cheeks, exposing the white cotton panties with tiny pink hearts beneath, "oh my god."
You cover yourself with both hands and blanch, "how long–"
He tilts his head and looks to the ceiling, "they're cute, I didn't wanna say anything. Besides, you were in the zone."
"Jeez, okay, well I'm done for the day, I'll be sore," you snip, "oh my goddddd."
You grab your water bottle and hold it behind you as you rush away.
"Alright, well, have a good one," he calls behind you wistfully, "I think Lululemons having a sale right now."
"Quiet," you stomp away and scurry down the hall as you hear his rumbling laughter.
You get to the locker room and only realise then how empty the gym is. Clark noticed how often you got distracted by other, fitter gym goers and recommended the less busy times for your sessions. You were thankful but now it's kind of eerie.
You put your bottle on the bench and pull out your bag. You take your street clothes and resign yourself to stinking them up and showering at home. You pull of your damp shirt and peel away your split leggings, morning the seam as you look to see how big it is.
The door opens suddenly and you look up as Clark appears around the bricked divider. You cry out and try to cover yourself as his shoes squeak to a halt. He hides his eyes behind his hand as he raises your phone in the other.
"I'm sorry, I didn't want you to leave before I got here–"
"Maybe knock?" You scramble to pull your shirt back on, "call through the door or something."
"Sorry, I…" he parts his fingers and you snarl, "take it."
"Stop looking!" You storm towards him and snatch your phone. "Jesus, as if it's not hard enough being here…"
You grumble as you go back around the bench and drop the phone on your gym bag. He doesn't move, your anger peaking at his lingering, and you look up at him as you open the denim. He stares blatantly as you steam and fumble to get dressed.
"Clark!" You bark, "go."
He doesn't move. His eyes cling to you, falling down to your thighs as he lets out a shuddering breath and runs his hand up the front of his shirt. His lips part as he steps closer, his silence prickling along your neck.
"Clark," you utter in confusion, his blue eyes dilated and dark, "what–"
"You shouldn't hide," his voice grits dangerously as he stops at the other side of the bench. You’re frozen as you clutch the jeans tightly, too afraid to move, his gaze like a predator's; unbreakable.
"Please, just go," you whisper.
"I can't," he shifts to the side as you try to go towards the door, moving the other way as you attempt that.
You sway back and forth as he mirrors you. In that moment, his size is more obvious than ever. You gulp and step back against the lockers.
"Clark, you're scaring me," you hug your jeans and bat your lashes.
His hand spreads across his chest as he inhales, tasting the air as his nostrils flare, and slowly he descends his touch. You squeak as you see the twitch in his shorts right before he grips it. He lets out a quaking growl and tilts his head, cracking it as he bares his teeth.
"I know," he sneers as he rubs himself through his shorts, "come get it before I come get you."
#clark kent#dark clark kent#dark!clark kent#clark kent x reader#drabble#ask drabble#dc#dcu#superman#au
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Party Banter #2
Read on AO3
Part 1 here
Series summary: A bunch of short scenarios involving Minthara and Galatea, based on some of the party's in-game banter.
A/N: Pretend that Lae’zel’s combat romance scene happens in act 3 ok.
Warning: the beggining of this chapter is very steamy.
It was late at night, when Galatea sneaked off into her lover’s tent, making sure not to make much noise. Slowly getting in, she smiled, seeing that Minthara was already naked. While the rest of their companions had all gone to sleep, Minthara and Galatea’s activities were just beginning.
After all, tonight was the night that Minthara would finally debut her most recent acquisition.
She had first seen it when the group visited Sharess Caress. While the brothel itself paled in comparison to the ones at Menzoberranzan, the drow was intrigued by one obscured area of the establishment, hidden behind a curtain. Minthara momentarily left the group, and taking one peak behind inside, she soon found out what it was: a small shop, full of sexual objects on display.
As the vendor happily showed her their items, Minthara found one in particular to be of great interest. The object itself was made of a material she couldn't recognize but it was shaped like a cock, with its tip slightly tilted to the side. It was connected to a bunch of leather straps, of which the vendor was happy to show Minthara how to put it on.
When she reunited with the group, smirking, Galatea was quick to ask where she had gone off. Minthara’s reply was a simple “you’ll find out soon.”
And now, as the drow relentlessly pounded into her, Galatea grabbed the back of her neck, bringing her close, whispering “This is the best money you have ever spent” before kissing Minthara.
After they both finished, Minthara slowly dragged the phallic object out of her lover and laid next to her. The two were tired, staying on the ground as they regained their breath, when Galatea heard something.
She sat up, looking around.
“What’s wrong?” Minthara asked, frowning.
“I’m hearing a commotion outside” She stood up, taking a peak behind the tent’s opening. “Oh gods…” she whispered, turning her head towards Minthara. “You should see this.”
The drow stood up, a brow raised as she looked in the same direction as Galatea. Soon, Minthara was smirking.
“It seems we aren’t the only ones having fun tonight.”
…
Minthara, Lae’zel and Galatea had gone out to the city, to buy supplies for the oncoming fights. Usually, Shadowheart would have come along, as she was one of the few healers of the group but she woke up…undisposed. Tired, as she claimed, from a restless night.
The tiefling approached the gith, a mischievous look on her face. “So, Lae’zel…it seems you and Shadowheart have finally gotten over your little disagreements.”
The fighter took a deep breath. “That is none of your business.”
“Oh please, the tadpole connect us all. Hard to keep secrets.” Galatea said. “Just admit it, you found love too.”
Lae’zel shot her a murderous look, but before she could say anything, Minthara stepped in between them.
“Speaking of which'' she began “a few pointers, Lae’zel. I heard you and your lover locked in combat, but the test you set was not rigorous enough.”
The gith huffed. “As if you could come up with something better.”
Minthara only smirked. “Oh yes. A personal suggestion, if you will.” The drow briefly looked at Galatea before turning to Lae’zel again. “Next time, tie them to the ground, and do not release them until you are both satisfied.”
“Hm…you have given me ideas.” Lae’zel replied, smirking. She then chuckled as a very red faced Galatea picked up her pace, walking ahead, with Minthara sprinting after her.
#minthara bg3#minthara baldurs gate 3#minthara baenre#oc: galatea von dewilde#minthara x tav#minthara x galatea#lae'zel bg3#mention of lae'zel/shadowheart#minthara centric#baldur's gate 3#my writing#bg3 fanfic
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"I don't ever want to get stuck with babysitting again." (2006)
"No one is allowed to take youth away from young people." (2017)
-Gojo Satoru
✧༝┉˚*❋ ❋*˚┉༝✧✧༝┉˚*❋ ❋*˚┉༝✧✧༝┉˚*❋ ❋*˚┉༝✧✧༝┉˚*❋ ❋*˚┉༝✧✧༝┉˚*❋ ✧༝
When i think of complete holistic growth, I think of Gojo Satoru. He is a character from the Jujutsu Kaisen series who plays as the teacher or "sensei" of Yuuji Itadori, Megumi Fushiguro, Nobara Kugisaki, etc.
Satoru was born with the title of the "strongest" after being the first user of the six eyes and the limitless technique in over 400 years. While this may be a blessing, the repercussions of his birth actually shifted the balance of the Jujutsu world; curses were getting stronger day by day due to this phenomenon. Needless to say, he was spoiled as a child because of the proclamation of being the current "strongest".
His character developed when he was a teenager who enrolled in the Tokyo Metropolitan Curse Technical College or Jujutsu High where he shared a class with Suguru Geto and Shoko Ieiri. Notably, Suguru and Satoru had a deep bond with each other with both of them being known at that time as the "strongest" due to their special grade status.
In 2006, both students were assigned to escort and assimilate Riko Amanai with Tengen, an important figure of Jujutsu society. Rather than sending her to Tengen immediately, they let Riko enjoy the last days of her life and her youth. Ultimately, Riko was killed not through assimilation but through a bounty / assassination that was placed on her. Her death disrupted both lives of Gojo and Geto; Gojo aimed to grow stronger and heightened his techniques while Geto was struggling over her death and his opinion of humans since the people responsible for Riko's death were humans. Geto spiraled and eventually became a cursed user (opposite of a sorcer who exorcise curses and protect people), an information that Gojo had a hard time grasping as Geto was someone who he valued in his life.
With Geto's defection, Gojo decided to become a teacher so no one would have to go through what Geto had gone. He aimed to make the next generation stronger or on par with him. In 2017, he met Yuta Okkotsu, a 16 year old, who was planned to be executed due to his immense power of a special grade spirit (and former love interest), Rika Orimoto. Instead of killing Yuta, he enrolled him to his alma matter where he helped him improve on his abilities. Soon after, he met Geto again as he [Geto] proclaimed to create a society where humans ceased to exist.
On the 24th of December 2017, Yuta and Geto clashed with each other, with Yuta standing victorious. During Geto's final moments, he and Gojo talked and it was soon revealed that even after everything, Gojo still had trust for him. Gojo ultimately killed Geto but did not dispose of his body.
The year of that, Yuji Itadori was introduced as a vessel for Sukuna (one of the most dangerous cursed spirits or the "King of Curses"). Once again, an execution was held for Yuji. Gojo took care of Yuji and instilled his teachings onto him.
During the Shibuya Incident, Gojo was sealed due to having an encounter of Pseudo-Geto (an entity named Kenjaku possessed the undisposed body of Geto). After having completely been sealed, Gojo placed immense trust on his comrades.
19 days after being sealed, Gojo was now placed under the predicament of fighting Sukuna, who now possessed Megumi. Although Gojo was killed in the process, he had expressed how thankful he was but regretted that even after he had given his everything, Sukuna was still unfazed. In the afterlife, it was shown that he was with Geto, Nanami, Haibara, and the people who had made his youth the best time of his life, the people who saw him as "human", not the "strongest".
°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°。°
Gojo was basically a man who was spoiled from the start, looking down on those who he deemed weak. Overtime, his character bloomed after having had lost his youth due to Toji Fushiguro. Toji had a son, Megumi, who Gojo took, trained, and cared for. Aside from the incident with Toji, he had lost his best friend, Geto, and with his defection, he made it his goal to change Jujutsu society's traditional views and help children grow stronger but still maintain their youth. His character is really complex, but what I can learn from him is that being the strongest comes with many consequences. Although his end was bittersweet, he was the happiest when he was able to be with those he cared for, the people responsible for his "blue spring". Gojo is one of my favorite characters in fiction not only because of his charming personality, but because of his character as a whole. He had truly developed over the years and for that, I could say that his growth was worth watching.
This relates to my real life experiences as I am someone who is really stubborn at times, but there are people who have shaped me into becoming better. For that, i am grateful for they have improved my individuality and capabilities.
And just like Gojo, who was perceived as just the strongest, I also struggled to find my true identity. "Are you the strongest because you're Gojo Satoru, or are you Gojo Satoru because you're the strongest?" is the surrounding question of Gojo's existence. It is important to know thyself first to have an established and well-formed holistic growth.
"blue spring"- In Japanese culture, these words imply excitement. It also refers to nostalgia and fondness, as well as a time of happiness and hope.
retrieved from: https://blog.rosettastone.com/5-japanese-words-that-dont-translate-from-japanese-to-english/
(gif credit: top row: silversoulsociety, middle left: tatakaeeren, middle right to the bottom all goes to their respective owners - sorry i found and downloaded those gifs and the image over a month ago and i couldn't find the owners🙇♀️)
#complete holistic development#gojo satoru#satoru gojo#im so sorry for not specifying the rest of the owners huhu#jujutsu kaisen
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[(Ancient)] PHARAOHS I.EGYPTIAN: Island (islands) I.Madagasy 'unnamed' [Orient] PIGMY; Pigmy "pigmy, pigmy" (Pigmies) Congolese I.Continent. .
(Africa) Henceforth presented by an hierarchial tribal-rule besides the Pigmies, as for which has been unrivalled and unbound to even the "Pharaohs of Egypt" whom wanted to become "Gods" invoked onto I.Nubian-Divinity "VIRILITY" (Infertility). This ancestral deity is revered as I.Virile-God & Nubian Gods (Demon). Evidently pertaining to the ancestral figure of virility that is declared at fault, although inadvertently for feminine infertility within women to be used as a spiritual-host in most "African" tribes. Mainly being culturally to blame for "Infertile" females that descend from tribal-backgrounds or lineage, as for which are without an "Uterus/Ovarian" II.Barren (barren). Those women in particular are deemed incapable to become birth surrogates.
Thus are not inclined to be suitable birth-suitors by royal review. Although having no menstrual cycle and/or I.menstrual-period that is not lengthened to flow periodically. An singular moment that concludes unexpectedly as being contrary to pending. Thereof an medical condition that has been examined by modern medicine, as the discarding of one (Ovary). In forbearance; these females that are born physically inapt reproductively do have an uterus, but with no ovarian/ovaries (Surrogates) "I.Barren" is basically capable for surrogacy/paternal-birth (Pregnancy).
RAMSES THE GREAT: Pharaoh I.Pharaoh (the first) I.Slave-king of Egypt (II Ramses).
In adherence, surrogate fertilization was first introduced hereby "Ancient-Egyptian" decree for "Virile" godliness (I.Nubian) to become benevolent. The "Pharaohs of Egypt" devout royal-declaration of benevolence impart emphasized ovarian (ovary) by cohesively implementing the physical availability of the female uterus. Even though problematic for some infertile surrogates; undoubtedly they must be reproductively able to sustain life within the womb, and confirmed as acceptable to participate. Henceforward without the use of the female hymen to ascertain, as an additional method for infertile/fertile "Surrogates" to reobtain is unnecessary. Thereby procreative default (hymen) lacking sexual reproductive attributes to conceive an baby.
(II.Ramses) Coherently involving the intransigent use of power domineered by Pharaoh to mitigate "Queen" Nefertiti of Egypt, and continuing to move forward reproductively with no issue. Thus monitoring the female-reproduction process for readiness, as it pertains to the periodically phased biological-cycle's disengagement without being spiritual offensive through cultivated beliefs. Nevertheless, not negating the coercion thereof acquiring a undisposed ovary (Ovaries). Furthermore gathered to be used effectively as contribution for an endeavor of (I.Benevolent) godly transcendence. Implored with supplying an sufficient amount of ovaries. Henceforth given the granted acumen approval to be receive.
