#International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
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Strengthen the meaningful engagement of girls and young women in all areas of public life, facilitating access to decision-makers.
Governments should:
- Remove any institutional barriers that constrain girl-led groups and youth groups’ freedoms of association and assembly, access to information, the right to privacy and to be heard. Their autonomy
must be respected and free from unwanted interference.
- Ensure that national laws and policies make it possible for girls and young women to choose to organise within movements or associations and legally register or not, without repercussion on their
activities or their funding options.
- Provide, along with local authorities, the necessary spaces and resources to enable girl and youth led groups to engage in public dialogue and decision-making as respected members of civil society.
- Adopt, budget for, implement and monitor national legislation and policies to ensure girls and young women activists in all their diversity, are able to actively contribute to public life. This should
include legislation that acknowledges and protects all children and young people from violence and particularly girls and women from gender-based discrimination when they choose to be politically
active. Legislation and policies should be full consistent with international human rights law including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Governments, local government and national ministries must:
- Increase, strengthen and adequately resource existing structures that enable girls and young people’s participation within formal governance mechanisms such as national youth councils,
and child and youth parliaments: ensuring these structures operate in a way that is gender- and ageresponsive and promote the inclusion of girls and young women in all their diversity.
United Nations, governments and the international community must:
- Fulfil their commitment to girls’ and young women’s meaningful participation in the shaping, implementation and monitoring of global development agendas and frameworks. This should
include upholding existing commitments to girls, gender equality and the Leave No One Behind principle in the SDG framework and other processes such as Generation Equality and the International Conference on Population and Development. To ensure girls and young women can access and freely express their views and recommendations at all levels of decision-making, governments should consider their inclusion in national delegations to intergovernmental spaces, including, but not limited to, the SDG Summit in September 2023 and the Summit of the Future in September 2024.
#girl and youth led groups#decisionmaking#innovation for equality#international day of the girl child#adolescent girls#dayofthegirl#SDG Summit#Summit of the Future#Leave No One Behind#local government#national ministries#Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)#Convention on the elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)#International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)#State of the World's girls
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What’s Wrong With Blasphemy Laws?
The End Blasphemy Laws campaign holds that “blasphemy” and “insult” to religion laws are wrong in several ways:
They violate the human right to freedom of expression
They protect religious beliefs and practices, institutions and leaders, from legitimate and often necessary criticism
They are intrinsically bad, subjective, inconsistent laws; there is no “right way” to use them
They legitimize vigilantism, mob violence, and persecution of minorities
All these areas are discussed in detail below.
Violating freedom of expression
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right for individuals. It is also vital for all societies, to enable a plurality of opinions. It is protected by all major international human rights instruments (including Article 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR)). The vast majority of countries are signed up to these conventions, and there is a strong claim even on the countries that are not signed up, namely that the right to speak freely is a basic moral right which states should uphold and protect.
Unlike freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR) which is absolute, freedom of expression can be limited under the international human rights framework. These limits vary from state to state but for example, they sometimes include libel and defamation against individuals, incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination against a person, a group or a community. (Such limits must respect strict legality and proportionality tests, as freedom of expression remains a human right, and its limitation must be the exception.) For this reason, some “blasphemy” laws may include — or be included in legislation which places — a ban on inciting hatred or violence. Such prohibitions against incitement to hatred or violence do not necessarily in themselves violate the right to freedom of expression.
However, by their nature laws against “blasphemy” and religious insult always go beyond a ban on incitement to hatred or violence. “Blasphemy” and religious insult laws always in practice prohibit, problematize or chill free expression when it comes to the asking of questions, the offering of criticism, and the expression of satire or ridicule, in relation religion.
These modes of discourse (questioning, criticising, satirising, ridiculing) belong firmly in the realm of freedom of expression. Therefore “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws, which criminalize such expression, contravene freedom of expression and are in violation of the international human rights framework.
While freedom of thought and belief, including religious belief, must be protected, it is equally important to guarantee an environment in which a critical discussion about religion can be held. There is no fundamental right not to be offended in one’s religious feelings. Religions per se do not hold rights. Churches and religious groups should be open to hearing criticism, just as every group in society. Intellectual and cultural advance rely on the free exchange of ideas. Protecting any ideas from criticism does them no favour: it allows them to survive unchanged without being adapted and improved.
Protecting religion from insult and criticism
To some it may sound desirable to protect religion from “insult”. After all, insult may seen unnecessary and hurtful to the followers of a religion. However, in practice prohibiting “insult” means prohibiting all manner of enquiry and critique in relation to religion; as seen time and again in countries around the world, it is easy to claim “insult” in response to any critical discussion of religion. As one high profile example, Raif Badawi advocated secular reforms between religious and state authorities in Saudi Arabia; for this he was prosecuted for “insulting Islam” and sentenced to 10 years jail, a 10 year travel ban, and 1,000 lashes.
So criticism bleeds into “insult”. But why should criticism as such be protected free speech? — To some it may sound desirable to shield religion from any criticism, however politely it is offered!
