#seapower | Explore Tumblr Posts and Blogs

altschmerzes · 4 months

Text

@jamiesfootball because you asked, here's a random assortment of clips of prose that are stuck in my brain, from the highlights sections of various books i've read on my kindle, some short, some longer, some profound, some that just got stuck in the gears:

Everyone's judgement was impaired. Nothing said or done now could be trusted. But somehow it wouldn't be forgotten or forgiven.

the ritual, adam neville

"Real magic can never be made by offering up someone else's liver. You must tear out your own, and not expect to get it back. The true witches know that."

the last unicorn, peter s beagle

The unicorn was weary of human beings. Watching her companions as they slept, seeing the shadows of their dreams scurry over their faces, she would feel herself bending under the heaviness of knowing their names.

the last unicorn, peter s beagle

But at the same moment, Prince Lír said, "No." The word escaped him as suddenly as a sneeze, emerging in a questioning squeak - the voice of a silly young man mortally embarrassed by a rich and terrible gift. "No," he repeated, and this time the word tolled in another voice, a king's voice; not Haggard, but a king whose grief was not for what he did not have, but for what he could not give.

the last unicorn, peter s beagle (cutting myself off here or i'd just include half the book) (some more under the cut)

"You're a knight now, Kay. You're one of them. They can't touch you, and they'll listen to you. I want you to be my go-between. You're my consiliarius, man. I trust you." Arthur leans over, grasps Kay's arm. Pulls him to himself, until their foreheads touch. "I love you, Kay. You know that, right?" "I love you too, Arthur." "We're brothers, Kay!" "Yes," Kay says. "Brothers." Arthur smiles. And Kay knows, at that moment, that he's lost him. That the Arthur he knew is gone forever, had perhaps never existed in the first place. This new Arthur is nobody's friend, and nobody's brother. He is alone.

by force alone, lavie tidhar

“This isn’t how the story’s written. There’s no happy ending for kings. They become by beating or killing the competition, then they rule, then…” He makes a chopping motion. “Another upstart comes along. And he’s young, and he’s hungry, and he’s just a little bit more vicious and he’s not scared to die. The king is dead. Long live the king.”

by force alone, lavie tidhar

The astonishing thing was how little appreciation existed for what all this meant; for what Tomahawk could do. As if it had not penetrated human understanding that each of them could transport a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead and that ships carried them by the score; the circumstance scarcely realized that Tomahawk embodied a revolution not just in seapower but in warfare itself, to the extent one could fairly state that it made little difference any longer what happened to land weapons, whether they were banned or not. It is a hard thing to say but the fact was this: All of the talk concerning the restriction or elimination of lad-based missiles constituted a historic charade, terrible in its meaning, its illusion. If the last one of these had been removed by such negotiations, nothing would have changed. It was almost as though people were being lulled into forgetting that there existed something called the sea: and that there are many seas, indeed that they occupy seven-tenths of the planet, and that there is no spot of land that cannot be reached by an object launched from some sea by a ship. People either did not know or could not grasp the fact that a single ship, such as ours, could fairly well exterminate a continent. And there were many ships.

the last ship, william brinkley

I read the letters the ship's blinker sent back in white bickerings across the water BOATS UNDERWAY SILVA BACK WITH FINE CATCH ENOUGH FOR ALL HANDS SILVA SAYS FISH AS GOOD AS CAPE COD SO MUST BE SOMETHING SINCE SILVA SAYS THAT'S WHERE GOD WAS BORN

the last ship, william brinkley

All witches are selfish, the Queen had said. But Tiffany's Third Thoughts said: Then turn selfishness into a weapon! Make all things yours! Make other lives and dreams and hopes yours! Protect Them! Save Them! Bring them into the sheepfold! Walk the gale for them! Keep away the wolf! My dreams! My brother! My family! My land! My world! How dare you try to take these things, because they are mine! I have a duty!

the wee free men, terry pratchett

#gav gab #this truly runs the gamut of a bunch of things huh #long post

19 notes · View notes

nicklloydnow · 10 months

Text

“Russia has successfully conducted tests on parts of its next-generation "Poseidon" nuclear-capable torpedo, according to reports.