However allowing implementation on other women, therefore provided with the necessary physical capabilities (Uterus) for reproduction intended to become impregnated. Apparently based on further analysis of barren-surrogates concludes after pregnancy they're most likely to give birth to an (Son) male infant, hence reassuring the first-born will always be a boy.
☠.GORILLA-I I-GUERRILLA.☠ [{]¤| Hail Satan |¤[}] 💀 Shivah "Shiva" (Egyptians) I.EGYPTIAN: Fertility.I (God) "NEFERTITI" Nefertiti I.fertile (Ovaries). Henceforth receive/renamed, Ethiopian-tribute I.Gold "UnK" (Ankh).
♾NUBIAN CREED: SATANIST: THE DARK GOD OF VOODOO. . . .
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@ifmywishescametrue felt like it was finally time from some good old-fashioned angst. stevetony rwrb AU ft. the night at Kensington Palace. @bieddiediaz pls enjoy your fav rwrb scene re-done.
please note : characters’ opinions about the English Monarchy do not reflect author’s own opinions. Fuck the Monarchy.
The rain is thunderous. Steve’s been in London when it’s rained before, but it’s never been this bad. Their visibility is shot to hell, and they’re inching towards Kensington Palace, because Clint is worried that if they go any faster, then they’re at a serious risk of losing control of the car and veering off the side of the road.
Steve knows this. He knows this because Clint’s told him as much, all three times that Steve has asked why they aren’t moving faster. None of this stops the anxious bounce of his leg, nor does it stop him physically hurtling out of his car as soon as they’re close enough to Kensington Palace that he can make out the shaky outline of the mansion in his periphery.
“Anthony Edward Stark!” He bellows, even though there’s a piss poor chance he can be heard over this rain, “Open your fucking door!” Its superfluous of course, because even if they weren’t fighting it wouldn’t be Tony who lets him in, but it has its desired effect : the door cracks open, and Bruce steps out.
“Mr. Rogers,” He inclines his head, and then looks past Steve, “Mr. Barton. His Royal Highness is indisposed at this time.” It’s the middle of the night. Steve knows, as surely as he knows the back of his hand, that Tony is just upstairs, sat on his bed.
“Undispose him then,” Steve says firmly, arrogantly, “I’m not leaving until I’ve seen him.”
Bruce’s face remains blank. “I’m sorry you’ve made it all this way for a wasted trip. His Royal Highness cannot see you now. If you insist on being a nuisance, rest assured there are other ways to get you to vacate the premises.”
Almost instinctively, Clint steps in front of Steve just as Steve stiffens. They both recognise Bruce’s words for what they are : a threat.
Still, Steve will not be deterred. “Oh for fuck’s -“ He cups his mouth and tilts his head back, “Tony ! I know you know I’m here ! The least you owe me is to look me in the eye, you absolute piece of shit!”
“His Royal Highness owes you nothing,” Bruce says harshly, “You’re lucky that you were able to get this close to the residence - “
The door opens again, and Tony steps out. He’s in silk pajamas, draped in a fluffy robe. He grabs it and wraps it around himself tightly, sighing deeply. Tony looks haggard, Steve thinks to himself, blinking through wet lashes, puffy eyes, sunken cheeks, and hair sticking up in various directions.
He’s never looked more beautiful.
“Let them in Bruce,” Tony says, placing a hand on his equerry’s shoulder, “Get Clint a towel and a change of clothes. Best to put a pot on as well, tea will kill the chill.”
Bruce inclines his head, and Tony turns around and walks back into the residence. The entire time, Steve notes silently, he hadn’t looked at Steve once. Bruce follows after, holding open the door for Clint and Steve to step in. They’re both soaked to the bone, dripping all over the expensive floors of Kensington Palace, but Steve couldn’t care less. He pauses just long enough to shrug off his jacket, safe in the knowledge that Clint will be taken care of, and moves two steps at a time - unwilling to lose Tony.
He knows the way to Tony’s bedroom, having been there the night after Wimbledon, but he wouldn’t put it past Tony to spirit away to another part of the Palace and leave Steve walking around the halls aimlessly.
“You can say what you’ve come to say,” Tony says once they enter his room, “And then you will leave.” It isn’t a request, it’s an order.
“Look at me,” Steve means for it to be firm, but it comes out soft, desperate. “Look me in the eye, Tony, you owe me that much.” With what looks like supreme effort, Tony raises his gaze off the floor, and meets Steve’s eyes.
“What happened?” Steve asks, begs, “We were good, we were happy. And then you just leave ? Scurry out of the apartment in the dead of the night, leave me this -“ He fists the scrap of paper out of his pocket and shakes it at Tony, “And then, nothing. No messages, no calls, not even a whisper. Do you know I checked the news obsessively for a week ? I thought, god I thought everything. Your father was poisoned, your sister relapsed, your plane was shot out of the sky by insurgents, you’d been kidnapped, anything because I didn’t want to believe that the man I am in love with would be this cruel.”
Tony makes a sound like he’s wounded, but Steve barrels on. “But eventually, I had to accept it. ‘When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’”
“Arthur Conan Doyle,” Tony interjects nonsensically.
“If you want to end this, end us,” Steve says, steeling himself, “You’re going to have to look me in the eye and do it.”
There’s a pregnant silence.
“My mother was one of the most celebrated actresses of her generation,” Tony starts, “She has one of the most recognisable faces on the planet. I have one of the most recognisable faces on the planet. I was four years old when I realised every single person in this country knew who I was. I was five when one of those people spat on my mother’s face and called her a currymuncher.”
“My mother gave everything up for this,” Tony gestures around him, “To be a symbol of something more. She believed that the monarchy could stand for better, to use centuries of blood money for something more. I have her face Steve, I can’t be like you. I’m not like you. I don’t have the luxury of giving them all of me, I don’t have the luxury of giving anybody all of me. I'm already too much. This is all I’ve got, and you made it abundantly clear in Brooklyn that it was no longer enough for you.”
After the election, Steve had said, mindlessly, thoughtlessly, We can walk around holding hands and it wouldn’t matter.
“I never said that,” Steve says fiercely, “Don’t put words in my mouth. I have never once said you aren’t enough. If you want to bury your head in the sand and stay in the closet forever, then that’s your choice, but don’t you dare say I’m the one who put you there.”
“I’m not in the closet,” Tony says tiredly, “I’ve known I was gay since I was eleven. My entire family knows, in some manner or fashion. Forgive me if I don’t want to hear it from someone who’s known they’re bi for all of five minutes, and didn’t say anything to anyone until he was literally caught with his hand on my dick.”
It’s a low blow, and from the way Tony’s face softens, he knows it. This is what Tony does, Steve reminds himself, he lashes out when he’s cornered. It doesn’t make it hurt any less.
“I have no more cards to play,” Steve says finally, changing tactics, “This is all I have. I love you Tony, I love you so much that sometimes it could kill me. You have consumed me, body and soul, you’re it for me. I have nothing left to give you.”
“So, if this is over, you owe it to me to tell me.”
“You think I don’t love you?” Tony runs his hands through his hair, “Christ Steve I’ve loved you since Rio ! You were bright and shiny, and I was utterly transfixed, and I just knew that if I let you that you would burrow yourself deep in me and never let go. But my life is the Crown, and I can love you, and want you, and still not want this. I can love you and still not want to subject you to that life, because this is all I have to give.”
“Do I get no say?” Steve asks hotly, because it hasn’t escaped his notice that none of those words were ‘It’s over’. “It’s my life too, right ? Our life.”
“The Crown - “
“Fuck the Crown,” Steve says passionately, fervently, “We can find a way to love each other on our own terms. You just have to be willing to try. Or : you tell me to leave, and I will leave, and nothing will happen to you. Nothing, will ever happen to you.”
"Ask me to leave." Steve says again, because he's a masochist, because Tony is the best thing that's ever happened to him, because Tony is the worst thing that's ever happened to me. "Ask me."
"You know I can't."
Steve steps forward, finally closing the gap between them to clasp his hands over Tony's. From this angle, Steve is taller than Tony, and Steve is close enough to count all of his eyelashes individually.
"Then let me stay." Steve begs, implores, "Let me prove to you that this, us, is worth it. Baby, let yourself have something for once. Let yourself have me."
Tony makes a sound in the back of his throat, and then wraps his hand around the back of Steve's neck, pulling him in for a kiss.
It's the worst thing that's ever happened to him. It's the best thing that's ever happened to him.
fin
#my writing#stevetony#steve rogers / tony stark#hrh tony stark#first son steve rogers#stevetony rwrb AU#desi tony stark#this snuck up on me but i just basically wanted to unpack why tony wouldn’t just abdicate#and i spiralled from there basically#i kept just thinking about meghan markle’s speech and how she gave up so much to marry harry#because she wanted to be a symbol of something more in the monarchy#and i kept thinking about how if you spend your whole time being told about your duty to the crown#a part of you might start believing it even if it means shackling yourself down#anyway yeah let me know what yall think
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previous owner left all sorts of poisons and undisposable chemicals for us to figure out how to get rid of
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The Fetal Personhood Masterpost
*this is a living document, chronically edited, check back for additions*
Beyond Infanticide
The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness
The Magnanimity of Spirit
In Defense of Humanity
The Ontogenesis of the Human Person
I Was Once a Fetus
In Defense of Speciesism
Is Speciesism Like Racism and Sexism?
Embryos & metaphysical personhood
On Abortion
The Uncertainty Principle
The Apple Argument Against Abortion
Personhood status of the human zygote
Construction vs. Development
Beyond the Abortion Wars
Gaining and Losing Personhood?
Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism, and Moral Status
An Alternative to the Rational Substance
Personhood: An Essential Characteristic
Miscellaneous
Excerpts below the cut!
1. Beyond Infanticide
“Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants” by Rodger, Blackshaw, and Miller (2018)
The stronger intuitions against the permissibility of these ‘pre-personal acts’ allow us to re-establish a comprehensive and persuasive reductio against psychological accounts of persons.
Since fetuses lack the relevant psychological apparatus or features (either in kind or degree), they lack certain rights or interests that adult humans ordinarily have, including the right to life.
Given the growing acceptance of the permissibility of infanticide, whether for severely disabled infants or more broadly, this has gradually ceased to be the case.
Given psychological accounts, we argue, it follows, first, that infanticide is permissible for healthy infants. Secondly, infants can be harvested for organ transplants (or, perhaps, for more trivial reasons). Thirdly, infants can be subject to live, invasive experimentation. Fourthly, infants can be used for sexual gratification. Finally, infants can be actively discriminated against on the basis of what are generally accepted protected characteristics for mature humans.
For those undisposed towards ‘rights’, our argument can be adapted, mutatis mutandis, for various accounts of the wrongness of murder.
For clarity, we take ‘x has a right to life’ to mean that other humans ordinarily have an obligation to refrain from killing x (excepting perhaps cases of self-defense, and so on).
the same accounts which permit infanticide fail equally to prohibit considerably more unpalatable actions.
the desire to continue existing requires the concept of a continuing self
‘a thing’s interest is a function of its present and future desires’
accounts need to be very carefully drawn even to include young children in the morality of respect.
According to these accounts, not all human beings are persons. There is a threshold (usually taken to be a complex of psychological properties and capacities) that must be attained for a human to be regarded as a person and to gain the rights most adult humans have. Although fetuses, newborns and infants may have some rights in virtue of their limited psychological capacities, they come nowhere near to having a serious right to life. And, in particular, the rights they do have are typically over ridable by the rights or interests of actual persons.
More precisely for our purposes, a pre-personal human is any human who has not yet attained the capacities or other features sufficient for inclusion within the community of full rights-bearers. We also define pre-personal acts: acts performed on or with a pre-personal human.
Infants are little different to conscious fetuses psychologically, and so according to typical psychological accounts of personhood, value and rights, they also lack a right to life.
The natural implication is that infanticide is at least sometimes permissible, and typically, ethicists who hold to psychological accounts agree that this is true for cases of severely disabled infants whose quality of life is likely to be poor.
most of the aforementioned authors do not make room in their accounts for any rights for fetuses and infants (excepting perhaps the right not to be subject to pain), while the other accounts suggest that in view of their minimal psychological capacities, their rights are present but easily overridable and, in McMahan’s (2003, p. 339) words, ‘may permissibly be weighed and traded off against the time-relative interests of others in the manner approved by consequentialists’. If this is correct, of course, it is plausible that infanticide is sometimes obligatory.
If the rights of infants are overridable by the rights of actual persons, there is no reason why healthy infants should be immune from the utilitarian calculus: if the interests of adults can be furthered sufficiently by killing the infant, there is no theoretical ground for opposing such killing.
According to McMahan (2003, p. 360), ‘most people will find this implication intolerable’, and he freely confesses ‘that I cannot embrace it without significant misgivings and considerable unease’. Despite his unease, however, McMahan (2003, p. 361) feels he is inexorably forced into accepting that newborns must be ‘in principle, sacrificable’.
‘we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be’.
One suspects, of course, that for many people the circumstances in which abortion is thought to be acceptable are considerably wider.
Involuntary organ donation is one possibility, mentioned by Kaczor (2014) as an implication of McMahan’s views. There is a critical shortage of organ donors worldwide, and if pre-personal humans that are unwanted by parents or relatives could help meet this need, there may be a moral obligation to use them thus.
they ‘fall outside the scope of the constraint against harmful using’
it is difficult to see how there could be any strong argument against even the commercialization of this practice.
If psychological accounts are correct and infants are not persons, there may even be a moral obligation to utilize available organs to maximize benefit to existing persons. Non-consensual organ harvesting, while desirable because of the obvious benefits to those in need of organs, is constrained by our obligation to respect surviving interests of the dead such as the previously expressed desire for bodily integrity after death. There are no such surviving interests for infants – their weak time-relative interests cannot survive their death. Discarding their organs appears to be unjustifiable, given the great goods that would accrue to actual persons from their use.
if he thinks we should all accept his arguments that infants and children are fundamentally different entities with different rights then, were we to do so, having an opportunistic attitude towards infants would be entirely consonant with having a protective attitude towards more mature children.