But banning criticism not only means violating the freedom of expression of the critic, it means that criticism is deterred or prevented altogether on:
religious beliefs and practices or beliefs and practices that someone associates with religion, (for example, child “marriage”, slavery, genital mutilation, stoning and other corporal punishments that constitute torture, denial of citizenship, bans on “inter-religious” marriage, persecution of religion or belief minorities, discrimination against sexual minorities, and many other such practices, have all sometimes been defended — or their perpetrators have claimed immunity from investigation or exemption from human rights legislation — on the basis that they are ‘religious’ practices or that they are based on ‘religious’ beliefs)
religious institutions (for example it is widely recognised that taboos against appearing to question, criticise, or threaten the public perception or ‘greater good’ of the Catholic Church and other religious institutions deters people from reporting sexual abuse and other crimes)
religious leaders (such as clerics, who in some cases may escape charges of abuse or corruption because adherents of their religion, or others, feel unable to raise their voices against them)
Shielding religion from criticism cannot be regarded as a social good. Criticism which is false can be tested and met with legitimate counter-arguments, while criticism which is true should be heard for the sake of correcting errors. In some cases, criticism helps religious thinkers improve theology. In more substantive cases, criticism is essential to shedding light on immoral or unlawful practices carried out in the name of religion.
Intrinsically bad law
The violation of the right to freedom of expression is a matter of incompatibility with international human rights legislation, as well as most domestic human rights laws. But in addition, “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws also suffer from internal inconsistency and subjective applicability.
A law prohibiting “insult” or “offence” to religion, or for “hurting the sentiments” of religious persons, may itself be “insulting” or “offensive” or “hurtful” to religion or to religious persons, if it prevents them from expressing their religious views because others find their religion offensive.
A law against “blasphemy” depends on some standard of what counts as “blasphemy”, which assumes something like a correct, inviolable standard of religion which is being blasphemed against. But even when states try to found blasphemy laws on a single religious text, it is abundantly clear that different sectarian groups within a single religion interpret all mainstream scriptures in a variety of ways, with different groups deciding that some declarations or depictions are ‘blasphemous’ while others disagree, or find other declarations or depictions ‘blasphemous’.
It may be considered “blasphemous” by some Muslims to consider Jesus of Nazareth “the Son of God”, while some Christians may find it “blasphemous” to say that Jesus was merely a prophet or an ordinary human being. Many Islamic scholars consider deviations from their own sect (either Sunni or Shia) blasphemous, as well as sects such as Ahmadiyya which they do not recognise as “Islamic”, but which are frequently treated as “blasphemous” to Islam.
In some jurisdictions, such as Pakistan, it is frequently claimed by witnesses to alleged “blasphemy” cases that to repeat what the accused is supposed to have said or done would itself be “blasphemous” and therefore they are exempted from having to explain the accusation. Courts will therefore sometimes accept the testimony of a supposed witness to the blasphemy without hearing any of the details of the accusations.
Likewise, those who call for the reform or repeal of blasphemy laws, have sometimes been accused of “blasphemy” for questioning the blasphemy laws.
The confused and subjective nature of “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws makes them bad law. They are therefore hugely prone to abuse, being used to target a variety of supposed “blasphemy”, from actual criticism or satire of religion, to merely stating alternative religious views, stating atheism, or in some cases, the accusation is entirely malicious, based on rumours or planted evidence.
“Legitimizing” mob violence, vigilantism, and persecution of minorities
Countries which prosecute “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” tend to suffer disproportionately many incidents of:
intercommunal and mob violence (for example: the episodic burning of Christian properties and murder of Christians by mobs of Muslim men in Pakistan, such as this incident in 2009 that left 6 dead, which usually follow unlikely, malicious, unsourced rumours that someone has “desecrated” the Koran)
vigilantism against individuals (for example: violence against secularist Bangladeshi bloggers in the past few years, including the murder of Ahmed Rajib Haider and a potentially fatal machete attack on Asif Mohiuddin, both of which coincided with calls by Islamist groups to have “atheist bloggers” prosecuted for writing which supposedly insulted religion and criticised religious leaders)
the general silencing and persecution of minorities (for example: in several Islamic states, Ahmadiyya Muslims are often regarded, against their self-identity, as non-Muslims who are “blaspheming” Islam, while conversely Bahai’s are often regarded, against their selfi-identity, as wouldbe-Muslims who are “apostates” from Islam because they follow Baha’i teachings! Both groups are widely marginalised and persecuted in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and numerous other states, and discrimination against them is bound up with claims of blasphemy, apostasy, or being kafir (infidels).
Criminalising “insult” to religion in the penal code, lends legitimacy to the social persecution of individuals and groups who are said to “offend” mainstream religious sensibilities, sometimes with their speech acts or writing, often just through their existence, or based on rumours spread with the intention of whipping up violence.
Moratoria and “dead letter” laws
The End Blasphemy Laws campaign recognises that in these cases, some laws may be considered for practical purposes to be unenforced, or unenforceable. Nevertheless even these “dead letter” laws remain of concern, and we want to see them repealed. There are several reasons for this:
even an apparently “dead letter” law can be reactivated. Some examples: In the weeks prior to the launch of the End Blasphemy Laws campaign (in January 2015) there were threats to file suits under the blasphemy laws in Ireland and in France in response to the publication of Charlie Hebdo. The “blasphemy” law the United Kingdom was declared by a peer in the House of Lords a “dead letter” law in 1949, but this status was unofficial and the law was used again; the last successful prosecution under the law came 28 years later, in 1977! In December 2014 the closely related death-for-apostasy law was reactivated after many years of disuse in Mauritania.
even unused or seemingly unenforceable laws can lend a legitimacy to people who argue that there is something inherently wrong with criticism of, or satire about, religion, or who advocate for the revival, use, or creation of new “blasphemy”-type laws
inactive, unused or less severe blasphemy laws in one country, still lend legitimacy to much more severe and actively-used blasphemy laws in other countries; for example the relatively recent creation of a blasphemy law in Ireland (despite there being no prosecutions under this law) has been used to justify the continued existence of Indonesia‘s blasphemy law (under which people have been sentenced to lengthy jail terms simply for posting about atheism on Facebook)
sometimes there is public desire, but no political will, to finally abolish “dead letter” laws; by listing and rating countries citing their blasphemy laws we hope to add to local pressure to repeal them.