Testing of reactors for the Poseidon unmanned nuclear-powered underwater drones shows "their operability and safety have been confirmed," Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported on June 23. The report was also shared on Russian-language social media channels.

"They are ready to work as intended," the Kremlin-backed outlet quoted an unnamed source "in the military-industrial complex." The first "sea tests" are scheduled for this summer.

The existence of the Poseidon "super-torpedo" was leaked to the international media in 2015 before it was formally announced in 2018. Moscow intends for the Poseidon, which can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, to be a "second- or third-strike option that could ensure a retaliatory strike against U.S. cities," according to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from March 2022.

(…)

Also known as "Status-6" or "Kanyon," state media reported that the torpedo is 20 meters long and 1.8 meters in diameter, weighing in at around 100 tons. Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow for seapower and missile defense at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, told Euronews Next in May 2022 that the weapon could have a range of at least 10,000 kilometers, or 6,200 miles.

(…)

The Russian state news agency Tass reported in January 2019 that the Russian Navy would put around 32 Poseidon drones on combat duty across four submarines, with each vessel carrying eight Poseidon torpedoes. These submarines would be part of Russia's Northern and Pacific fleets, the outlet said.

Special-purpose submarines, carrying the Poseidon "super-torpedo," will join the Pacific Fleet in the far eastern Kamchatka peninsula between the end of next year and the start of 2025, according to Tass.”

“We believe Russia’s continued observance of New START Treaty limits is increasingly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin could rely more on nuclear weapons to compensate for his declining conventional performance in Ukraine. Should Russia do so and, on the worst day, choose to preemptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal in a crisis, President Putin has a range of options to employ against America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. For this and other reasons discussed below, we believe that the United States should keep its intercontinental ballistic force “on alert” and maintain its “launch under attack” option to both ensure the force’s survivability in a conflict and deter adversaries from seriously contemplating a first strike.

(…)

While not stated directly, the only way to demonstrate a commitment to end the launch under attack option and to prevent the president from executing this option is to de-alert the force. These actions would be dangerous and would undermine America’s response to the rapid nuclear breakout of China and Russian aggression.

Montoya and Kemp are correct in suggesting that it is difficult to successfully eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in a first strike because of the total number of weapons required for this task. The 400 missiles, across 450 silos, with 45 launch control centers, and the ability to launch from the Airborne Launch Control System, make the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad a formidable challenge to a Russian first strike. These characteristics of the nation’s silo-based single-warhead missiles make them valuable; ensuring their destruction is a daunting task that enhances American deterrence.

(…)

Montoya and Kemp are correct in saying that “the United States currently maintains the option to launch under attack so that in the event of a first strike by Russia, U.S. silo-based missiles could be launched before they are destroyed.” An option does not constitute a posture or a doctrine.

The primary purpose of a launch under attack option is to enhance not missile survivability but deterrence. Deterrence is a psychological effect achieved in the mind of an adversary. The United States enhances deterrence by threatening cost imposition, reducing the benefits of action, and encouraging restraint. Launch under attack reduces the benefits of action by increasing uncertainty and perceived risk. President Putin does not know if he will strike empty silos.

(…)

With a ballistic missile force on alert, Russia must employ a shoot-shoot-look tactic because it must achieve complete destruction with a first strike or risk retaliation. This is necessary because the current launch under attack option forces Russian planners to employ a much higher percentage of the force in a first strike, hoping the United States does not launch its long-range missiles before Russian reentry vehicles strike their targets. This creates the uncertainty needed to deter a first strike.