It is at least worth considering whether more trivial benefits for actual persons might equally justify this practice. After all, if the deontic constraints on killing humans are absent for infants, and if they are sufficiently anesthetized (for example), it becomes difficult to explain why only the great benefit of saving lives via organ transplants would justify the practice – why not more trivial benefits, like purely hedonic ones?
According to bioethicist R. Alta Charo (2015), nearly everyone in the United States (US) has benefited in some respect from research using fetal tissue. But with similar justification, tissue obtained from infants whose lives have been ended by infanticide could also be used. The use of euthanised infants’ organs and tissues in this way is not the only possibility.
it seems that using infants for medical research prior to being euthanized (or even without being euthanized) would also be permissible, provided sufficient benefits to actual persons accrue. It would be necessary to ensure that the research does not cause pain, but this is compatible with relatively extreme actions as long as appropriate safeguards are in place (e.g. a requirement for sufficient analgesia). It might even be that a degree (perhaps a large degree) of pain is morally acceptable, provided it is not gratuitous, and provided the benefits are sufficiently large. It is also possible that this could be a commercial transaction.
Provided that such acts do not result in physical damage or pain, such acts could be permitted on any human that is yet to reach the threshold of personhood, including those that will become persons in the future.
Of course, if the infant is subsequently killed, harm that would manifest in the future may not even be relevant.
In any case, since there is no principled objection to using infants in this way according to the morality of respect, all that is necessary to justify it is sufficient gratification for the actor.
Again, as with organ harvesting and experimentation, this could even be commercialized.
If we are to ground the common intuition that having sexual relations with infants is wrong, we will need an explanation of why infants have a non-negotiable right to sexual integrity but animals do not, without relying on species exceptionalism.
But if infants are not persons in any relevant sense, and if they are not part of the ‘morality of respect’ in virtue of being ‘one of us’, it is difficult to see how rape could constitute such an assault on them. And it is especially difficult to see, if infants are not ‘one of us’ in a way that accords them broadly the same rights as us, why we should attribute to them the same interest in sexual integrity which we have. For those who oppose abortion and infanticide, one way to attribute the same interest here is in claiming an identity relation between fetuses, infants and adults, and to suggest that identity relations are sufficient (though not necessary) to preserve interests and rights.
it might be that they have latent second-order desires against being used sexually, but the admission of latent second-order desires would only serve to prohibit abortion and infanticide similarly.
the sexual rights the victim would have if he were, in fact, too cognitively impaired to consent: ‘it makes it less clear what the nature of the wrong might be…if Stubblefield wronged or harmed him, it must have been in a way that he is incapable of understanding and that affected his experience only pleasurably’.
For the problem with such justifications is that most people would recoil at the idea that there are only instrumental reasons for the prohibition on sexual activity with infants: the heinousness of sexual activity with infants is surely something intrinsic to the action itself – not merely a pragmatic concern.
We suggest that human infants are more similar in kind to human adults than pebbles and mosquitoes in this respect. It would be wrong to selectively destroy black infants because one prefers white infants aesthetically, just as it would be wrong to selectively destroy female infants for the same reason (or to help prevent the spread of Duchenne muscular dystrophy). Or, supposing we could tell from an early stage whether a child was likely to be same-sex attracted or not, it would be wrong to kill an infant on those grounds (this need not result directly from antipathy towards same-sex attracted people: one might have only the resources to raise one child, and yet strongly desire grandchildren, in a country where same-sex attracted adults were banned from adopting).
We suggest, therefore, that the intuitive injunction against the discriminatory killing of infants undermines the proposed psychological accounts of value and rights.
So it is not possible to dismiss this as a straw man implication of psychological accounts.
the behaviors described in these scenarios constitute such violations.
argue that other intuitions pertaining to personhood and value imply that a serious right to life requires certain actual – not potential – psychological capacities
Consequently, psychological accounts prima facie imply the permissibility of our five scenarios, contrary to our intuitions about their wrongness or heinousness.
Moral theories that violate our strong intuitions need to explain why these violations do not undermine their status as moral theories
There are two options for the defender of psychological accounts: to reject these intuitions, or to explain why each of these scenarios is morally problematic. In the former case, there is not much we can do other than to strengthen the intuitions and defend them from undercutting defeaters. We take it that most people will feel the force of these intuitions and not give them up lightly. Although there is a strong intuition against infanticide which we have strengthened, we have also detailed further scenarios against which there are even stronger intuitions, such that the cost of giving them up is augmented.
But our primary task here is shoring up the intuitions against pre-personal harms and exhibiting the cost of rejecting them.
So the task is not merely to explain why these scenarios involve moral wrongdoing.
It is to explain, firstly, why they involve wrongdoing in ways that, for example, abortion does not. Secondly, since the intuitions here are not merely that the scenarios are to be avoided but that they involve intrinsic wrongdoing, we need an explanation of their intrinsic wrongdoing without reference to practical concerns that might easily be outweighed.
Explanations appealing only to contingent features, or which allow for these actions to be only negligibly wrong insofar as other wrong making characteristics are absent, will not suffice.
In the absence of such accounts, we conclude that our overall reductio succeeds.
Insofar as this is the case, the credibility of psychological accounts is thereby diminished in proportion to the strength of the intuitions against such acts.
But if all this is true, it has significant implications for abortion ethics. As we noted in the introduction, many contemporary defences of abortion depend on denying fetuses (and often infants) the status of personhood on the basis of psychological accounts of rights, value and personhood. If, as we suggest, those accounts are made implausible by the reductios described above, defenders of the permissibility of abortion will have to appeal to alternative arguments.
2. The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness
“The Moral Insignificance of Self-Consciousness” by Joshua Shepherd (2017)
I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions
about self-consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self-consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self-consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self-consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.
Self-consciousness's significance. The fact that an entity E is self-conscious generates strong
(i.e., not easily outweighed or overridden) moral reasons against harming or killing E.
Self-consciousness [Capacity]. Self consciousness is the capacity to think of oneself as oneself,
and to think of various features of oneself as features of oneself.
An implication of this is obviously that the self-consciousness in question can be ascribed to all creatures that are phenomenally conscious, including various non-human animals.
In addition to containing a number of questionable claims, this line of reasoning obscures our topic. Intuitions about the moral significance of human beings may track a wide range of properties, and may thus mislead us here. Even if not, we want to know about the moral significance of self-consciousness, no matter what kind of entities possess it.
Broadly, self-consciousness might come by its moral significance in two diff erent ways. Call the first way indirect, the second direct. If one takes the indirect route, one argues that self-consciousness is significant in the sense that the possession of self-consciousness is critical (perhaps necessary, perhaps sufficient) for possession of other properties, capacities, or whatever and that these other properties, capacities, or whatever are the things that generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing. By contrast, self-consciousness is significant in a direct way if the possession of self-consciousness itself generates strong reasons against harming or killing.
the best-known arguments related to self-consciousness is significance share an unwarranted optimism regarding the functional significance of self-consciousness.
the possession of self-consciousness involves a capacity to token mental states with a certain kind of representational content— de se content, or content that includes explicit reference to the subject who tokens the state.
Peacocke draws a useful contrast between the capacity to token self.referring states and the wealth of background knowledge a creature may deploy in representing various things as holding of themselves. A creature may possess the relevant capacity—and thus qualify as self-conscious—without possessing a very sophisticated mental life. What is critical is not just the relevant capacity, but interactions between this capacity and a wide range of additional cognitive capacities, including abilities to represent various things as holding of oneself.
This is not to say that self-consciousness is of no functional significance.
So if these proposals are right, self-consciousness will extend quite far into the animal kingdom.
we should question whether such talk is as accurate as moral theory needs it to be. For the fact is that in human beings the capacity for self-consciousness emerges alongside a suite of sophisticated cognitive capacities
If self-consciousness is only one piece of a very complex and integrated tapestry, one wants a justification for the singling out of self-consciousness as deserving of special attention in moral philosophy. Short of such a justification, it seems we should be discussing the significance of cognitive sophistication generally—of the whole tapestry.
Failure to appreciate the limited functional significance of self-consciousness alone exposes moral philosophers to a danger in reasoning regarding the functional role of self-consciousness on the one hand, and its moral significance on the other.
there is no good reason to think that the particularity of an entity's mental life depends upon possession of self-consciousness
In order to properly examine the moral significance of some feature or property of an entity, we need to get a grip on the feature or property. We need to know what it is we are examining.
it is important not to conflate self-consciousness with cognitive sophistication
A claim about moral significance depends on unwarranted functional assumptions about the possession (or absence) of self-consciousness.
Interests about the future do not require self-consciousness. Interests about the future can be interests about the future, whether or not they are about your own future existence.
On the latter, there is little reason to say, as Baker wishes to, that personhood emerges around the time of birth
‘A being with a rudimentary first-person perspective is a person only if it is of a kind that normally develops robust first-person perspectives
This view is coherent. But it is not very plausible. What Baker needs is a reason to give rudimentary first-person perspectives person-making significance. According to these perspectives, developmental significance does not work, since it is dubious that this perspective is really doing the relevant developmental work. Moving to kind membership does not remove the problem either—it simply buries it. Membership in a kind has little to do with the rudimentary first-person perspective, which is now starting to look like an arbitrary feature of many kinds in the animal kingdom.
Baker's attempt to ground the metaphysical importance of a rudimentary first-person perspective (which does not involve self-consciousness) in the possession of a full-blown first-person perspective (which does involve self-consciousness) falls flat.
There is an apparent conflict here, and Baker attempts to resolve these intuitions (initially) by arguing that the non-self-conscious entities are in some developmental sense on the way to self-consciousness, and are persons in virtue of this.
we have no great reason to conceive of an entity as developmentally on the way to self-consciousness unless self-consciousness is of critical functional importance for the entity. Once we see self-consciousness as a minor part of a general trend toward cognitive sophistication, theories of personhood that include strong appeals to self-consciousness look to suffer from misplaced focus.
something has intrinsic moral significance (or value) if its value in some sense depends or supervenes on its internal or non-relational properties
the best kind of support for an attribution of intrinsic moral significance to some property or capacity is that the property or capacity passes a kind of isolation test.
The kind of answer we need is one that is fairly clear and obvious, and one that compels widespread agreement among those that have an adequate understanding of the nature of the capacity or property.
One takes the property or capacity in question and considers its presence or absence in situations that hold fixed other relevant properties or capacities. This can be tricky. One wants to avoid illicitly building in features that make the thing instrumentally or extrinsically morally significant. For such features might cloud judgment regarding the thing's intrinsic significance.
we value certain aspects of phenomenal consciousness for their own sakes, or intrinsically. If we accept that in so valuing them we are not horribly mistaken, we can accept that some aspects of phenomenal consciousness are intrinsically valuable.
One way to make sure we don't mistake these features for self-consciousness's intrinsic significance is simply to rule them out.
Is self-consciousness so significant that its possession generates strong reasons against harming or killing the entity that has it—reasons that are absent in the case of the otherwise similar but non-self-conscious entity? Plausibly, the answer to all of these questions is no. Self-consciousness does not appear to have much intrinsic moral significance.
it is clear that understanding a thing's final value sometimes requires getting the circumstances surrounding the thing just right. This is because we ascribe (or ought to ascribe) final value to a capacity, object, or whatever not necessarily because of its intrinsic properties, but simply because we value (or ought to value) it for its own sake, that is, not merely as a means.
The kind of value that accrues to self-consciousness here seems analogous to the value we might give to a range of mental capacities, such as the capacity to direct covert attention, or generate mental imagery. These capacities are nice to have. But their value seems contingent on predilections of the valuer. (One is not deluded if one fails to value the possession of covert attention, or the capacity to generate mental imagery.) The final value such mental capacities possess thus does not seem sufficient or even necessary for the generation of strong reasons against harming or killing entities that possess them. Analogously, whatever final moral significance self-consciousness might have does not seem sufficient or even necessary for the generation of strong reasons against harming or killing an entity.
In my view, self-consciousness can and often does function as a particularly shiny red herring.
We lack good reasons to think that self-consciousness is highly morally significant. Reflection on the nature and grounds of human and non-human moral significance should turn elsewhere
I would insist that analogous desires or goals that lack self-referring content could be inserted, and thus that the normative role of self-consciousness here is relatively unimportant
this argument's reliance on future orientation is problematic. The older one gets, the less future-oriented one might become. It does not become better to kill the aged because they are less future-oriented than the young.
metaphysical personhood is not moral personhood—if we want metaphysical personhood to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing, we need some kind of bridge principle linking metaphysical personhood and moral significance.
Baker offers no argument for the assertion quoted above. And I can see no good reason to
accept it. It is not analytic that the only things capable of possessing a right to life are things that qualify as metaphysical persons. Until we know more about the content of metaphysical personhood, it would be wise to withhold judgment about whether metaphysical personhood is necessary for possession of a right to life (or possession of moral significance more generally). And this raises the stakes for what an account of metaphysical personhood should contain if
it is to offer an indirect route to moral significance.
3. The Magnanimity of Spirit
"The Magnanimity of Spirit: On the Human Consideration of Animals" by Antonio Wolf (2021)
With natural rights we have the peculiarity of right which exists where no claim is made, and where no enforcement actualizes right.
a right is in essence a social phenomenon of recognition of will established in and through an enforcing institution.
The animal values life because it is part of its natural drive to live at all cost despite the seemingly most intolerable and forsaken conditions. Animals value life because they feel it, but there is no rational judgment of the quality of this life.