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It's surprising which countries still have blasphemy laws, especially given how irreligious some of them are. Australia, Germany and the UK still have them, New Zealand, France and Canada have only recently repealed them.
#blasphemy laws#blasphemy#religion#end blasphemy laws#religious sentiments#hurting religious sentiments#religion is a mental illness
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On the day Meta’s new app, Threads, launched, CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained that it would be “an open and friendly public space for conversation.” In a not-so-subtle dig at Twitter, he argued that keeping the platform “friendly” as it expands would be crucial to its success. Within days, however, Media Matters claimed that “Nazi supporters, anti-gay extremists, and white supremacists” were “flocking to Threads,” posting “slurs and other forms of hate speech.” The group argued that Meta did not have strict enough rules, and that Instagram, the platform that Threads is tied to, has a “long history of allowing hate speech and misinformation to prosper.”
Such concerns about hate speech on social media are not new. Last year, EU Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton called efforts to pass the Digital Services Act “a historic step towards the end of the so-called ‘Wild West’ dominating our information space,” which he described as rife with “uncontrolled hate speech.” In January 2023, experts appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council urged platforms to “address posts and activities that advocate hatred … in line with international standards for freedom of expression.” This panic has led to an explosion in laws that mandate platforms remove illegal or “harmful” content, including in the EU, Germany, Brazil, and India.
These concerns imply that social media is a lawless mayhem when it comes to hate speech. But this characterization is wrong. Most platforms have strict rules prohibiting hate speech, which have expanded significantly over the past several years. Many of these policies go far beyond both what’s required and permissible under international human rights law (IHRL).
We know this because the Future of Free Speech project at Vanderbilt University, which I direct, published a new report analyzing the hate speech policies of eight social media platforms—Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube—from their founding until March 2023
While none of these platforms are formally bound by IHRL, all except Reddit and Tumblr have committed to respect international standards by signing on to the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Moreover, in 2018, the U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression proposed a framework for content moderation that “puts human rights at the very centre.” Accordingly, we compared the scope of each platform’s hate speech policy to Articles 19 and 20 of the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 19 ensures “everyone … the right to freedom of expression,” including the rights “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers … through any … media of his choice.” However, this right can be subjected to restrictions that are “provided by law and are necessary” for compelling interests, such as “respect of the rights or reputations of others.” Article 20 mandates that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Any restrictions on freedom of expression under Articles 19 and/or 20 must satisfy strict requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. These requirements are meant to protect against overly vague and broad restrictions, which can be abused to prohibit political and religious dissent, and to safeguard speech that may be deeply offensive, but doesn’t reach the threshold of incitement.
So how do platform hate speech policies measure up to these standards? In some areas, they are aligned closely. A decade ago, more than half of the eight platforms did not have an explicit hate speech prohibition. In 2014, only 38 percent of the analyzed platforms prohibited “hate speech” or “hateful content.” By 2018, this percentage had risen to 88 percent—where it remains today. Similarly, a decade ago, only 25 percent of platforms banned incitement to or threats of violence on the basis of protected characteristics, but today, 88 percent of the platforms do. These changes generally align with the prohibition on incitement to hatred under IHRL.
In other ways, however, platforms’ hate speech restrictions have mushroomed beyond the human rights framework. In 2014, no platforms banned dehumanizing language, denial or mocking of historical atrocities, harmful stereotypes, or conspiracy theories in their hate speech policies—none of which are mentioned by Article 20. By 2023, 63 percent of the platforms banned dehumanization, 50 percent banned denial or mocking of historical atrocities, 38 percent banned harmful stereotypes, and 25 percent banned conspiracy theories. It is doubtful that these prohibitions satisfy Article 19’s requirements of legality and necessity.
Many platforms’ hate speech policies also cover identity-based characteristics that are not included in Article 20. The average number of protected characteristics covered by platform policies has gone from less than five before 2011 to 13 today. Several of the platforms prohibit hate speech targeting characteristics such as weight, pregnancy, age, veteran status, disease, or victimhood in a major event. Under IHRL, most of these characteristics do not enjoy the same protected status as race, religion, or nationality, which have frequently been used as the basis to incite discrimination and hostility against minorities, sometimes contributing to mass atrocities.
Our research cannot identify the exact causes of this scope creep, but platforms have clearly faced mounting financial, regulatory, and reputational pressure to police additional categories of objectionable content. In 2020, more than 1,200 business and civil society groups took part in the Stop Hate for Profit boycott, which leveraged financial levers to pressure Facebook into policing more hateful content. Such concerted pressure creates an incentive to take a “better safe than sorry” approach when it comes to moderation policies. The expansion in protected characteristics may reflect what University of California, Los Angeles, law professor Eugene Volokh calls “censorship envy,” where groups pressure platforms to afford them protection based on the inclusion of other groups, making it difficult for platforms to deny any without appearing biased.
Most platforms refuse to share raw data with researchers, so identifying any causal link between changes in policy scope and enforcement volume is difficult. However, studies in the United States and Denmark suggest that hate speech comprises a relatively small proportion of social media content. There are also numerous examples of hate speech policies causing collateral damage to political speech and dissent. In May 2021, Meta admitted that mistakes in its hate speech detection algorithms led to the inadvertent removal of millions of pro-Palestinian posts. In 2022, Facebook removed a post from a user in Latvia that cited atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and quoted a poem including the words “kill the fascist,” a decision that the platform’s Oversight Board overturned partially based on IHRL.
he enforcement of hate speech policies can also lead to the erroneous removal of humor and political satire. Facebook’s own data suggests a massive drop in hate speech removals due to AI improvements that allowed it to identify posts that “could have been removed by mistake without appropriate cultural context,” such as “humorous terms of endearment used between friends.” In 2021, the U.S. columnist and humorist David Chartrand described how it took Facebook all of three minutes to remove a post of his that read “Yes, Virginia, there are Stupid Americans,” for violating its hate speech policies.