It is also worth reiterating that a Russian first strike is highly unlikely prior to a breakout that gives the Russian military significantly more fielded warheads than the United States. In such a situation, launch under attack becomes even more important because a larger Russian arsenal means the percentage of their force needed to conduct a first strike decreases, and exchange ratios are meaningless.

(…)

Putin’s recent suspension of Russian participation in New START only underscores our view that any Russian strike on the United States will take place after a breakout that is unmatched by the United States. Given Russia’s track record for cheating on treaties (Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Open Skies), it is unwise to think they would abide by treaty requirements prior to a nuclear strike on the United States.

(…)

Thus, arguments that suggest an attack on the missile fields are somehow acceptable because the submarine and bomber legs of the triad will go untouched in a conflict are fundamentally flawed. We assess that any attack will begin with attempts to blind the United States by taking out space-based integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capabilities, all while cyber attacks and sabotage attempt to take out command and control. In our assessment, attacks on submarine and bomber bases are also likely to precede or coincide with attacks across the missile fields.

Military planners must consider the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, in which a Russian attack employs surprise and, consistent with Russia’s operational approach, uses overwhelming force in an initial attack. This leaves the United States insufficient time to deploy the submarine fleet or load and disperse bombers. Under these conditions, ported submarines and much of the bomber fleet are early casualties in a Russian first strike. With the development of a second nuclear-armed peer adversary, America must take the steps necessary to enhance survivability across the triad.

Conclusion

We do agree with Montoya and Kemp when they write, “Instead of holding fast to the idea of immediate launch, it is far sounder to build a nuclear capability that can survive a first strike and for which decision-makers are not pressed to make decisions with incomplete information.” To achieve this objective, it will take strategic decisions like building mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, increasing the number of hardened and deeply buried facilities, and placing strategic bombers on dispersed nuclear alert. Continuing on America’s current modernization trajectory will never achieve what both Montoya and Kemp and these authors desire.

It is important to maintain an on-alert missile force capable of launching under attack if the United States desires to deter Russia from contemplating a first strike on the nation’s missile fields. Removing the launch under attack option will not improve the credibility of American deterrence or reduce the risk of accidental detonation or war. It will only further undermine American credibility. With President Putin suspending Russian participation in the New START Treaty, a breakout from treaty restrictions cannot be ruled out. Such a decision would only make a launch under attack option even more important for maintaining deterrence.”

“These days, it is nuclear issues reawakened by the Ukrainian war, the widespread discussion of war with China provoked by the Taiwan dispute, the unsettled Iran question and the growing North Korean capability that are in the limelight. They are being treated as something novel under the sun. That is perplexing – and disturbing. Decades ago, very able minds conducted fine-grain examinations of the logic and psychology of nuclear strategy which produced analysis of remarkable sophistication. It acquired further authority by the experience of the past 70 years. Yet, today self-proclaimed experts and pundits take exceptional liberties that reflect neither focused thought nor history nor any awareness whatsoever that the matters they freely pronounce on have been addressed previously in a thorough-going fashion.

This situation has prompted me to attempt a summing up of what we have learned since 1945 and to apply it to present and prospective circumstances. It is intended to establish a conceptual framework for consideration of the two current deviations from orthodox nuclear wisdom that have gained currency: 1) the feasibility of employing low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) to alter the balance in a conventional military conflict; 2) the possibility that the protagonists could engage in restricted nuclear exchanges without it escalating into a cataclysm. The commentary is unusually lengthy due to the inclusion of supplementary material. (…)

10. This above logic manifestly has been absorbed by everyone who has been in a position to order a nuclear strike. No civilian leader (and nearly all military commanders) with the authority to launch a nuclear attack ever believed that the result would be other than a massive exchange -mutual suicide for those with large arsenals. Certainly, that was true from the early 1960s onwards once the USSR had deployed reliable retaliatory nuclear weapons and the notion of ‘winning’ a nuclear exchange of any kind faded in the Pentagon and among its intellectual auxiliaries. This sobering reality did not encourage risk-taking at lower levels of conflict. Just the opposite.