Not only that, a human being is willing to reason about the value of the lives of others despite the other’s immediate feelings, e.g. the duty to deny others the freedom to self-destruct.
there is a normative argument to be made which, despite not ceding the question of rights, does impose certain necessities on ethical life and even demands a duty of the human towards the animal not for the animal’s sake, but for the sake of the human subject’s actualization and
Freedom. Human beings have moral duties to their self which demand their developing of the qualities of humaneness towards animals even if these are not ethical duties to animals as such.
for Kant human beings alone are ends in themselves due to their autonomous rational nature, and so must regard themselves and other humans as ends and not means. The recognition of this confers to such beings a dignity (intrinsic value) which commands the respect of any moral agent, and dignity alone commands moral duty.
When it is said in common thought that we can recognize the ‘humanity’ of animals, that is, that we can speak of how human they are, it is often said with an unspoken projection of humanity onto them. With Spirit that comprehends itself, however, there is no need to project humanity, for humanity is there in animal being; it is simply partial.
No, what we recognize in animals is precisely the partiality of human essence: freedom. A free individual, one capable of recognition, desires to see freedom in the social and Natural world around them.
nowhere in the rational development of freedom does it ever make sense to put oneself in a relation of absolute dominion or absolute antagonism towards not just anyone, but of anything whatsoever. The fully free individual has no desire to dominate another for the sake of domination, not even animals, and instead enjoys not only the freedom of recognition, but the recognition of freedom.
Because if one is truly free, one cannot help but recognize freedom and desire its actuality.
Human being entails magnanimity towards animals because animals do not deserve the consideration, yet it is afforded because it is the humane thing to do, and this is concretely no mere abstract dictate of reason, but is fully felt by an actualized human being who recognizes at the highest degree. Fully actualized Spirit desires to see freedom realized, and it takes satisfaction in its reality even if that reality is the reality of a being which cannot measure up to Spirit.
with magnanimity as the only necessary relation there isn’t a reason for why biological necessity has any bearing.
As the social consciousness of modernity has come to confluence on the recognition that, though animals are unequal to human beings, they are nonetheless partially human, we have seen that we have opted to extend to them the privilege of protection within law itself, an objective ethical relation which is most interestingly done mostly out of a concern for the inhumanity of the deed and not for the quality of life of animals.
As based on the fact that for us—free beings—freedom is of value everywhere, and the fostering of this freedom is our greatest mission both in the human and animal world. It is because a cruel human being is not free, that an animal should be free from human originated cruelty.
4. In Defense of Humanity
"In Defense of Humanity: Why Animals Cannot Possess Human Rights" by Nicholas H. Lee (2014)
Mary Ann Glendon calls this allure of rights the “romance of rights” and contends that this new rights discourse focuses on influencing the courts rather than influencing society as a whole.
Rather, Smith holds, inherent worth should be based on the intrinsic nature of the species, and capacities such as creativity, responsibility, language, and the like that indicate moral differences in kind are all “capacities that flow from the nature of humans and are absent from the natures of all animals.”
He responds, however, that it is not individuals who are awarded rights once they achieve some level of special capacity.
He logically concludes, therefore, that capabilities are not at issue in this debate.
A direct consequence of rejecting human exceptionalism is that the weak lose status and can be abused by the strong.
He adds that being part of the human species is a morally relevant fact, and “[i]f the moral irrelevance of humanity is what philosophy teaches, so that we have to choose between philosophy and the intuition that says that membership in the human species is morally relevant, philosophy will have to go.”
“we may end up treating human beings as badly as we treat animals, rather than treating animals as well as we treat (or aspire to treat) human beings.”
5. The Ontogenesis of the Human Person
"The Ontogenesis of the Human Person: A Neo-Aristotelian View" by Mathew Lu (2013)
the embryo possesses its rationality in potency. But the key point is that it has the potential to manifest rationality only because it is an instance of the natural kind human being, to which rationality belongs as an essential property.
For even if we cannot easily give an account of exactly what properties are sufficient for a substance to count as a moral person, if a normal adult human being counts as a person, then so does the embryo.
This follows simply from the reasonable assumption that what makes a normal adult human being a person is some aspect of his or her human nature. Thus, anything that shares that nature would also have to count as a person.
no human being is ever “pre-rational.” All human beings are always already rational, though it is true that in particular cases their rational powers might be in potency. The key Aristotelian metaphysical grounds for this is simply that no power can be in potency except insofar as it belongs to the nature of the kind of thing that has that potential power. In other words, all human beings, including the immature and incapacitated, as well as those who are in some way “defective,” are always already rational simply because all human beings qua human beings instantiate a human nature that is essentially rational. Furthermore, this is true even if those individuals will never manifest the rational powers
on this view the set of human beings is, at minimum, a complete subset of the set of moral persons understood substances of a rational nature.
On this model the embryo has moral value for what it always already is, (in virtue of instantiating a rational human nature)
embryos are always already persons, because what it means to be a person is simply to be a substance of a rational nature, and any possessor of human nature qualifies. A particular creature either entirely possesses a human nature or entirely lacks one. Thus, it is nonsensical to speak of the embryo as a “potential person.”
If one assumes that all persons have a “right to life,” the embryo, as an instance of rational human nature, has such a right.
without something like this analysis, especially including an appeal to the teleological ordering of nature in general, and human nature in particular, we find ourselves unable to explain even very simple facts, such as that human embryos regularly mature into individuals who manifest rational activity
6. I Was Once a Fetus
"I Was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is Wrong" by Alexander R. Pruss (2001)
since it is uncontroversial that it is wrong to kill an adult human being for the sorts of reasons for which most abortions are performed, it follows that most abortions are wrong.
The advantage of this argument over others is that it avoids talking of personhood
It certainly did not behave like a body part of either my mother or my father.
we can see that in the earliest days of this organism before implantation, the organism floated free, independently seeking nutrition in my mother’s womb. This organism certainly was not a part of my mother.
If an organism that once existed has never died, then this organism still exists.
it is sufficiently established that Bob, that embryo who came into existence nine months before my birth, has never died. But by my metaphysical principle, if he has never died, he is still alive.
If Bob is here, and if no part of me is a large animal, and if Bob is a large animal, Bob and I must be one and the same entity.
every organ of mine is an organ of Bob’s since Bob’s organs have developed into being my organs, and yet without any transplant happening. Thus, I and Bob are organisms having all of our organs in common. But the only way that can be is if I and Bob are the same organism
My body is simply my property, and so stealing one of my kidneys is a mere property crime–it is not stealing a part of me. These consequences are ethically unacceptable.
Finally, if this is right, then the traditional rallying cry of abortion supporters that “it’s my body” is no different in principle from the silly argument that I can do whatever I like in my house because my house is my property.
There is too much absurdity there, and so this Cartesian view fails.
it could only be used by the proponent of abortion if he had good reason to deny that the soul substance was united with the embryo from conception–otherwise, the safer thing is to refrain from killing what might be I. But since the soul substance is unobservable, no such grounds are possible
as soon as there is a unitary organism, there is a soul.
Why should the cells that were the precursors of the brain cells not be counted as having been the same organ as the brain, albeit in inchoate form? If so, then perhaps I was there from conception, even on this view.
I am nothing else than a process of thinking. We would do well to reject this view just because it contradicts the commonsensical fact that we think.
as in 259 out of 260 cases twinning will not occur, one needs to act on the presumption that it will not in fact occur.
consider the hypothetical killing of the fetus that I once was. This killing would have exactly the same victim as killing me now would.
Given that murder is a crime whose wrongness comes from the harm to the victim, it is clear that when the victim is the same, and the harm greater, killing is if anything more wrong.
we see that the wrongfulness of killing me when I was a fetus is at least as great as the wrongfulness of killing me now in relevantly similar circumstances. Thus, my moral status when I was a fetus with respect to being killed is the same, or more favorable to me than, my status now.
nothing is said here about whether I was a person when I was a fetus. That issue is irrelevant. Whether I was a person then or not, killing me would have had the same victim and involved greater harm as killing me now. Observe that if I was not a person when I was a fetus, then the harm in killing me then would have been even greater than if I was a person then. For killing me when I was not a person would thus have deprived me of all of my personhood as lived out on earth
The essential property of a being is a property which that being cannot lack as long as that being exists.
it is likewise plausible that being a person is an essential property of every person. If someone were a person and if personhood were removed from her, she would cease to exist. If this is correct, then the fetus that I was truly was a person since I am a person.
If the fetus that I was were not a person, then it would be the case that I could have existed without being a person–which is impossible.
Human dignity is a property of me that makes it wrong for another human being to set out to kill when I am juridically innocent
Human dignity is an essential property: it is part of the essence of who I am. Were I to lack this intrinsic dignity, I would not be myself; I would not exist.
But if human dignity understood in this way is an essential property and I have it, then the fetus that I was also had it– otherwise it wouldn’t be an essential property.
Whether it is acceptable to kill the fetus under those circumstances depends on whether it would be acceptable to kill me now were I to endanger my mother’s life unintentionally.
The loss of an organ does not kill a human being unless it disrupts general functioning, and in this case no disruption of general functioning occurred.
7. In Defense of Speciesism
“In Defense of Speciesism” by Michael Wreen (1984)
Personal identity seems to be closely tied to bodily identity, with the latter seeming to be either a necessary condition for the former or criteriologically related to the former.
For it would seem, first, that there is at least a quasi-meta-physical linkage between the concepts of a person and a human being, and second, that our ability to identify with human non-persons in a way that we seem not to be able to identify with sentient and intelligent nonhuman non-persons thus has a solid metaphysical basis. And it would therefore also seem, though this must be taken with caution, that there is an intimate connection between basic rights, such as a right to life, and humanity, here taken biologically.
A human being can function as a person only if he has adequate food, water, shelter, air, an intact and properly functioning brain, and the time, ability, an opportunity to acquire knowledge and develop his intellectual capacities and moral sensibilities. These conditions, among others, are what I shall call the empirical preconditions for human personhood (EPHP).
If they are satisfied, the beneficiaries can take no credit for having seen to it that they were; that wasn’t their doing. And if they are not satisfied, the victims deserve no blame; that also was not their doing. The latter, the victims, are Fortune’s Fools, or, in the case of the infant and the fetus, Fortune’s Not Yet Favored (if they are lucky).
Basic rights may well depend on personhood simpliciter in a world in which the notion of a person were easily separable from that of a human being, and in which personhood wasn’t bound by biological, social, physical, and psychological factors, or by the vulnerabilities to which human flesh and mind are subject, or by the real threats to existence which we all face, threats posed by conditions over which we have little or no control
Human non-persons, then, should be ascribed basic rights; for although in the primary case it is persons who are ascribed basic rights, equality of opportunity, or, better, fairness, requires us to ascribe basic rights to human non-persons as well.
they were denied the opportunity to become or to remain persons.
The reach of basic rights, then, exceeds the grasp of personhood, and that because we live in the world, and the decidedly imperfect world, that we do.
For personhood is species-specific (so far as we know), and within our species the norm: its absence, not its presence, calls for special explanation.
Gifts of fortune, unlike personhood, are no one’s birthright.
8. Is Speciesism Like Racism and Sexism?
"Is Speciesism Like Racism and Sexism?" by Mathew T. Lu (2017)
In short, discrimination on the basis of race or sex is not wrong per se. Rather “racism” and “sexism” name precisely those cases in which race or sex are used to discriminate even though those factors are properly irrelevant to some broader end or purpose. That is what makes them examples of injustice and the product of irrational judgments.
In the case of racism or sexism the false judgment is that race or sex is a relevant criterion for making a distinction in some particular case. In the case of speciesism the false judgment is supposed to be that membership in a biological species is a relevant criterion for moral personhood.
First, he focuses almost entirely on the active exercise of certain powers, e.g., using language. Second, he fails to understand how such capacities (i.e., potencies) properly belong to (and only make sense in the context of) the nature of certain kinds of substances.
Instead, what actually matters is that human beings are a natural kind that is rational by nature. Now, as it happens, it is true that all members of the biological species homo sapiens
sapiens are in fact instantiations of the natural kind that we call “rational animal.” But non-humans could, in principle, also belong to that natural kind.
What ultimately matters for moral personhood is not biological species membership but the possession of a rational nature. It is, however, absolutely crucial to understand that not every individual who possesses a given nature will be able to actively exercise all the powers that belong to that nature at any given time. While all human beings are rational by nature, not all individual human beings can actively exercise the characteristic powers of that nature, such as the use of language and abstract thought. But, metaphysically speaking, it is only contingently (or accidentally) true that such individuals lack the ability to actively exercise those powers. On the other hand, beings that are not rational by nature – whether rocks or dogs – lack those powers essentially.
It is not that a non-rational being has been replaced by a rational one. Rather, the very same being was rational by nature from the beginning of its existence, but those rational powers remained for some time in potency and were only (contingently) actualized at a later time. Nonetheless, in virtue of her rational nature those powers were always properly predicated of her, even before should could actively exercise them. The powers belong to her substantial nature, whether or not they are actively exercised.
They point to essential realities about the natures of certain kind of things (humans, salmon, oak trees) even if it turns out that particular members of those natural kinds never happen to exhibit the properties in question for contingent reasons.
the rational powers belong to the essence of human beings even though some particular human beings might never actively exercise those powers for contingent reasons
Even though she will never exercise the rational powers, she nonetheless actually possesses them (in potency) precisely because, as a human being, she has a rational nature.
Ultimately, it is impossible to make sense of a capability or potency except with regards to a particular nature or essence. In other words, exercising a rational power just is, and can be nothing else than, the actualization of a potency of a rational nature.
just because someone refuses to do metaphysics explicitly does not mean that he is not implicitly employing a variety of (undefended) metaphysical presuppositions.
since properly understood personhood is founded precisely on the possession of a rational nature and all members of the human species possess such a nature (including those contingently unable to actively exercise the rational powers), there is hardly anything that could be more relevant to the question of whether a particular individual is a moral person.
Recognizing the moral status of all human beings is the opposite. It is an expression of justice (giving to each his due) on the basis of a true judgment about his nature.
9. Embryos & metaphysical personhood
"Embryos & metaphysical personhood: both biology & philosophy support the pro-life case" by Kristina Artuković (2021)
in order to explain why abortion is morally impermissible and should be legally impermissible, we will have to (a) address the relation that members of our natural kind, including preborn humans, must have towards metaphysical personhood, which should (b) establish the proof of their moral status, which would then (c) provide a substantial reason for giving them protection via legal personhood.