Our research shows that the hate speech policies of many platforms currently don’t comply with the human rights standards they claim to respect. So perhaps the right analogy for social media is not a lawless Wild West—but rather a place where no one knows when or how the ever-changing rules will be enforced. If so, the right path forward is not to make these rules even more complex.
Instead, platforms should consider directly tying their hate speech rules to international human rights law. This approach would cultivate a more transparent and speech-protective environment, though it would not eliminate erroneous or inconsistent policy enforcement and would leave up a lot of offensive speech.
Alternatively, platforms could decentralize content moderation. This option would give users the ability to opt out of seeing content that is offensive to them or contrary to their values, but it would also protect expression and reduce platform power over speech. Meta seems to envisage steps in this direction by making Threads part of the so-called fediverse, meaning that it enables users to connect with users on platform protocols not controlled by Meta. Combining IHRL and decentralization is also possible. Content moderation and curation could be decentralized, with the requirement that third-party algorithms still respect international human rights law. None of these options will be perfect or satisfy everyone. But despite the very real challenges and trade-offs that they entail, they are preferable to the status quo.
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tag game!
tagged by @wdcmv1 !!
relationship status: single (thank god)
fav colour: blue and purple but most of my clothes are green lol (just did an inventory)
song stuck in my head: busy boy by chloe x halle
last song I listened to: master of puppets by metallica
3 fav foods: the ramen and gyoza combo (specifically kyushu style yum), chicken satay, and parfait
last google: iccpr lol (the international covenant on civil and political rights, was doing my thesis)
dream trip: anywhere beachy tbh i miss swimming in the ocean
anything I want right now: to finish my thesis and graduate 😭😭😭
not tagging any1 but feel free to do this ehe
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The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples’ Rights in Russia
Ekaterina Zmyvalova
Umea University, Sweden
Abstract
This article discusses how the war in Ukraine, started by Russia, impacts the lives of Russian Indigenous small-numbered peoples. First, one can observe Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations. Second, the Russian State is continuously introducing new sanctions against persons and organizations who do not support the Russian regime. Third, the pressure on Indigenous peoples’ representatives is increasing. Fourth, a significant number of members of Indigenous small-numbered peoples actively participate in the war due to, inter alia, socio-economic problems and lack of reliable and objective information about it. Fifth, there is a decline in international cooperation with the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. Finally, it is visible that the role of Indigenous peoples, including Russian Indigenous peoples, in international decision-making changes.
Keywords:Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia, war, Ukraine, human rights
Correspondence to: Ekaterina Zmyvalova, e-mail: [email protected]
The war in Ukraine, started by the Russian Federation (RF), has further complicated the fulfillment of the human rights of Russian citizens, inter aliathe rights of Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. Among these various rights are the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to enjoy their culture, regulated in Article 27 of the ICCPR, and the right to life, liberty and security stipulated by Articles 2 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.1These same rights are also regulated by other international legal acts. Article 69 (1) of the Constitution of the RF guarantees the rights of Indigenous small-numbered peoples according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the RF. In addition to Russia’s international legal obligation to fulfill these rights, Russian federal legislation also provides for these rights.2
The war has triggered different reactions among the 47 Indigenous small-numbered peoples recognized as such by the Russian State.3State representatives supporting Indigenous peoples’ organizations have supported the war in Ukraine.4Some other representatives of Indigenous peoples have condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression.5,6
This review focuses on some of the significant impacts on the lives of Indigenous peoples in Russia caused by the war in Ukraine.7These impacts include: Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations; the introduction of new sanctions against persons and organizations who do not support the Russian regime and increased pressure on Indigenous peoples’ representatives; the active participation of Indigenous small-numbered peoples in the war due to, inter alia, socio-economic problems and the lack of reliable and objective information about the war in Ukraine; and a decline in international cooperation with the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. In addition, I will address the issue of the changing role of Indigenous peoples, including Russian Indigenous peoples, in international decision-making.
Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations
Article 15 of the Russian Constitution states that universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as international agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of its legal system. Nevertheless, a growing disregard by Russia for its international legal obligations and the prioritization of Russian law over international law has been observed. One example of this tendency (among others) is the relationship between the RF and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). A number of major amendments to the Russian Constitution were proposed in January 2020, approved through a national vote and took effect in July 2020, including an amendment to Article 79 concerning the decisions of the international bodies which are no longer subject to enforcement in the RF. The last sentence of the amended Article reflects this idea. The Article reads:
The RF can participate in international associations and delegate to them part of its powers in accordance with international treaties of the RF if this does not entail limitations on the rights and freedoms of man and citizen and does not contradict the foundations of the Constitutional structure of the RF. Decisions of the international bodies adopted on the basis of the provisions of international treaties of the RF and which in their interpretation contradict the Constitution of the RF, are not subject to enforcement in the RF.
