Military Monday | Crassus’ Parthian Campaign
A Pint of History is a local history seminar series based in Hobart, which is run every third Thursday of the month. History is full of drinking. Be it alcoholic or non-, made from fruit, grain, spuds or sugar. In sorrow or celebration, glasses have been raised, from battlefields to children's parties. We continue the tradition, bringing tales of old to the pub – Shambles Brewery. Each month we set a different topic and some of Hobart's (and Tasmania’s) leading historians get ten minutes each to guide a group of amateur historians and history enthusiasts through the quirky, entertaining, and downright confusing people and events of the past.
Last week, after being part of the team for a year, I finally presented at A Pint of History. The topic: #EpicFail. I told the tale of Marcus Licinius Crassus’ woeful journey into Parthia and, with it being Military Monday, I thought I would post my presentation. Unfortunately, I don’t have a recording of it but I hope it will be an interesting read!
~ admin @sassy-cicero-says
Although remembered for being Rome’s richest man, Marcus Licinius Crassus was also a successful politician who made his way up through the ranks to hold his first consulship in 70 BCE. He was considered by his contemporaries to be a quiet, straight-forward speaker in the law courts of the time, and as a general, he was known for his zeal and courage in the civil war of 83 and 82 BCE, and a decade later he was instrumental in suppressing the servile revolt led by Spartacus where others had failed. He was an ambitious man – he sought power, as did all leading men in Rome. It led him to form a partnership in 59 BCE, known as the first triumvirate
The triumvirate was an amicitia, an unofficial coalition between two leading politicians – Crassus and Pompeius – and a then junior politician, Caesar, whose death you may be more familiar with than his life.
Essentially, the triumvirate was a personal agreement formed so they could work towards their own political ends. Who was responsible for forming the coalition? Well, that depends on who you ask, and I’m not going to add to the debate today. The important thing is to understand what motivated Crassus to take part in this alliance.
Power in Rome was influenced by auctoritas gained in political and military pursuits, of which glōria was also an important influencing factor. Politically, Crassus’ career was typical for a man from a prominent family; there was little to distinguish him from his peers. Militarily, while he’d been instrumental in repressing the servile revolt, Pompeius stole some of his thunder by arriving at the last minute and slaughtering thousands of the adversary as they fled. And, because the victory was over slaves, it wasn’t deemed as worthy as an international conquest. Crassus saw Parthia as an opportunity, a challenge. Success would mean a triumph and recognition of his prowess as a general. It would also add to his personal prestige and wealth.
The Expedition
So, with the help of his fellow triumvirs, Crassus received Syria as his province in 55 BCE. provincia was not a geographical descriptor as we understand it today. Instead, it was a responsibility assigned to Roman officials that could be militaristic or administrative in nature. In the case of Syria, Crassus recognised the potential to open opportunities as far as Bactria, India, and the Outer Ocean but there was no mention of war with Parthia in the law which gave Crassus his command. His intent was still evident, as Plutarch tells us: “there was a considerable part who objected strongly to the idea of a man going out to make war on people who, so far from having done any harm to the Romans, were bound to them by treaties of friendship.” (Plutarch, Crassus 16)
But Parthia was in a state of civil war, making conditions ideal for intervention. Orodes, the ruler at the time of Crassus’ arrival in the east, stood undisputed, but his throne was insecure. The unrest, it was argued, represented a threat to Roman interests in the area, although analysis of the sources suggests this argument was weak at best: Parthia’s preoccupation with internal disturbances effectively prevented indulgence in international adventures. But, like Gabinius before him, Crassus used a perverted interpretation of his provincial command to attack Parthia who Cicero, our only contemporary source, numbered among the most peaceful of nations.
Indeed our sources, most of which have the advantage of hindsight, believe that Crassus’ expedition was doomed from the start. Crassus supposedly ignored every bad omen, from a violent lightning storm, to the eagle on the first standard raised facing about on its own accord. Ateius, one of the tribunes of the time, even cursed Crassus’ expedition – an event Cicero confirms in his writings.