All beings of the same kind necessarily take part in the essential properties of that kind which designate them through the entirety of their existence.
It would be very, very easy to say: all humans take part in metaphysical personhood, therefore all of them have moral status. However, we would fail to address how exactly humans take part in metaphysical personhood and deal with those gray areas of “human non-personhood.”
all living humans must have an inherent and active relation to metaphysical personhood
Attainment of metaphysical personhood is why zygotes, embryos, fetuses and newborns necessarily have moral status. As individual members of our species, they are always in an active, inherent, self-initiated and self-governed relation of attaining the capabilities we all share radically, as members of the same rational type of natural kinds. Every increment of the human developmental process, from conception to the end of our life, is part of the physical and metaphysical chain that sustains or enables the capabilities that comprise metaphysical personhood. This is a nice example of how science without philosophy cannot tell us what human means, and how philosophy without science cannot explain human in a relevant way.
These two processes aren’t stopped by negative factors, but instead are organically overshadowed.
after this relation becomes absolutely passive, these humans nonetheless retain a remnant of their moral status through their corporeality, echoing in the legal universe, since we generally find it morally and sometimes even legally binding to respect their explicit will regarding the integrity of their body and regarding the transfer of their property, all within the framework of common good. This also serves as a reminder that there is no sharp distinction between the body and metaphysical personhood — they are infused into each other from the moment of conception.
Attainment, retainment, and restoration are actual, not potential. So the moral issue of prenatal justice is actually about what we are stopping by killing prenatal humans. It may be one thing to kill something alive but essentially non-sentient, but it is a fundamentally different thing to kill an entity that is actively involved, with the entirety of its corporeality, in the finite and foreseeable process of attaining consciousness and reason. And how do we prove that? In the case of prenatal humans — easily, because they are bound by the developmental rules of our kind.
10. On Abortion
“On Abortion” by Rehumanize International (2019)
Modern pro-choice ideology seeks to exclude certain human beings from personhood based on factors such as size, dependence, and ability level. Pro-life people, on the other hand, often argue that we must expand personhood, eliminating these arbitrary distinctions
Throughout history, the concept of personhood has almost exclusively been used as an excuse to discriminate against whole classes of human beings. While expanding the definition of personhood could prevent further dehumanization and violence, we propose an alternative solution: "personhood” should not be amended — it should be abolished.
We advocate for human rights, not person rights, because the definition of who can or cannot be a person is ultimately a rhetorical debate that ignores scientific facts. If there could ever be a category of “living humans who are not persons,” then personhood at best is a useless attribute. At worst, it is discriminatory and deadly.
11. The Uncertainty Principle
"The Uncertainty Principle" by Abort73 (2017)
In order for abortion to be justified, there must be absolute certainty that it does not kill a human person.
there are only four possibilities with regard to abortion. They are:
The fetus is a person, and you know that.
The fetus is a person, but you don't know that.
The fetus is not a person, but you don't know that.
The fetus is not a person, and you know that.
Now consider each of these ramifications in actual practice:
If a fetus is a person and you know that, then abortion is an act of homicide. You intentionally killed an innocent human person.
If a fetus is a person but you don't know that, then abortion is an act of manslaughter. You unintentionally killed an innocent human person.
If the fetus is not a person but you don't know that, then abortion is an act of criminal negligence. You didn't kill an innocent human person, but you intentionally risked doing so.
If a fetus is not a person and you know that, then abortion is an act that needs no justification. You did nothing more significant than getting a haircut or removing your tonsils.
Notice that only one of the above scenarios justifies abortion, and notice that it is a scenario that does not exist in the real world. No one can say with absolute certainty that abortion does not kill a human person. At best, someone can be strongly convinced that it does not, but they have no capacity to prove so, since their metrics are indistinct and immeasurable.
Personal conviction makes no difference. The absence of human life must be completely verified before any of these actions can take place.
In the context of abortion, the burden of proof lies with those who want to justify the practice, not with those who oppose it.
As such, it is not the responsibility of abortion opponents to prove that abortion does kill a human person; it is the responsibility of abortion advocates to prove that it doesn't. If ANY uncertainty exists, then abortion cannot be justified.
12. The Apple Argument Against Abortion
“The Apple Argument Against Abortion” by Peter Kreeft (2001)
Roe used such skepticism to justify a pro-choice position. Since we don't know when human life begins, the argument went, we cannot impose restrictions. (Why it is more restrictive to give life than to take it, I cannot figure out.)
You're not sure there is a person there, but you're not sure there isn't either, and it just so happens that there is a person there, and you kill him. You cannot plead ignorance. True, you didn't know there was a person there, but you didn't know there wasn't either, so your act was literally the height of irresponsibility. This is the act Roe allowed.
In Case 3, the fetus isn't a person, but you didn't know that. So abortion is just as irresponsible as it is in the previous case.
You cannot legally be charged with manslaughter, since no man was slaughtered, but you can and should be charged with criminal negligence.
Only in Case 4 is abortion a reasonable, permissible, and responsible choice. But note: What makes Case 4 permissible is not merely the fact that the fetus is not a person but also your knowledge that it is not, your overcoming of skepticism.
So skepticism counts not for abortion but against it.
13. Personhood status of the human zygote, embryo, fetus
"Personhood status of the human zygote, embryo, fetus" by John Janez Miklavcic and Paul Flaman (2017)
The study also suggests that the developmental potential of the human zygote genome is unique in some respects from that of the murine zygote genome. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the human from the murine zygote genome likely extends to other mammalian species and other human cell types in its totipotent and pluripotent properties for early human development. There are features of the zygotic DNA that are unique to the development of a human organism. While some believe that humans are distinct from other animals due to attributes of self-reflection, cognitive sapient awareness and advanced reasoning, there are also fundamental distinctions in the biology of humans that stem from initial development at the one-cell stage. One could thus propose that certain features appearing in embryogenesis and fetal progression that are uniquely human (i.e., cognitive sapient awareness) are uniquely reliant on human zygote DNA (and its division and subsequent development). This argues strongly that the human being at the one-cell stage already possesses the status for personhood.
The appearance and development of organs cannot be a criterion for personhood since the continued differentiation of tissue in the adult human means that there is a risk of having personhood status revoked from an individual if and when an organ may take on the appearance (and function) of another organ (see Capacities section for further discussion). Although, due to the constant de- and re-differentiation of tissues, who can say which features or at which time a human being actually becomes a human person? Human biology is not static, and humans are in a continual state of organ and tissue turnover. Proposing that personhood relies on achieving certain biologic milestones would mean that personhood status too would not be static and would be a “moving target.” It would not serve to have personhood as a concept loosely bound to philosophical arguments based on arbitrary criteria whereby a human can cyclically gain and lose personhood repeatedly.
Given the genetic component of intelligence, it stands that a combination of numerous genes is expressed to produce the intelligence phenotype. It is likely that many of the genes that contribute to intelligence have yet to be discovered. Shi and Wu describe the expression of genes at several stages in the pre-implantation embryo: fertilization, cleavage, morula, and blastocyst (Shi and Wu 2009). Genes are not expressed solely after birth; genes including those related to intelligence are expressed in parental gametes, at the single-cell zygote stage, and throughout all prenatal stages. Intelligence then is a capacity that is developing and present in an individual even before birth and potentially as early as fertilization. Thus, the intelligence criterion does not preclude personhood status before birth, at fertilization, or at an earlier stage of development.
In the case of the prenatal and postnatal human being, change is only in regard to the continuum of development. This notion is supported by George and Tollefsen (George and Tollefsen 2008) in stating that “the difference … is merely a difference between stages along a continuum” (119). As personhood is an ontological concept, then exhibiting actual characteristics is inherent in the “potential” being. The ontological person is not a sum of its parts, so exhibiting qualities of an actualized person in the “potential” state qualifies a being as a human person. In the case of an “embryonic human [being] and that same human [being] later in life … there is only a difference of degree” and “the changes from embryo to fetus to infant to adolescent … are merely changes in degree of natural development of the entity” (George and Tollefsen 2008, 120, 123) that constitute the ontological person.
There is risk in allowing exercisable capacities to define personhood, as doing so may confer more or less moral status to some persons over others. For example, if self-consciousness was deemed an essential characteristic for personhood, it can be said that some persons have more self-consciousness than others and thus have more moral status than others (Lee and George 2005, 13–26). In this example it can easily be seen how bestowing personhood on the basis of capacities necessarily conflicts with the right to equality among people as some persons develop more or greater capacity than other persons and would thus have a higher moral status than others. Extending the argument for personhood on the basis of any other capacity is subject to the same rebuttal. It follows then that all humans are deserving of personhood irrespective of the degree of development of capacities.
Proponents for personhood on the basis of capacities (i.e., McMahan and self-consciousness) may also argue that personhood can be revoked upon the loss of capacities. We argue, however, that even if there was a capacity that was deemed necessary for personhood and this capacity was lost, revoking personhood would be erroneous since capacities can often be restored. Consider that Jones describes the “brains of human beings [as] far from fixed” in relaying the concept of plasticity of brains (Jones 2004, 22–31). In the case of neurodegenerative cell death in Parkinson’s disease (Gaillard and Jaber 2011, 124–33), neurological restructuring of the brain for new synaptic connections potentially allows some functionality to be restored. The brain is able to create new connections to restore abilities. For example, if the capacity for speech is hindered or lost, it is possible that the brain can restore some or all of the ability for speech by creating or restructuring neural networks. The range of plasticity for which the brain is capable of restoring capacities (and which specific capacities) which have been lost is unknown. Thus, defining personhood by capacities encounters an ethical incongruency in clinical decision making and associated healthcare provision. Revoking personhood upon loss of capacities, when the capacities may be restored would be erroneous and, thus, defining human personhood using any criteria for capacities is flawed.
14. Construction vs. Development
"Construction vs. Development: Polarizing Models of Human Gestation" by Richard Stith (2014)
The humanity of a developing embryo—and not just its humanity in general (or essential humanity) but also its particular humanity (sex, race, likely height, even special talents, etc.)—seems to them present from conception rather than something to be added on from the outside in the course of gestation. For constructionists, the embryo is only a first step toward making a human being; for their opponents, the embryo is a human being taking his or her first developmental step.
In brief: a living organism defines itself independently of our definitions.
The humanity of the embryo, however, is always objectively present and active: the embryo is stamped from conception with the design of a human being, and that design is not just some sort of passive blueprint. It is a directing power gradually revealing its nature. Though (like the block) the embryo can linguistically be said to have a hidden potential, its active inner design already gives the embryo a species identity and an individual identity
an embryo cannot be fully described (certainly not as “rocklike” or “wormlike”) without disclosing its active inner potency, perhaps someday including (as we learn more) its particular individual character (race, deep sexual tendencies, and more). To call its future merely “potential” is thus misleading at best, in that the word can refer ambivalently either to a passive potential or to an active potential.
An “in-divid-ual,” a being unified and indivisible, cannot be composed of unrelated parts that some outside force has simply pushed together into a certain shape and then abandoned.
she will not envision the unborn fetus ever to be truly alive. Even if it finally fulfills her subjective criteria for counting as a living human being, the fact that it appears to be merely constructed means that it cannot be fully appreciated as a living human being, for its form will not seem to sustain itself. Put another way, no mere construction can, at any stage, be as fully alive as a developing being is from the first moment of its active development, for only the latter contains and gradually manifests its own form.
If the latter are constructionists, and construction alone cannot generate life, then their lack of passionate opposition to late-term abortion makes sense. Yes, the fetus now meets their definition of a human being, but it still does not seem to them really alive because they still define it rather than it defining itself.
Once a concession has been made to the concept of manufacture and to an arbitrary point at which development has proceeded “far enough” along the assembly line to generate a human being, the precise positioning of this point becomes purely a matter of preference, convenience, and the power to enforce one’s view.
The capacity to be a friend is a universal trait of human beings and yet also a personalizing one.
every friend is a unique individual. To say that an embryo could be a friend is thus to envision it as a human individual even though nothing individual is yet known about him or her.
15. Beyond the Abortion Wars
"Beyond the Abortion Wars" by Charles Camosy (2015)
a human fetus or an infant, if she or he is allowed simply to develop and fulfill the potential inside of her/him, will do all of these things. This potential, I would argue, is why both prenatal children and newborn infants are persons.
The problem, rather than actual disagreement, largely comes from confusion over the meaning of the word "potential."
The first understanding is something like what we mean by "probability," or "chance." In this view, a being has the potential to become X if that being has a percentage chance greater than zero of becoming X. But the second understanding refers to potential of a different kind: what already exists inside a being as the kind of thing that it already is.
she is speaking of the potential that already exists inside of you. It is part of who you are as a human person. It is potential based on the nature of the kind of thing that you already are.
It ceases being a tree and becomes a new kind of thing. The fancy phrase I like to use for this process is a "nature-changing event."
It just needs energy and the right environment to become the kind of thing it already is. No "nature-changing event" is necessary.
This is not true of the human fetus or newborn infant. These entities are already human organisms, and thus they already have this potential inside them based on the kind of things that they already are. Based on their nature. No "nature-changing event" is necessary. They only require energy and the right environment to express their potential to become the kind of thing they already are.
Indeed, we already acknowledge this kind of potential when we say that a prenatal child or newborn has a "disease" or "injury." Something accidental to her nature is frustrating her ability to express the potential that exists inside of her. If we find a way to heal the disease or injury, we don't consider this to be anything like a nature-changing event. We say that the potential that always existed inside her was finally able to be fully expressed. A diseased or injured person, when healed, is finally able to fully express who he already was the whole time.
consider a severely mentally disabled human being who has the cognitive and mental capacities similar to those of a high-functioning dog. Why should that human being be treated in a different way than the dog is…?