Although the amendment does not concern Indigenous peoples directly, it is relevant to mention here because Article 79 concerns international bodies to which Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia could appeal to protect their human rights. One of these bodies is the ECHR.8,9
The war in Ukraine has negatively impacted relations between Russia and the ECHR. On February 25, 2022 the Committee of Ministers suspended Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.10On March 15, 2022 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe manifested its Opinion recommending that the Committee of Ministers “should request the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw from the Council of Europe”.11On March 16, 2022 the Committee of Ministers adopted the decision to immediately exclude Russia from the European Council.12On March 15, 2022 the RF “informed the Secretary General of its withdrawal from the Council of Europe in accordance with the Statute of the Council of Europe and of its intention to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights”.13In June 2022, the President of Russia signed the laws that ended ECHR’s jurisdiction in Russia.14According to these laws, ECHR judgments coming into force after March 15, 2022 are not subject to enforcement in the RF and shall not be grounds for revisions of criminal cases.
Russia’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe may prove drastic for the protection of human rights in Russia.15Among other groups, this concerns the protection Indigenous peoples’ rights. Previously it was possible to apply to the ECHR for the protection of human rights once national mechanisms had been exhausted. At present, this alternative seems to have disappeared.
The introduction of new sanctions and increased pressure on Indigenous peoples
It is worth mentioning that Russia is continuously introducing new sanctions against those persons and organizations who do not support the regime. Among these sanctions one can single out administrative measures (Article 20.3.3 of Code of Administrative Offences of the RF) and criminal responsibility (Article 280.3 of Criminal Code of the RF) for “public actions directed at discreditation of the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation aimed at the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintenance of the international peace and safety or carrying out their function by the State bodies of the Russian Federation aiming at the above mentioned purposes”. Criminal responsibility “for public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and carrying out their functions by the State bodies of the RF” (Article 207.3 of Criminal Code) results in different types of punishment, with fifteen years of deprivation of freedom being the maximum punishment. A new law “On the Control of the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence” defines terms such as “foreign agent”, “foreign impact”, “foreign source” and “political actor”. Persons under foreign influence are forbidden to teach at State and municipal educational organizations, or to carry out any educational activity with minors.16Moreover, Article 275.1 has been added to the Criminal Code of the RF. This article “Confidential cooperation services of foreign States” mandates punishment in cases of cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies as well as common international or foreign organizations or its representatives.
Thus, in addition to the already existing punitive mechanisms, the State has introduced other legal sanctions to the Code of Administrative Offences and to the Criminal Code regarding those persons and organizations whose opinion about the war in Ukraine differ from the State’s position. This has certainly had a negative impact on human rights, including Indigenous peoples’ rights, in Russia. The introduction of these sanctions has resulted in a lack of freedom of expression, liberty, and security among the Indigenous populations in Russia. Consequently, fearing for their safety some Indigenous small-numbered people have been silenced or have chosen to leave their lands.
Russia’s policy of intimidation has also been observed in international organizations such as the United Nations. In July 2022 at the XV Session of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Geneva, Yana Tannagasheva, a representative of Indigenous peoples of Russia who had reported on human rights violations in Russia, was aggressively confronted by a representative of the Russian state delegation. This confrontation raised critical public opinion. For example, Christoph Wiedmer, co-director of the Society for Threatened Peoples, was extremely shocked by this public intimidation of an Indigenous peoples’ representative by a representative of the Russian government. According to him, Russia has crossed a red line. In his opinion, the Russian government is actively intimidating civil society activists from Russia and communication with Russian Indigenous peoples has become almost impossible.17
Thus, in addition to newly introduced legal sanctions against those who disagree with the war in Ukraine, the Russian State is using intimidating measures against people and organizations, including Indigenous small-numbered peoples. The Tannagasheva case is one of many examples of this kind of State pressure.
Active participation of Indigenous small-numbered peoples in the war
As previously stated there are 47 Indigenous small-numbered peoples recognized in Russia. The Russian legal term ‘Indigenous small-numbered peoples’ differs from the international legal term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in that it entails a numerical constraint. The Indigenous small-numbered people’s group shall not include more than 50 000 persons. Some groups are substantially smaller in number, encompassing merely a few hundred members. It has been officially recognized that a large number of the Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine are from Indigenous peoples groups.18,19There are many reasons for Indigenous peoples participating in this war, among them economic reasons (poverty and the need for economic rewards for participation in the war) and a lack of reliable and objective information about the war in Ukraine.20The death of Indigenous peoples in the war is a tragedy, but this does not erase personal responsibility for participation in the war. According to human rights activist and former member of the United Nations Forum on Indigenous Issues, Oliver Loode, the Russian army mirrors the socio-economic problems of the State, especially where Indigenous small-numbered peoples reside. He observes that most of the army recruits come from peripheral regions where unemployment, drug addiction and criminality are rampant and thus recruitment to the army becomes the only possibility to survive.21Another activist, Sires Boliaen, has observed that the share of Indigenous peoples in the total number of deaths in the war is disproportionately high, based on Russian statistics and numbers provided by Russian scientists.22To conclude, the war in Ukraine has made Indigenous peoples even more vulnerable and further worsened their unprotected position.23
International cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia with their international partners
The war in Ukraine has impacted the cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia with their international partners. Currently it is hard for international organizations to trust Russian Indigenous people’s organizations because of their differing positions on the war.24One example of Indigenous peoples of Russia whose cooperation with international colleagues has been impacted by the war in Ukraine is the Sámi peoples. The Sámi are the Indigenous peoples of four countries, namely Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Traditional Sámi lands are called Sápmi. The Sámi population resided in this territory before the establishment of State borders. The open support of the war in Ukraine by the Russian Sámi organization, namely Kola Sámi Association, has triggered negative reactions from the international Sámi community. For example, the Sámi Council, which is the body which brings representatives of all four Sámi countries together, has put cooperation with Russian member organizations on hold, until the next Sámi Council meeting.25For the Russian Sámi, membership in the Sámi Council has been crucial because they have received substantial support for their cultural projects from this organization. Their share of applications for financial support from the Council has always been the highest compared to the other members.26Thus, suspension of their membership in this organisation has had a significant negative impact on the protection of culture and language of the Russian Sámi.