(…)

2b. Two things deter: certainty (see ‘3’); and total uncertainty (see ‘1’ above). Certainty can take the form of tripwires: e.g. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe deployed on the battlefield that almost surely would escalate into strategic, inter-continental exchanges. Certainty could take another form: “launch-on-warning.” That is to say, as soon as incoming missiles are detected – in whatever number, on whatever trajectory – ICBMs and SLBMs are activated and launched. That also obviates the risk that an incoming strike might ‘decapitate’ the targeted government’s leadership – leaving it paralyzed to respond. Knowledge that such arrangements are in place should be the ultimate deterrent to an intentional first-strike. However, in the event of an accidental launch or limited launch, you have committed both sides to suicide. The U.S. government never has stated that in has in place any such arrangement to provides a direct link between warning system and release of ICBMs – but there are recurrent assertions that in fact they have existed since Jimmy Carter’s day.

(…)

4d. In nuclear matters, it is dangerous to put together a team of intelligent strategic planners who have plenty of time and a mandate to think out of the box. They likely will generate intricate schemes which have a surface plausibility but in fact only a tenuous connection to reality. The performance of the RAND Corp in service to the Air Force confirms that fear. Here is an example of the extreme proposals that can emanate from this type of blue-sky thinking; One idea that got off the drawing board envisaged a reaction to signals that NORAD had picked up flights of Soviet missiles on a trajectory pointing to our own missile silos. It called for a synchronized startup of our 1,000 plus liquid-fueled ATLAS rocket engines which would produce such a tremendous reverberation as to stop the rotation of the earth for a micro-second. As a result, the Soviet missiles would miss their targets – winding up in Missouri cornfields, Mount Rushmore and Yellowstone Park instead. Physicists possessing a modicum of knowledge realized that it was a ridiculous expectation – and, if such a shock could be produced, the earth itself would split open. (See Ellsberg for a fuller account).

In short, the nuclear doctrine with attendant deployments that is most effective as deterrent is the worst to have in place were actual hostilities to break out.

Theoretically, there is a way to reconcile the two objectives: loudly announce that you have set in place launch-on-warning arrangements but refrain from doing so. Nobody is likely to call your bluff.

(…)

This reasoning highlights how reckless is both the idea that a conventional war between nuclear powers could be fought without escalating to the nuclear plane, and the belief that there is no escalatory ladder from battlefield TNWs and an all-out nuclear exchange.

7g. For a while, concocting nuclear scenarios – strategic (counterforce) and tactical focused on TNWs in Europe – was a sort of intellectual parlor game among defense intellectuals (including some military people). By the mid-70s, it ran its course as everyone came to accept the ‘Bomb’ even if they didn’t come to love it. The role of SLBMs in solidifying MAD was the capstone.

(…)

8h. Here is one general thought about extended deterrence as a ‘generic’ type. Throughout the Cold War years, the United States and its strategically dependent allies wrestled with the question of credibility. Years of mental tergiversations never resolved it. For one intrinsic reason: it is harder to convince an ally than it is to convince a potential enemy of your readiness to use the threat of retaliation to protect them. There are two aspects to this oddity. First, the enemy has to consider the psychology of only one other party; the ally has to consider the psychology of two other parties. Then, the enemy knows the full direct costs of underestimating our credibility and, in a nuclear setting, will always be ultra conservative in its calculations. By contrast, the ally that has not experienced the hard realities of both being a possible target of a nuclear attack and the possible originator of a nuclear attack cannot fully share in this psychology.

(…)

It is imperative that we restate and absorb the understanding acquired decades ago. For there is a new generation of writers on nuclear strategy that seems bent on either ignoring or rejecting it. One is the revival of “counterforce” doctrine. Simply put, “counterforce” is apposite to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in that it posits the possibility of fighting a winning a nuclear encounter. The postulated ability to destroy the retaliatory capability of the enemy through a first-strike that eliminates its missiles (land or sea-based), strategic bombers and nuclear tipped cruise missiles deployed on ships. Such a disarming blow, as the scenario goes, neutralizes the opponent’s deterrence – making the country hostage to your coercive demands. General speaking, it encourages risk-taking in crisis-management.