16. Gaining and Losing Personhood?
"Gaining and Losing Personhood?" by Alexander Pruss (2023)
1. Love (of the relevant sort) is appropriately only a relation towards a person.
2. Someone appropriately has an unconditional love for another human.
3. One can only appropriately have an unconditional R for an individual if the individual cannot cease to have the features that make R appropriate towards them.
4. Therefore, at least one human is such that they cannot cease to be a person. (1–3)
5. If at least one human is such that they cannot cease to be a person, then all humans are such that they cannot cease to be a person.
6. If all humans are such that they cannot cease to be a person, then it is impossible for a non-person to become a human person.
7. All humans are such that they cannot cease to be a person. (4,5)
8. It is impossible for a non-person to become a human person. (6,7)
9. Any normal human fetus can become a human person.
10. Therefore, any normal human fetus is a person. (8,9)
17. Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism, and Moral Status
"Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism, and Moral Status" by David Hershenov (2023)
The causal relationship between the stages of entities that belong to a natural kind will serve to distinguish the embryonic human animal and person from other Four-Dimensional objects that likewise are mindless at one time but later think.
Our intuitions that we would survive certain hypothetical changes as indicated by what appears to be prudential concern for the resulting individual can’t be accounted for in terms of the persistence of a capacity for self-conscious reflection or ties of psychological connections and continuity. My contention is that only an appeal to a criterion that identifies us with a future thinker in virtue of sharing the same biological life can make sense of such responses.
Four-Dimensionalism can be defined as the view that “Necessarily, each spatial-temporal object has a temporal part at every moment of its existence”
An entity is said to perdure if it persists in virtue of having temporal parts.
Three-Dimensionalism is a view that denies that we have temporal parts, are extended in time, and persist by perduring. Rather, we are said to persist by enduring, being wholly present at each time that we exist.
the mindless embryonic stages are the same kind of stages of the latter thinking person – i.e., they are all animal stages. There are mindless animal stages linked by life processes to thinking animal stages. They are all living stages of an animal. Their diachronic (as well as synchronic) unity is due to their parts being caught up in the same life processes. They are stages of the same token of a natural kind, not parts of two things of distinct kinds cobbled together in virtue of the principle of unrestricted composition
So the idea is that there’s a principled distinction between things that have thinking parts at one time in their existence but not at another. The mindless animal stages that are part of a later thinking thing are stages of one and the same animal. The later thinking stages are also animal stages united by life processes.
I suspect only the human animal will have its mindless and thinking stages bound by the same unity relation. And the reason there is no animal composed of you up to this moment and another reader after this moment is that there is not the appropriate immanent causation characteristic of life processes, the earlier stages of a life causing the successive stages of the same life. Likewise for the composite of
the scattered gametes and the reader that resulted from their fusion. There are three lives involved. The same life does not link them diachronically or synchronically.
So we can grant that mindless human animals are persons without having to bestow that title on every object which has mindless stages preceding its thinking ones.
Olson cautions that trying to determine what is directly involved in the production of thought is as hopeless as trying to determine which of the many workers, suppliers, managers, tools and materials is directly involved with the factory production of a knife, or which parts of the body are directly involved with walking. He insists that the problem is not even one of vagueness – it is not that we have a clear application and then boundary cases. Instead, the fault lies in the notion of directly involved being unprincipled.
The animal needs to be alive to think. The fact that the event of someone’s biological life could configure less material than it does is irrelevant. While it is true that one’s animal can become smaller, that does not mean that the life processes which make thought possible were not earlier an event of a larger substance. Since one’s thoughts depend upon the contribution of such processes, wherever they are located, so is the thinker of those thoughts to be found. And that life is dispersed throughout the body.
Damasio’s acceptance of “the idea that the mind derives from the entire organism as an ensemble” (1994, p. 225) leads him to reject the assumptions underlying one of philosophy’s most famous thought experiments - the brain in the vat. He claims the disembodied brain floating in a vat of nutrients, without perfect duplication of the inputs and stimuli outputs, might not even be able to think.
We are persons because of our capacity for self-consciousness, but that capacity is not actualized during all of our stages.
So to then insist that the thoughts are ours as long as some part of the brain produces them is unwarranted. The boundaries of the brain have been rather arbitrarily drawn by the authors of anatomy texts rather than determined by a unified function. The brain does many things, only some which involve the fore-mentioned neurological processing of pain and pleasure sensations. Since such sentient activities are not what unifies all the parts of the brain, there are not grounds for claiming we persist as long as somewhere in that brain are the vehicles of such sensations.
once readers see that thinkers are best individuated by life processes, it becomes arbitrary to claim only part of the animal is a person.
our prudential intuitions, our belief that we are persons if any entities are, and the maximality principle all serve to indicate that the human animal is the least arbitrary candidate for the persistence of the person in the above cases.
mindless animals have interests: they have an interest in food and survival and flourishing of a sort. We can speak of things going well for mindless animals, their functioning as they should. They have a good. As creatures with a good, a later mental life can earlier be in their interest. That mental life will serve the animal’s interests or telos. Just as other organ systems served to keep the organism alive and flourishing, so will its later cognitive systems.
it still makes sense to speak of a telos due to an innate development pattern (or design) and an interest in that telos of mindless human animals.
neither an individual sperm or egg, nor the scattered pair of gametes whose chromosomes have yet to fuse, possess a genetic nature that determines the particular capacities whose actualization can make a life good.
What the fetus is finally, is something that makes itself self-aware: that good is the fetus’s good – this is its nature. Anything benefits from the good which it is its nature to make for itself. I submit that we have a prima facie duty to all creatures not to deprive them of the conscious goods which it is their nature to realize
18. An Alternative to the Rational Substance
"An Alternative to the Rational Substance Pro-life View" by David Hershenov (2023)
My critique of the Rational Substance View is that it’s bad biology and questionable metaphysics, as rational capacities aren’t essential and their loss or gain doesn’t constitute substantial change.
I’ll contend that rational development is a contingent rather than essential trait.
I’ll instead recommend to pro-lifers the Healthy Development Account in which fetuses are contingently rational and the morally relevant potential is that of healthy development.
mindless human beings have interests in healthy development, the satisfaction of which results in sophisticated, rational, reflective mental lives capable of unrivalled levels of well-being. This will bestow upon them great moral status.
The reductios of potentiality plaguing many other pro-life approaches are circumvented by the Healthy Development Account on the grounds that they all involve creatures that aren’t unhealthy if they don’t become persons.
If an animal lacks a root or radical capacity for rationality, then it is not a human being. It could have human parents but not be human because it is lacking a rational nature.
George and Tollefsen (2011) hypothesize that some miscarried fetuses were so chromosomally deficient that they were not human.
The capacity is untapped. But it is part of our nature. All human beings, including our embryos, have it.
The Rational Substance Pro-Life View will maintain that fetuses have great moral status because of their ability to later actualize their root capacity for rationality.
the active or intrinsic potential of the human fetus to develop its mental capacities is morally significant.
development is a matter of degree, not kind.
it is not the capacity that matters but being a member of the kind. And that kind membership doesn’t come in degrees. We are all human. We are not human to different extent.
If a living being ceases to exist, then it has died as death involves ceasing to instantiate life processes
A non-rejected organ shouldn’t destroy the recipient.
the reductios of potential believed to befall accounts that bestow elevated moral status on mindless and minimally minded humans in virtue of the mental capacities they will later manifest after considerable development can be avoided without an appeal to substantial change
"An entity has moral status if and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity’s own sake, such that it can be wronged"
I’m dubious of claims that newborns and the unborn lack the interests required for the moral standing that warrants protecting their lives. Those maintaining such a position typically fail to recognize that something can be in an individual’s interest even if that individual doesn’t take an interest in it.
What is in the interests of individuals need not be conscious or even accessible to their consciousness. It is in the unborn and newborn’s interest to survive even though they do not consciously desire to live on into the future—nor could they given their lack of the requisite conceptual apparatus.
My contention is that all living things have an interest in being healthy, which involves not just health at the moment but healthy development, the two being intertwined. The living aren’t healthy at any time that their development is stymied, and they then cease to make preparations for their growth and maintenance. And so every human potential person, even those who are too immature to have ever been conscious or are no longer conscious due to pathology, necessarily have a prima facie interest to live and develop in a healthy fashion. Their well-being when mindless just consists in their healthy functioning. And their healthy development will lay the foundation for their fuller flourishing when conscious.
Non-living mindless entities cannot maintain or undergo changes in their well-being and thus don’t have an intrinsic welfare.
Mindless living beings, on the other hand, can undergo fluctuations in their well-being as their health improves or worsens. As living teleological systems, they monitor themselves and their environments, and they respond and make internally driven adjustments to acquire and maintain health. In virtue of such results, we can state whether their lives are going well or not, whether they are flourishing or failing.
Understanding well-being in relation to flourishing that will provide continuity between the minded and mindless.
“Flourishing consists in the growth and development of the capacities of a living being.” At times later in that development, the flourishing of human beings will involve the maturation and exercise of mental capacities. But earlier, when mindless, they could be flourishing in the appropriate way for their stage of development.
If the mindless do have interests, I don’t see what else other than health could be the basis of the interests and well-being of the non-conscious. The manner in which non-conscious organisms operate can’t be described as directed at anything else but survival and reproduction.
the degree of the harm of an entity’s death depends, at least in part, the value and extent of the well-being that it loses out on
Our great moral status and interest in maintaining it is why we are protected by a right to life
While our moral status depends upon our being the kind of being capable of such great well-being when healthy, it doesn’t depend upon our always being able to reach such levels of well-being.
late in life when we have very little time left because of a fatal pathology and thus little well-being left to obtain, our moral status doesn’t diminish and our right to life doesn’t vanish or decrease in stringency.
An organism will be healthy when its parts are functioning properly. They are functioning properly when they make the appropriate contribution for members of that reference class of males and females of certain ages to the goals of survival and reproduction
Health doesn’t depend upon our values, so an interest in health won’t mean the pursuit of outcomes that depend upon and fluctuate with variations in societal values.
Living beings thrive when they are healthy. When they are mindless, health is all there is to their well-being. Health is good for the mindless and the good is their interest.
given their potential to obtain great levels of well-being when they develop in a healthy manner, that means they’ll be greatly harmed if deprived of that valuable future.
if there is an unhealthy, cognitively impaired human fetus or infant and a healthy non-human animal with comparable manifested mental abilities (which includes the equal absence of mental life), they are not equally harmed by never becoming persons, because it isn’t unhealthy for the non-human to be so mentally limited. Only human beings are unhealthy when they fail to develop into persons or cease to remain persons.
when mindless or minimally minded, it is only human beings that have interests in developing the rational mind of a person.
Present health can’t be coherently described without understanding future healthy development.
The future good must be in the mindless being’s interest when it is mindless. This distinguishes the Healthy Development Account of potential from other accounts that just ascribe moral significance on the basis of future property acquisitions or capacity actualizations or later interests.
The mindless presently have an interest in a healthy life.
it is the case that a healthy life is good for them now and their interest in health is an interest in ongoing health that includes their future healthy development. The basis for their future health is their present healthy development as structures and properties are prepared and sustained for their role in future healthy mental functioning.
The only basis that I can see for ascribing interests to the mindless is to appeal to the good realized by their healthy development for entities of their kind.
if the mindless don’t have any level of well-being, then we can’t explain why it is a harm to lapse into a coma and why the harm occurs when one is in the coma. Nor can we make sense of why it would be beneficial for someone to come out of coma or, better yet, be in their interest to become conscious for the first time.
Consciousness makes possible pain, not harm. Entities can be harmed by not becoming conscious. Individuals who are supposed to be conscious, but aren’t, can be harmed to degrees not reached by living creatures not designed to develop consciousness.
The benefit of acquiring a mind for the first time can’t be explained without according wellbeing to the mindless, while some philosophers might try to explain the harm of losing one’s mind without acknowledging well-being in the mindless.
Given that it is surely in their interest not to so suffer, we can conclude that they can have interests that they can’t conceptualize.
possession of that interest in pain avoidance doesn’t require the onset of consciousness, but merely the potential to suffer pain in the future.
If readers maintain well-being depends upon conscious interests, then a minded being only has interests of which she is aware or could immediately access.
if consciousness of the interest in health isn’t required for the neonate to possess it, then that interest should exist earlier in the fetus before there is any consciousness at all.
a scattered object is not alive and so, according to the Healthy Development Account, doesn’t have interests. Ergo, the potential of any cells other than the zygote to become a person is morally irrelevant.
The young human being’s interests in realizing that potential health, however improbable or passive, bestows upon it considerable moral status and distinguishes it from all other kinds of potential rational persons.
19. Personhood: An essential characteristic
"Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species" by Frederick White (2013)
human social order recognizes the personhood of human beings within two competing constructs—an existential construct that personhood is a state of being inherent and essential to the human species, and a relational construct that personhood is a conditional state of value defined by society.
This essay provides an overview analysis of the existential and relational constructs of personhood in the interpersonal context and finds a broad range of results that are manifestly superior under existential theory.
Such empiricism supports a normative conclusion that the good rests in the existential construction of human personhood, and gives credence to a claim of truth that personhood is an essential characteristic of the human species and is not a conditional state dependent upon circumstance, perception, cognition, or societal dictum.
The secular mind has also found in humanity that which extends beyond the physical.
The construct of a Deity allowed man to transform those behaviors into customs extending beyond the confines of a given social context, thus becoming ‘habitual convictions controlled by reason’
The latter, moral, nature of man Darwin admitted as “a more interesting problem.”
noted, Plato found intelligence as “the most divine thing in man, the most essentially human because [it is] the only part of himself which he does not share with the animal kingdom….”
However, Aristotle held the nous as distinctive to man, being “the power of responding to universals and meanings, the power of acting with deliberation, with conscious forethought, or acting rationally”
“the human race exists by means of art also and the powers of reasoning”. Human beings, unlike even the most highly developed animals, have the capacity to relate to God, to understand a moral code, and to choose to live by it.
Even Darwin in later years felt that the existence of the world as a function of natural processes was not incompatible with the transcendental,
if animals have some form of rational thought, then a conception of human exceptionalism and of human personhood based in solely in rationality would need re-examination.