Another important cooperation arena for the Indigenous peoples of Russia with international partners, is the Arctic Council. Six Indigenous organizations, including the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North-RAIPON, are permanent members of the Arctic Council.27Due to the special status of Indigenous organizations within the Arctic Council, this is a forum where Indigenous peoples can make their voices heard. At present, the RF is serving as the chair of the Arctic Council until 2023. Due to the war in Ukraine, the Arctic Council has postponed all official meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies until further notice.28The decision to do so was made by the member states (except Russia) without consulting the Indigenous organizations who are also permanent participants of the Arctic Council.29This decision negates and undermines the special status Indigenous organizations have had in the Council, and may substantially affect the participation of Indigenous organizations in the international arena. Moreover, the suspension of the official activities of the Arctic Council has had a negative impact on the activities of the Indigenous peoples of the Russian Arctic.
The present review has cast a light on some of the impacts on Indigenous peoples of Russia caused by the war in Ukraine. Among these impacts are Russia’s disregard of international legal obligations, sanctions against opposing opinions, making the Russian Indigenous peoples even more vulnerable in addition to their unprotected position due to their participation in the war, as well as a substantial decrease in international cooperation, which has negatively impacted the development of languages, culture, and other aspects of life of the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia.
NOTES
* I would like to express my gratitude to the Sámi rights activist Andrei Danilov who found an opportunity to discuss the situation of Indigenous peoples’ rights in Russia with me in connection with this review.
1. Russia ratified ICCPR: Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium N 4812-VIII of September 18, 1973 ‘About the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Right’. Russia ratified European Convention on Human Rights: FL N 54-ФЗ of March 3, 1998 ‘On Ratifying the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocols Thereto’.
2. For example, among other acts, the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression (Article 29), cultural rights (Article 69 (2)), the right to life (Article 20), liberty and personal integrity (Article 22 (1)).
3. Regulation of the Government of the RF N 255 of March 24, 2000 ‘On the Unified List of the Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation’.
4. For the full list of Indigenous organizations supporting the war in Ukraine see: “Ассоциация КМНСС и ДВ РФ выступила в поддержку Президента нашей страны В. В. Путина” [“RAIPON supported President of our country V. V. Putin”], https://raipon.info/press-tsentr/novosti/assotsiatsiya-kmnss-i-dv-rf-vystupila-v-podderzhku-prezidenta-nashey-strany-v-v-putina-/(accessed July 11, 2022).
5. Dan Robert Larsen, “Russisk sameleder: – Vi er mot krigen i Ukraina,” https://www.nrk.no/sapmi/samisk-organisasjon-i-russland-erklaerer-motstand-mot-krigen-i-ukraina-1.15929090?fbclid=IwAR2mn72ZTqSpctQ7NTO01m-2vOUIGszAJ1PQ1xjtSdtOOWF5j6tz5iMPQak(accessed July 13, 2022).
6. Thomas Nilsen, “War protesting Sámi activist from Kola seeks asylum in Norway,” https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/life-and-public/2022/04/sami-activist-and-war-protester-kola-seeks-asylum-norway(accessed July 13, 2022).
7. Other opinions regarding the impact of the war in Ukraine on Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia can be found here: Dmitry Berezhkov, “How does the militarization of Russia’s internal politics, social life and economy affect indigenous peoples’ development in Russia?,” 15th session of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. July 4, 2022, Geneva, https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/22882(accessed July 14, 2022).
8. For example, the ECHR accepted for consideration a complaint from a Russian Indigenous people’s organization called Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North. ECHR considered the complaint of the Center together with other complaints from non-governmental organizations and ruled regarding the “Foreign Agents” law in Russia. See: Judgment of the ECHR, Case of Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-217751(accessed July 21, 2022).
9. For more analysis see: Ekaterina Zmyvalova, “Human Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples in Russia: Recent Developments,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics11 (2020): 350–352.
10. Decision of the Committee of Ministers CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3 of February 25, 2022, ‘2.3 Situation in Ukraine – Measures to be taken, including under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe,’ https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680a5a360(accessed July 18, 2022).
11. Parliamentary Assembly Opinion N 300 (2022), ‘Consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,’ https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29885/html(accessed July 18, 2022).
12. “The Russian Federation is excluded from the Council of Europe,” https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/full-news/-/asset_publisher/y5xQt7QdunzT/content/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe(accessed July 18, 2022).
13. Ibid.
14. “В законодательство внесены изменения в связи с признанием не подлежащими исполнению в России вступивших в силу после 15 марта 2022 года постановлений ЕСПЧ” [“Amendments due to recognition of the judgments of ECHR unenforceable in Russia after March 15, 2022 were introduced in the legislation”], http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/68648(accessed July 18, 2022).
15. The situation can get worse. While ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights Russia also signed and ratified Protocol N 6 of it in 1997. Due to this fact a moratorium on the death penalty was introduced in Russia. After Russia’s withdrawal from European Convention of Human Rights this punishment can be reinforced in the RF.
16. Федеральный закон N 255-ФЗ от 14 июля 2022 ‘О контроле за деятельностью лиц, находящихся под иностранным влиянием’ (FL N 255-ФЗ of July 14, 2022 ‘On the Control of the Activities of Persons Under Foreign Influence’).