‘Counterforce’ concepts defined American nuclear war plans throughout the 1950s. Kennedy and McNamara forced modifications but the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) designed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was amended only gradually. Right into the 1970s, the SIOP gave primacy to variations of ‘Counterforce’ doctrine – this despite the Soviet Union’s development of an assured second-strike retaliatory capability. They remain an integral part of the SIOP to this day.

“Counterforce” ideas always have encountered two analytical obstacles: one technical, the other psycho/political. In order to contemplate such a strategy,` one must have at its disposal missiles of extreme accuracy able to destroy hardened missile silos, means to detect and destroy nuclear armed submarines, and wide coastal coverage that ensures the targeting of surface vessels. This conjectured capability, moreover, must possess a degree of reliability and precision that makes success a near certainty. Otherwise, you open your country to destruction by the enemy’s surviving force – a small fraction of which are adequate to wreak intolerable damage on population centers. Any government that perceives even a slight vulnerability to a first-strike would, of course, reject the idea of playing a “counterforce game” and instead threaten massive retaliation.

New-age “counterforce” revivalists focus on technical advantages which might aid the aggressor. In particular, there is reference to improved missile accuracy aimed at hard targets.4 Reducing the CEP (Circular Error Probability) by a few tens of feet, though, is not the crucial variable. That number already has been extremely low (50 – 100 feet) for decades. Emphasis is also placed on improved tracking technique for detecting submarines. What lacks is assurance that the net effect is to reduce the odds on retaliation by SLBM to near zero. Unless one can do that, unilateral deterrence sets in.

That leads us to the second precondition: the ability to intimidate a nuclear armed opponent by a) demonstrating a first-strike capability or b) launching a comprehensive first-strike and daring the enemy to retaliate with the remnant of its own nuclear force and face destruction itself. The counter to the first, as noted above, is to threaten retaliation against high-value targets (cities) and perhaps to deploy and advertise “launch on warning” or trip-wire mechanisms. The counter to the second is a matter of will and emotion. Nobody considering a first-strike can know with confidence what the enemy’s state of mind and emotion would be in the hypothetical circumstances. When the stake is your continued existence as an organized society, no reasonably sane person(s) will tempt fate in the hope of guessing right.

(…)

All doctrines and strategies for nuclear war-fighting – whether of the ‘counterforce’ variety or TNW variety – are largely fanciful. Not only is their logic flawed, as demonstrated above, but they predicate a cool-headed rationality of individuals and institutions which is unrealistic. Human beings are not calculating machines, no matter how high their office or how grave the matters they treat. They are susceptible to emotions and impulses that can distort or even override pure rationality. When you place them in settings where multiple other human beings are involved under intense pressure, the possibility of deviating off the track of impeccable logic increases.

In truth, we have no grounds for assuming that government leaders, at multiple levels making decisions and charged with operationalizing them, will collectivity behave as postulated by nuclear war-fighting scenarios. Herman Kahn, the early Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling at times, and today’s self-conscious revisionists have fantasized about a world that doesn’t exist.* These days, when the head of the biggest nuclear power is Donald Trump, the purveyors of doctrines that feature intricate nuclear games are as deluded as the President himself.

(…)

Nuclear strategy is a bit like Marxism or Freudian analysis or market fundamentalist economics. A lot of superior minds deploy their talents to concoct ingenious elaborations of received Truth that demonstrate brilliant logic – but their conclusions are completely divorced from reality.”

#nuclear weapons #nuclear war #russia ukraine war #wwiii #russia #posideon #henry kissinger #herman khan

7 notes · View notes