While “the body is necessary for the action of the intellect,” he also held it as true that “the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body.”
For Plato it was clear that the essence of a human being transcends its physical substrate,
Echoing Kant (and Darwin), they argue that, “No neuroscientific discoveries can solve any of the conceptual problems that are the proper province of philosophy, any more than the empirical discoveries of physicists can prove mathematical theorems”
any deterministic assault of biologic reductionism upon the assertion that personhood is intrinsic to human life, or upon the doctrine of the imago Dei, is simply inconclusive.
“will again by normal processes give rise to a conscious life, or can be caused to give rise to a conscious life….”
Among the conditions he applies to personhood are rationality, consciousness, the attitude or stance taken by society, capacity for reciprocity, capability for verbal communication, and a self consciousness
“if the moral status-conferring attribute varies in degrees,” then “it will follow that some humans will possess the attribute in question in a higher degree than other humans, with the result that not all humans will be equal in fundamental moral worth, that is, dignity”
Conditional personhood is flawed in its argument that a lesser expression alters the very state of personhood.
If personhood can end before life ends, then human nature becomes a fragile expression of self-awareness, and is not a robust and inalienable foundation of human rights and culture.
Tertullian held that human personhood was not removed in impending death but rather limited in its fullest expression.
This analysis begins with two fundamental assertions: that personhood is a distinctly human state within the natural order, intrinsic to human life, and independent of the status of the human being—an assertion of existential personhood—and the antithetical position that personhood is a conditional state dependent upon circumstance, perception, cognition, or societal dictum—an assertion of relational personhood.
In existential thought, characteristics of human personhood are innate and are to be discovered. For relational theorists, the characteristics of human personhood are to be defined by the society.
‘“society” and “individuals” do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing’
“the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations.
Here, an ostensibly democratic society turns to its fundamental conception of persons as the explicit basis for political subjugation of individuals.
the objective to “turn the Jews into ‘socially dead’ beings…and, once they were, to treat them as such.”
This empirical analysis, at least in the context of the practical rationality of natural law theory, finds manifestly superior results associated with the application of an existential construct of personhood, and supports the conclusion that the good rests in the existential assertion that personhood is not a creation of society
the recognition that inalienable rights of humans endow due to equality in creation is further support to the conclusion that the good rests in the existential construct of personhood.
Such a relational construction appropriates sweeping powers to the State and sets the stage for arbitrary allocation of life sustaining resources.
Such a construction is inherently dangerous in a time of plenty, and could easily become malevolent in times of scarcity
A result of this ethic is that persons of advantage or authority may take actions toward vulnerable persons which do not depend upon the consent of those individuals and may not reflect their best interests.
Absent a commitment to an existential personhood of humanity, the right of “every person” to be free of discrimination is quite distinct from a right protecting all human beings.
Here all persons hold equality in rights to care and dignity, forming a beneficent foundation for determination of best interests.
Such empiricism supports the normative conclusion that the good rests in the existential construction of human personhood, and gives credence to a claim of truth that personhood is an essential characteristic of the human species, and is not a conditional state dependent upon circumstance, perception, cognition, or societal dictum.
The authors note that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has “in effect replaced the Cartesian dualism of mind and body with an analogous dualism of brain and body”
“there is no hope for any form of reduction that will allow one to derive laws governing phenomena at the higher level of psychology from the laws governing phenomena at the neural level”
While explicitly rejecting personhood as intrinsic to humanity, Dennett does seem to accept the converse, finding humanity “as the deciding mark of personhood”
20. Miscellaneous
we care for pain and distress that animals may suffer and try to diminish it, but not because animals have rights, but because our human nature compels us to do so. Source
Feminist philosophers have also challenged the individualism that is central in the arguments for the moral status of animals. Rather than identifying intrinsic or innate properties that non-humans share with humans, some feminists have argued instead that we ought to understand moral status in relational terms given that moral recognition is invariably a social practice. As Elizabeth Anderson has written:
Moral considerability is not an intrinsic property of any creature, nor is it supervenient on only its intrinsic properties, such as its capacities. It depends, deeply, on the kind of relations they can have with us. "Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life" by Elizabeth Anderson (2005)
Social Dominance Orientation: the ideological belief that inequality can be justified and that weaker groups should be dominated by stronger groups (Dhont, et al., 2016)
Ultimately, we must treat animals right not because of what they are, but because of who we are. Source
That legitimacy threatens universal human rights, which are grounded in the principle that all humans are equal simply because we are human. If we reject that principle and argue that our rights are based on something other than our shared human nature—that it is a creature's apparent rationality or self-awareness, for instance, that entitles it to rights—we can wind up elevating the rights of chimps and pigs above those of profoundly disabled or demented humans. Indeed, some animal-rights advocates have done just that.
Animals do not have rights or the moral responsibilities that accompany rights… and that's why we ponder our moral obligations to animals—who are, after all, the ultimate speciesists—even though animals do not do the same for us. We do so because we are human, endowed with exceptional dignity that deserves singular defense. Source
I believe we cannot live together (or even alone) without privileging our own existence. We don’t have to see ourselves as the divinely appointed stewards of creation to recognise that we bear responsibility for restoring the magnificent living systems we have harmed. And we don’t have to deny our bias towards ourselves to defend the lives of other beings. Source
some criterion has to be found which is applicable in practice and which allows us to determine whether an entity belongs to the class of moral subjects or not. Here an interdisciplinary approach is necessary that combines the above moral considerations concerning the quality characterizing a moral subject with the state-of-the-art knowledge from the natural sciences about when an entity actually possesses this quality. Source
Membership in a certain species can be suggested as a a) necessary, b) necessary and sufficient or c) sufficient condition for being morally considerable. The according claims would be that a) only (but possibly not all) members of the favored species are to be considered, b) all and only species members or c) all (but not necessarily only) species members ought to be taken into account. Source
What Solinger's analysis suggests is that, ironically, while the pro-choice camp contends that the pro-life position diminishes the rights of women in favor of "fetal" rights; the pro-choice position actually does not ascribe inherent rights to women either. Rather, women are viewed as having reproductive choices if they can afford them or if they are deemed legitimate choice-makers. Source
human beings are endowed with a certain intrinsic dignity that cannot, indeed, ought not, be degraded by cost-benefit analysis nor affirmed existentially by another's choice… Respecting the non market norms and values of these most intimate human relationships… provides the surest defense against a complete commercialization of all of human life… "The Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision" by Erika Bachiochi (2021)
Using legality as your way to define personhood, rather than humanity, will always exclude certain humans. Which is exactly what has been done throughout history as an excuse to discrimate, torture, and kill.
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. –Kant
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what is your underlying motif?
john allerdyce: the lightning rod.
whether it is your turbulent nature, your flash quick mind, or the air of unknown about you, your undercurrent is the lightning rod. you are somewhat unpredictable, but if we unravelled we would see that you know exactly what you are doing, but it makes you feel less vulnerable to pretend it was not planned. some people stay back from you, but the others would follow you cross country, for the very same reason. they do not know enough about you. the difference is in who wants to learn more. keep your golden nature, it is exciting, but do not be afraid to admit what you know. matshona dhliwayo said “lightning strikes but does not roar” — your bite will always be worse than your bark, keep that close to your chest.
tagged by: @bllakcat. tagging: @thengone, @unmorbid, @undispose, @mournlamb, @ruingod, @wiseagent, @eiqht.
what is your underlying motif?
alex claremont-diaz: the coffee.
whether it is your sharp tongue, your tendency to blow hot or cold, or the familiarity of you, you are the coffee. do not immediately assume that your undercurrent means you are bitter, a common misconception, because people who like coffee always make it work for them. coffee does not always have to be dark, it can be a warmth that is comforting and the first start to a day. you are not nearly as tough as you make out to be, but we will keep your secret. you are a constant, you will not ever go out of style. not everyone’s taste, but what is these days? an unknown quote reads “i like drinking coffee alone and reading alone... i realize that even though i like being alone, i do not fancy being lonely” — remember you do not always need to face things yourself, there is a reason people suggest “coffee?” when they want to spend time together.
julia cornwall: the home.
whether it is your warm embrace, your unwavering reliability, your smile that says “welcome back”, your motif is the home. you are the equivalent to coming out of the rain to the fire on and your slippers waiting by the door. your uncanny way of making people feel alright, you are treasured in these trying times. i respectfully request you take care of yourself, the world will never be as kind to you as you are to it. anne lammott said “lighthouses do not go running all over an island looking for boats to save; they just stand there shining” and through unconventional, lighthouses are inhabited and your cup runs over with generosity, because you probably do not hear it enough... thank you.
#⁽ ‧₊˚ ☁️⋅♡ identification: alex ˚₊‧ ⁾#⁽ ‧₊˚ ☁️⋅♡ identification: john ˚₊‧ ⁾#⁽ ‧₊˚ ☁️⋅♡ identification: julia ˚₊‧ ⁾#these are accurate 🩶 thank you deax!
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you're not disposable, callie. private callie adams foster of freeform's good trouble. you're not worthless. # undispose
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The Star-splitter
BY ROBERT FROST
"You know Orion always comes up sideways.
Throwing a leg up over our fence of mountains,
And rising on his hands, he looks in on me
Busy outdoors by lantern-light with something
I should have done by daylight, and indeed,
After the ground is frozen, I should have done
Before it froze, and a gust flings a handful
Of waste leaves at my smoky lantern chimney
To make fun of my way of doing things,
Or else fun of Orion's having caught me.
Has a man, I should like to ask, no rights
These forces are obliged to pay respect to?"
So Brad McLaughlin mingled reckless talk
Of heavenly stars with hugger-mugger farming,
Till having failed at hugger-mugger farming,
He burned his house down for the fire insurance
And spent the proceeds on a telescope
To satisfy a lifelong curiosity
About our place among the infinities.
"What do you want with one of those blame things?"
I asked him well beforehand. "Don't you get one!"
"Don't call it blamed; there isn't anything
More blameless in the sense of being less
A weapon in our human fight," he said.
"I'll have one if I sell my farm to buy it."
There where he moved the rocks to plow the ground
And plowed between the rocks he couldn't move,
Few farms changed hands; so rather than spend years
Trying to sell his farm and then not selling,
He burned his house down for the fire insurance
And bought the telescope with what it came to.
He had been heard to say by several:
"The best thing that we're put here for's to see;
The strongest thing that's given us to see with's
A telescope. Someone in every town
Seems to me owes it to the town to keep one.
In Littleton it may as well be me."
After such loose talk it was no surprise
When he did what he did and burned his house down.
Mean laughter went about the town that day
To let him know we weren't the least imposed on,
And he could wait—we'd see to him tomorrow.
But the first thing next morning we reflected
If one by one we counted people out
For the least sin, it wouldn't take us long
To get so we had no one left to live with.
For to be social is to be forgiving.
Our thief, the one who does our stealing from us,
We don't cut off from coming to church suppers,
But what we miss we go to him and ask for.
He promptly gives it back, that is if still
Uneaten, unworn out, or undisposed of.
It wouldn't do to be too hard on Brad
About his telescope. Beyond the age
Of being given one for Christmas gift,
He had to take the best way he knew how
To find himself in one. Well, all we said was
He took a strange thing to be roguish over.
Some sympathy was wasted on the house,
A good old-timer dating back along;
But a house isn't sentient; the house
Didn't feel anything. And if it did,
Why not regard it as a sacrifice,
And an old-fashioned sacrifice by fire,
Instead of a new-fashioned one at auction?
Out of a house and so out of a farm
At one stroke (of a match), Brad had to turn
To earn a living on the Concord railroad,
As under-ticket-agent at a station
Where his job, when he wasn't selling tickets,
Was setting out up track and down, not plants
As on a farm, but planets, evening stars
That varied in their hue from red to green.
He got a good glass for six hundred dollars.
His new job gave him leisure for stargazing.
Often he bid me come and have a look
Up the brass barrel, velvet black inside,
At a star quaking in the other end.
I recollect a night of broken clouds
And underfoot snow melted down to ice,
And melting further in the wind to mud.
Bradford and I had out the telescope.
We spread our two legs as it spread its three,
Pointed our thoughts the way we pointed it,
And standing at our leisure till the day broke,
Said some of the best things we ever said.
That telescope was christened the Star-Splitter,
Because it didn't do a thing but split
A star in two or three the way you split
A globule of quicksilver in your hand
With one stroke of your finger in the middle.
It's a star-splitter if there ever was one,
And ought to do some good if splitting stars
'Sa thing to be compared with splitting wood.
We've looked and looked, but after all where are we?
Do we know any better where we are,
And how it stands between the night tonight
And a man with a smoky lantern chimney?
How different from the way it ever stood?
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wip wednesday 😳
i tag myself and everyone else. unfortunately my star trek!endeavour fic is slow going because i am so sleepy lately. but i've been having so much fun imagining morse as an even more repressed half Vulcan so i know i will finish this at some point. untitled as of yet sadly ! probably won't be more than 5k in the end
Morse’s typical Vulcan formality is amplified like he’s visiting an Admiral or a prince instead of just Max down in sickbay. His hands are clasped behind his back, head and shoulders high and straight, and even his blue shirt seems brighter, or perhaps more heavily starched than usual. Something thrums below his tautness. His face is carefully neutral, but this far into their journey Max can see the tension in the lines around his eyes and forehead. He looks tired, if Vulcans ever can. Well. Half-Vulcans. But he otherwise looks unharmed. No blood or bones.
“And hello there.” Max puts the report aside again. “Lieutenant Commander.”
He can’t help himself. Any other Starfleet officer and Max would’ve applauded when he walked in. Instead he gestures to the chair preceding his desk. “Coming or going?"
Morse’s mouth thins nearly imperceptibly. Maybe three other men on the ship besides Max would've caught it. He surveys the banks of empty beds before stopping before the desk. He inclines his head. “Doctor.” And hesitates, again. "I came to inquire that if you were undisposed. Would you find it agreeable to have a drink at this time."
“You would be pressed to find a time where I am not free to have a drink, Morse, especially when such congratulations are in order.” He makes for his glasses and bottle. “Come now, let’s see them.”