17. Sarah Zeines, “Russian Indigenous Spokeswoman Faces Intimidation at the Human Rights Council,” https://us19.campaign-archive.com/?u=b3372615f7a316d6426d48fc4&id=7f77e87a90(accessed July 13, 2022).
18. By no means do I want to belittle the suffering of Indigenous peoples of Ukraine.
19. “Заявление в ООН: Москва уничтожает в мясорубке войны коренные народы” [“Statement in the UN: Moscow destroys indigenous peoples in the meat grinder of war”], https://idel-ural.org/archives/syres-bolyaen-prizval-oon-obratit-vnimanie-na-ispolzovanie-moskvoj-korennyh-narodov-v-vojne-protiv-ukrainy/?fbclid=IwAR2a5tkYDY6UyHKd8UGiJO4iL0DI5ZZ8F5dZoB_q5jMvEnVqo2s1lfaJ7Lk(accessed July 13, 2022).
20. The issue of misinformation deserves special attention. At present, strict censorship has been introduced in the RF regarding spreading information about the war in Ukraine. For example, on June 30, 2022 the deputies of the State Duma approved a law that allows the Public Prosecutors Office to close sources of mass media publishing ‘fake’ news or news ‘discrediting’ the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation or ‘urge sanctions’. See: Федеральный закон N 277-ФЗ от 14 июля 2022 ‘О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации’ (FL N 277-ФЗ of July 14, 2022 ‘On Introducing Amedments into some Legal Acts of the Russian Federation’).
21. “Особое 9 мая. “Раньше Кремлю было достаточно воспевать славные подвиги предков, теперь — надо побеждать самим”’ [“Special 9th of May. ‘It was enough for the Kremlin to anthem the glorious deeds of ancestors, now- they have to win by themselves”], https://www.idelreal.org/a/31838711.html(accessed July 13, 2022).
22. “Заявление в ООН: Москва уничтожает в мясорубке войны коренные народы” [“Statement in the UN: Moscow destroys Indigenous peoples in the meat grinder of war”], https://idel-ural.org/archives/syres-bolyaen-prizval-oon-obratit-vnimanie-na-ispolzovanie-moskvoj-korennyh-narodov-v-vojne-protiv-ukrainy/?fbclid=IwAR2a5tkYDY6UyHKd8UGiJO4iL0DI5ZZ8F5dZoB_q5jMvEnVqo2s1lfaJ7Lk(accessed July 13, 2022).
23. Дмитрий Бережков, “Влияние войны на коренные народы России” [Dmitry Berezkov, “Impact of war on Indigenous peoples of Russia”], https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/22240(accessed July 13, 2022).
24. Ibid.
25. Christina Henriksen, “Cooperation with Russian side on hold,” https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/cooperation-with-russian-side-on-hold(accessed July 11, 2022).
26. Personal communication with Andrei Danilov (March 15, 2022).
27. “About the Arctic Council,” https://www.arctic-council.org/about/(accessed July 15, 2022).
28. “Arctic Council,” https://www.arctic-council.org/(accessed July 13, 2022).
29. Barry Scott Zellen, “The Arctic Council Pause: The Importance of Indigenous Participation and the Ottawa Declaration,” https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/the-importance-of-indigenous-participation-and-the-ottawa-declaration(accessed July 13, 2022).
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PUBLISHED
2022-08-18
ISSUE
Vol. 13 (2022)
SECTION
Debates on Arctic Law and Politics
KEYWORDS:
Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia, war, Ukraine, human rights
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR includes to allow victims claiming to be victims of human rights violations to be heard by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and aiming to abolish death penalty. Member States that ratifies ICCPR are obliged to protect and preserve basic human rights enshrined in the treaty. The Covenant acts as international treaty that impose obligation in international law on states.
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations in 1966 and came into force in 1976. It is the most extensive human rights treaties as they cover wide range of rights and protect wide range of people. The ICCPR attempts to ensure the protection and promote conditions within the states to allow the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Among the rights protected under the ICCPR are:
Article 6: Right to life, Article 7: Freedom from torture, Article 8: Right not to be enslaved, Article 18: Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 24: Children’s right, Article 25: Right to political participation.
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
PART I
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
PART II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.
Article 4
1 . In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
PART III
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3.
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
2.
(a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.
Article 11
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
Article 13
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.
Article 14
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.
Article 15
1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
Article 16
Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Article 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.
Article 23
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
PART IV
Article 28
1. There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity.
Article 29
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons possessing the qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated for the purpose by the States Parties to the present Covenant.
2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may nominate not more than two persons. These persons shall be nationals of the nominating State.
3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.
Article 30
1. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of the present Covenant.
2. At least four months before the date of each election to the Committee, other than an election to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written invitation to the States Parties to the present Covenant to submit their nominations for membership of the Committee within three months.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated, with an indication of the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Covenant no later than one month before the date of each election.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of the States Parties to the present Covenant convened by the Secretary General of the United Nations at the Headquarters of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States Parties to the present Covenant shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.
Article 31
1. The Committee may not include more than one national of the same State.
2. In the election of the Committee, consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems.
Article 32
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the meeting referred to in article 30, paragraph 4.
2. Elections at the expiry of office shall be held in accordance with the preceding articles of this part of the present Covenant.
Article 33
1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, a member of the Committee has ceased to carry out his functions for any cause other than absence of a temporary character, the Chairman of the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then declare the seat of that member to be vacant.
2. In the event of the death or the resignation of a member of the Committee, the Chairman shall immediately notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or the date on which the resignation takes effect.