Yet Crassus pressed on, and Parthia, despite the threat of invasion, wanted to maintain the friendly terms they’d enjoyed with Rome for some thirty years. As Plutarch tells us, ambassadors came to Crassus from Arsaces [Parthia] with a short message: “If, they said, this army had been sent out by the Roman people, then it meant war to the bitter end with no question of negotiations. But if, as they had been informed, the fact was that Crassus, for his own private profit and against the wishes of his countrymen, had invaded Parthia and occupied Parthian territory, then Arsaces was prepared to adopt a reasonable attitude: he [Orodes] would take pity on Crassus as an old man, and as for his soldiers, who were rather in the position of Crassus’ prisoners than his protectors, he would allow them to go back to Rome.” (Plutarch, Crassus 18)
Defeat
As you probably guessed by the title, Crassus’ expedition did not fare well. According to tradition, he made three major mistakes which contributed to his downfall. First, after crossing into Mesopotamia in 54 BCE:
He failed to follow through with an assault on Seleucia and Ctesiphon, despite successfully capturing one city and receiving the surrender of several others.
He instead chose to withdraw to Syria for the winter:
This gave the Parthians time to prepare for his impending attack. Crassus also ignored the King of Armenia’s advice to march through Armenia where he would be well supplied and could march in safety, protected by the mountains and country generally unsuited to cavalry operations:
Instead, Crassus listened to the advice of a treacherous pretend ally and abandoned the Euphrates river – his supply line. He then marched across the arid plains of central Mesopotamia to meet the Surena, the Parthian General, and his army:
Although Crassus’ army boasted seven infantry legions plus four thousand auxiliary cavalry and light-armed troops (outnumbering Parthia’s army) they were ill-prepared to face the all-cavalry force of the Parthians. The combination of cataphracts – heavy-armed cavalry – and mounted archers proved unstoppable. When the two forces met at a location near Carrhae, the Parthian cataphracts and mounted archers overpowered Crassus’ mainly infantry force.
Crassus, fearing he would be entirely surrounded, sent a message to his son asking him to join the battle. Publius, with 1,300 cavalry, 500 archers, and 8 cohorts from the infantry led them forward. Upon seeing the advance, the Parthians who were trying to encircle Crassus turned back, drawing Publius away from his father.
Crassus received news of his son’s dire situation, but before he and his remaining forces could reach Publius, Parthian men came carrying the head of Publius fixed on a spear – it was this sight, Plutarch tells us, that “broke the spirit and paralysed the energies of the Romans.” (Plutarch, Crassus 26)
At nightfall, they withdrew to bury their dead and tend to the wounded and dying.
Following the battle, the Surena approached Crassus, who had taken refuge on a hill. He came in person to offer a truce. He said, Plutarch tells us, “that from now on a state of peace existed between King Hyrodes and the Romans; it was necessary, however, to go forward as far as the river [Euphrates] and have the terms of agreement put into writing. ‘We find,’ he added, ‘that you Romans have not got very good memories about the terms of treaties.’” (Plutarch, Crassus 31). Once Crassus came down from his position, however, a brawl broke out between the groups, and a Parthian killed Crassus. The Surena then took his head and hand as he lay on the ground, sending it to Hyrodes.
So, to put it shortly. Ouch.
Crassus’ defeat remained a great source of shame and humiliation for the Romans centuries later, and Romans agreed that the great blow to their prestige and power could only be avenged by a successful war, an attitude which influenced Roman policy towards Parthia for decades. Crassus’ loss was truly a Roman #EpicFail.
To finish off, and perhaps lighten the mood, here’s a quick summary of Crassus’ misadventure:
Select Bibliography:
Cassius Dio, Roman History. Translated by Earnest Cary. 1914. London: William Heinemann.
Cicero, De Divinatione. Translated by William Armistead Falconer. 1932. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP.
Plutarch, Life of Crassus. Translated by Rex Warner. 2005. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Keaveney, A. 1982. “The King and the War-Lords: Romano-Parthian Relations Circa 64-53 B.C.” The American Journal of Philology 103.4: 412-428.
Mattern-Parkes, S. P. 2003. “The Defeat of Crassus and the Just War.” The Classical World 96.4: 387-396.
Simpson, A. D. 1938. “The Departure of Crassus for Parthia.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 69: 532-541.
Further reading:
Marshall, B. A. 1976. Crassus: A Political Biography. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.
Ward, A. M. 1977. Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
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