Morse gives him the cool look he always uses when humans are acting a little too human around him, but when he reaches for the glass all is revealed anyway: a new dotted line has joined his braid of gold on the end of his sleeves, the two of them now matching.
Max resists the urge to whistle. He resists the urge to grab Morse’s hand and shake it violently, to grip his arm or smack his back or hold him by the shoulders and shout, “You did it, you sonuvabitch!” Instead he grins and nods admiringly and settles on holding up his glass. “To you, Morse. Congratulations - a job well done.”
Morse puts his glass down without drinking. It thunks against the desk, like the new embroidery weighs more than fabric and thread.
there will be more on ao3 eventually! it will be slight h/c as usual. jakes will be there as a petty and jealous and crushing first officer and obv thursday is captain and it will be so good
thanks for reading <3
#wip wednesday#itv endeavour#and so what if i do have a whole star trek endeavour au i've thought about for 9 years. maybe so.#my writing#my fic#ummm what else#long post#?#ig
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was waiting for ori to remake her blog, so, SMALL ANNOUNCEMENT ! this blog and its lore is tied to @parricider ! this makes them my main scourge and shipping partner, however, i am not undisposed to play with other scourges ! they will simply have some other sort of dynamic.
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I Don't Need Saving Chpt 6
TW: harassment, sexism, a little fighting violence no gore, no death, but heads will get smacked.
Chpt 6: The Brawl
Just as the sun set a booming voice echoed across the empty town. “Welcome Ladies and Gents to the Wario Staduim Brawl!”
The stadium’s dirt track had been flattened out. In the center of the dirt oval was a huge wrestling ring. Wario was in the center of the ring with a mic rallying the crowd. He was dressed to the nines. A white suit coat with pink accents and pink cummerbund, white boaters’ hat, yellow bowtie, and nice blue slacks. Several Lakitus with cameras floated around on their clouds capturing the action. Huge screens around the Stadium showed off their cinematography. One Screen had a bracket of contestants.
“Participants will fight in hand-to-hand combat until a K.O.! This will be a one v. one fight. Winner of the fight will move on until there is one champion left standing!” The rowdy crowd cheered.
Some of the notable contestants were. A Goomba with a helmet. A Toad with an eyepatch. A Pianta in a suit. A Koopa Football player named Chuck, A shy guy with a cowboy hat, A Sumo wrestler. And a large magenta shelled Koopa with sunglasses. His name was Roy, he was a leader of some of Bowsers Armed Forces. That was a surprise. The town was strictly not a part of any kingdom not even Bowsers. But Wario didn’t care as long as it brought him money.
Daisy stretched and warmed up on the side lines. She wished Luigi could be with her on the sidelines but that would draw unwanted attention to him. She wondered if he was in the audience. She wouldn’t be able to see if he was, the blaring lights just made the audience look like a dark blur. They had planned to meet up at the garage after she had won. They would take her motorcycle and her backpack filled with supplies and drive away. Daisy reached down to touch her toes. She couldn’t think about that right now. Now it was just time to enjoy the show and wait for her time to shine. She figured Luigi would show up after her victory.
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The brawl was a great romp. Hard hits and slams. The crowd ate it all up. As the contestants narrowed down Daisy got more and more excited.
Unsurprising Roy Koopa was winning. He had only to defeat Chuck and a Sumo Bro. Nervous butterflies flitted in Daisy’s stomach. She took some deep breaths.
“Enjoying the show princess?” Daisy jumped, Waluigi appeared out of nowhere and was suddenly behind her.
She glared at him. “Didn’t you ever learn it is rude to sneak up on people?”
“Before you go out there, I have a good luck gift for you.” He twisted his thin mustache. He felt quite dashing. He had on his best purple vest, a nice pinstripe shirt and a fedora with a red rose in the brim.
She turned her shoulder away from him. “Better give it to me afterwards I need to study this fight.”
“Come on princess! I know you will like it.” He grabbed her arm with is long hand.
She tried to wiggle her arm out of his grip, but he held fast. “Don’t Touch ME!”
WHAM the two were distracted by what was going on up on the stage. Roy had defeated the Sumo. He was shaking his fists to the crowd. It now was just Chuck and Roy left. Wario waddled to the center of the ring with his microphone.
“We have a last-minute adjustment!” There was a wave of ‘what’s and ‘huh’s throughout the stadium. “The Princess is undisposed at the moment. but fear not! Your new prize is revenge on the Mario Brothers!” A Lakitu soared into the center of the arena he was dangling a small cage attached to a chain. He let the cage down in one of the corners of the ring. All the spotlights turned to the prisoner. It was Luigi! His green hankie was still gaging him, his jacket was gone exposing his green shirt underneath. His hands were bound behind his back. The cage was so small he couldn’t stand up. he was on his knees and looked terrified.
“That’s right folks! The last two are fighting for Luigi! You can sell him to Bowser for a price or beat him to a pulp for all I care just get him out of my Stadium! Now who is ready to Rrrrrruuuuumblllllllle!”
Cheers erupted. Daisy struggled even harder against Waluigi. “Let go of me!” He did and she landed on her face. He jumped on her and twisted her hands behind her back. Click! Handcuffs closed around her wrists “You Monsters!” No one could hear her over the ruckus of the audience.
He lifted her up wrapped an arm around her waist. He took his other hand and clamped it down over her mouth. He carried her writhing into the shadows and into the empty hallways. They ended up outside of Wario’s office. It was the securest room in the whole stadium as it was where all the money was kept.
Waluigi kicked the door open and threw her onto the floor. He turned his back to her to lock the door. Wham! Daisy had jumped up and body slammed the tall man into the door as hard as she could. she had hoped she could slam his head into the door to knock him out, but it didn’t work.
“Why you….!” He pushed himself off of the door and turned slapping her across the face hard. It stung so bad she crouched down tears streaming down her face. He took a step towards her. Big mistake. Her leg shot out and swiped his foot. He came crashing down. She stood over him. He looked up at Daisy only to get a swift kick in the head.
Finally, he was out cold. Daisy took a deep breath of relief. Now she needed to help Luigi. She searched Waluigi’s purple pockets the best she could while her hands were handcuffed behind her back. The first pocket she reached into had her picture in it. EWWW! She ripped that up right away. The other had a key to the handcuffs. It took a couple of tries to get herself unlocked but she finally managed it. She rummaged through the office to see if she could find any other keys especially to Luigi’s cage. NONE! They must be on Wario. She pocketed some coin that was on the desk as a little revenge. She swung open the door smacking Waluigi in the head again and ran out.
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Chuck looked pretty dumb maybe Luigi could talk his way out of the cage if he won. Roy though he wouldn’t be easy to escape from. Luigi watched the fight thinking.
He heard jingling of metal on metal. He shuffled around. Daisy! She had a bobby pin and was trying to pick the lock of the cage. Luigi gave a worried look and let out some strange muffling. Daisy looked up at Luigi, but it was too late to see his warning. A meaty hand grasped her shoulder.
“What are you doing here?” it was Wario. She immediately sent a fist to his chin. Wario caught her fist in his large hand. He swung her into the side of the raised fighting ring. Twisting her arm hard behind her back.
“Waluigi was supposed to be taking care of you!” Daisy used her other arm to push away from the wall. She kicked behind her hard. Jackpot! Wario stumbled back, hunched over holding his groin. Daisy sent a swift upper kick contacting with is jaw. He landed on his back unconscious. She dug in his pockets and found a large key ring hooked to his belt look. There was probably a key for every room in the Stadium. She got to the cage and tried several keys. This would take a while.
Smack! The Crowd cheered. Oh no! she looked up to see Roy with his foot on the back of his opponent. he was shaking his fists in the air. She thew the keys into the cage and jumped into the ring. Luigi started to use the keys to saw at the ropes that bound his hands.
“Hold it right there Roy!” the audience gasped. “You are going to have to get through me if you want Luigi.” She pointed her thumb into her chest.
Roy kicked his downed opponent off the stage and started stalking toward her. “So be it princess.”
He swiped his claws at her. She ducked and kicked at his legs. They were too stable! He took a stomp at her. She rolled out of the way. He was too protected! She ran to the edge of the ring to get her time to think. Roy Charged. She jumped to avoid his attack she landed on the back of his head. There was a clattering sound. Daisy rolled into the landing.
“OH MAN! MY SUNGLASSES!” Roy gently picked up the pink sunglasses he had sported. He put them up to the light to see if there were any scratches. This was Daisy’s time. She jumped on to his shoulders and held his head tight while she used her other hand to punch him in the head several times. Roy dropped the glasses and struggled.
“Pass out pass out pass out!” she hoped. Her fist was throbbing.
Eventually he grabbed hold of her head and slung her off of his shoulders. He rubbed his head and glared at her. She got up from the ground. Roy ran at her again she slipped to the side. One of his claws caught her arm. She scrambled to the other side of the ring. Instead of turning around normally he got into his shell and used his momentum to bounce off the ropes. Sending his spiked shell hurling toward her. She ducked. The bottom of his shell hit her shoulder and hands that she had up to protect her head. He's shell skidded and stopped at the ropes in front of her. Daisy was on the floor she was running out of energy. She needed to get up and far away from her opponent. On the other side of the ring, she saw the pink sunglasses laying abandoned.
She scooped up the glasses and hopped onto the corner of the ropes. “Oh Roy!” She sung out. He had popped out of his shell and was rubbing his head “lookie at what I got!”
Roy turned to glare at her. “Hand them over or you’ll Die!”
“Catch!” She tossed them just short. Causing Roy to dive forward to catch them before they hit the ground. Daisy jumped off the corner post. Her heel collided with the back of his head. SMACK! His head slammed into the ground. Daisy hopped off of the large turtle. He was out cold. The glasses shattered on the ground.
Cheers rung out. What a twist! Everyone was entertained! Daisy celebrated her victory with woops and jumps. There was a clunk. Luigi had found the right key. He ran up to her and lifted her on his shoulder in celebration.
When he dropped her down, a Lakitu handed her the mic. “That’s right! Daisy of Sarasaland is your winner! If anyone wants to mess with me or my country, you will get my fist!” she raised her fist to the air. “As winner of this Brawl, I’ll let you all on a little secret.” She reached for the keys in Luigi’s hand. “These keys are to the Stadium, Wario and Waluigi are knocked out and their stash of coin is unguarded.”
She saw the green Toad chief he was looking down at Wario. He had a drink that Wario had requested before the commotion. Daisy tossed the keys to him. “Have fun.” The drink spilled as he caught the keys. A stampede of ‘employees’, and locals came after the Toad. He jumped and ran as fast as he could to get to the office before them.
Daisy felt someone take her hand gently. She looked over to Luigi, he was looking worryingly at the cut on her arm. He untied the green handkerchief from off his neck and tied it around her arm. He was so soft and gentle and calm in the craziness that stormed around them. She caught his hands “Let’s get out of here.” He nodded vigorously.
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#I Don't Need Saving#I Don't Need Saving Chpt 6#fanfic#fanfiction#nintendo#luigi nintendo#daisy x luigi#luigi#luigi x daisy#luaisy#princess daisy#mario kart#mario land#super mario#wario#waluigi#waluigi is a creep#super mario bros#toad mario#roy koopa#super smash brawl#super smash bros#mr. l#Wario's Stadium
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I found this as to find the definition of a population that celebrate the perpetrator, like 'good job, you got one'. This statement be of a perpetrator who was commended of a job well done. There may be a list of commended perpetrators, that I also conclude of 'have-gotten-one', will have each 'one' they have gotten as what may be overlooked as actually pre-undisposed victims. All the victims may not even know that their own perpetrator, or violator, has befriended the victim's family and friends.
By the mentioning of "...you got one, good girl!", that 'one' that was gotten can be you. How would you know, if no one knows what is being shared out in society, or the world of civil civilizations lead by perpetrators themselves. How would you know the perpetrator is right next to you, also leading the youth into sexual servant practices, and/or tailor fitting the truth to meet primal fantasies of selfish indulgence.
In a world of modern technologies, social media, was deemed one of the most dangerous to basic living instances of civilians living a just and normal civil life that does not want underlying confusion and debauchery. The key words were "social media", and in a modern day era whose supreme reach for social status in the fast-times of challenges--that are given a wealthy dose of provisions; the actual form of communication highrises in our own biological domains of cognitive abilities.
Cognitive, cognitive as the ability to acquire in our own psychological senses of biologics. The action to acquire, is it practiced amongst individuals who share the same data? How, if possible with biological ccommunications? What social group of social media transmit with their own telekinesis-of-a-communication to exploit towards any direction of choice, as to do what one pleases? To feel justified and above the law because fear is spread with these abilities that are, ultimately, used for intimidation and self-indulgence to perhaps get revenge on an individual and their off-spring, because that victim fits the demographic description from generalizing those characteristics into their target. To have revenge on someone that has never even thought about an individual in any negative context to bare down on to their target with true hatred that is unknown, personally, has never been seen. What happens in the basic quantized-mechanics of polarities within what is known as a reality to the very basics of matter, containing negative and positive charges that keep Earth's poles stationed which ever side as UP. You know like north pole stays on one side, and the south pole stays in another. Are these the same type of charges that induce aromas from what is truly known as the victim, to have the victim stink of commiting a crime or hurting somebody.
Referring to the first paragraph between the perpetrator, victim and celebraters of the initial assault like, " wow, you really got it huh?! You are really up and aware"; as all this is to self-perpetuate immortalization of the criminal self into an underworld of stigmata and an unspoken-unseen-unheard intimacy that keeps a giver giving, and the taker, then, takes continuously without memorable anchors into each occurrence. The giver-taker relation in an intimate partner violent (IPV) relationship has a dangerous bite into the looping position of addiction. Once seen and aware of the IPV equation to cease, an abrupt cease if this equation can get dangerous. If the equation held a social group based on IPV fixes of the addiction, from the victim, can have a violent domino effect.
#para-professional#urbanplaygroundradio#up101#urban playground#biological communication#cognitive warfare#psy-op#adult playground#making ir right
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