Article 34
1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with article 33 and if the term of office of the member to be replaced does not expire within six months of the declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify each of the States Parties to the present Covenant, which may within two months submit nominations in accordance with article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the persons thus nominated and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Covenant. The election to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accordance with the relevant provisions of this part of the present Covenant.
3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shall hold office for the remainder of the term of the member who vacated the seat on the Committee under the provisions of that article.
Article 35
The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the General Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's responsibilities.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present Covenant.
Article 37
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at the Headquarters of the United Nations.
2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.
3. The Committee shall normally meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva.
Article 38
Every member of the Committee shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open committee that he will perform his functions impartially and conscientiously.
Article 39
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that:
(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.
Article 40
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned;
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports as may fall within their field of competence.
4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present Covenant.
5. The States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations on any comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.
Article 41
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation, or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter;
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State;
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged;
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article;
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant;
(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information;
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered in the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to the present Covenant have made declarations under paragraph I of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 42
1.
(a) If a matter referred to the Committee in accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may, with the prior consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The good offices of the Commission shall be made available to the States Parties concerned with a view to an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the present Covenant;
(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons acceptable to the States Parties concerned. If the States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement within three months on all or part of the composition of the Commission, the members of the Commission concerning whom no agreement has been reached shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee from among its members.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not Party to the present Covenant, or of a State Party which has not made a declaration under article 41.
3. The Commission shall elect its own Chairman and adopt its own rules of procedure.
4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However, they may be held at such other convenient places as the Commission may determine in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the States Parties concerned.
5. The secretariat provided in accordance with article 36 shall also service the commissions appointed under this article.
6. The information received and collated by the Committee shall be made available to the Commission and the Commission may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information.
7. When the Commission has fully considered the matter, but in any event not later than twelve months after having been seized of the matter, it shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a report for communication to the States Parties concerned:
(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its consideration of the matter within twelve months, it shall confine its report to a brief statement of the status of its consideration of the matter;
(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on tie basis of respect for human rights as recognized in the present Covenant is reached, the Commission shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;
(c) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (b) is not reached, the Commission's report shall embody its findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issues between the States Parties concerned, and its views on the possibilities of an amicable solution of the matter. This report shall also contain the written submissions and a record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned;
(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under subparagraph (c), the States Parties concerned shall, within three months of the receipt of the report, notify the Chairman of the Committee whether or not they accept the contents of the report of the Commission.
8. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Committee under article 41.
9. The States Parties concerned shall share equally all the expenses of the members of the Commission in accordance with estimates to be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the members of the Commission, if necessary, before reimbursement by the States Parties concerned, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this article.
Article 43
The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may be appointed under article 42, shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 44
The provisions for the implementation of the present Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the field of human rights by or under the constituent instruments and the conventions of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the States Parties to the present Covenant from having recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements in force between them.
Article 45
The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations, through the Economic and Social Council, an annual report on its activities.
PART V
Article 46
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 47
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.
PART VI
Article 48
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have signed this Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 49
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 50
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.
Article 51
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 3. When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 52
1. Irrespective of the notifications made under article 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the same article of the following particulars:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 48;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 49 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 51.
Article 53
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Covenant to all States referred to in article 4.
Adopted on 16 December 1966 by the General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI).
#core instruments#international instruments#national and international courts and tribunals#The convenant#human rights treaties#political rights#civil rights#united nations human rights council#ohchr#Human Rights Committee (HRC)
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"The Safeguarding National Security Ordinance covers treason; insurrection and seditious acts; theft of state secrets and espionage; sabotage; and external interference.
Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de facto constitution since the United Kingdom transferred its sovereignty of the city to China, stipulates that the Hong Kong government should enact a law that safeguards national security. Hong Kong people have consistently opposed such legislation since at least 2003, when half a million people marched against it.
No genuine public consultation took place during the legislative process, Human Rights Watch said. After Beijing imposed the National Security Law on the city in June 2020, it dismantled the city’s pro-democracy movement by detaining and prosecuting elected representatives and thousands of peaceful protesters, eliminated civil society groups and independent labor unions, and shuttered its most popular pro-democracy newspaper, among other measures.
In February, the Hong Kong government conducted a four-week “public consultation” on Article 23 legislation and claimed that 98.6 percent of the submissions supported the proposal. It dismissed submissions and statements from international human rights groups and overseas Hong Kong activists and groups – over 100,000 Hong Kongers have fled the city – as “deliberate smears."
The new law already has had a chilling effect on free expression. Local media reported that US- funded news outlet, Radio Free Asia, planned to withdraw from Hong Kong by the end of March.
The ordinance will further devastate human rights beyond those curtailed by the National Security Law. Its provisions contravene human rights guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law, and violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is incorporated into Hong Kong’s legal framework via the Basic Law and expressed in the Bill of Rights Ordinance.
The Australian, UK, and US governments, the European Union, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have all publicly expressed concerns about the law."
#Human Rights Watch#hong kong#china#Elaine Pearson#article 23#hong kong basic law#hong kong national security law#political repression#freedom of association#freedom of assembly#activism#protest#human rights#International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
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SUDARSHAN LIVE KHABAR LOBBY
Sudarshanlive:12/03/2024, international news updates, report by-un geneva,
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty that commits nations to respect the civil and political rights of individuals.The Human Rights Committee, a body of 18 independent experts, monitors the implementation of the Covenant in the 173 States parties. The Committee’s 140th…
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The Role of Soft Law in International Human Rights
By Summer Lee, University of Colorado Boulder Class of 2023
September 12, 2023
Following the aftermath of World War II, the UN General Assembly presented the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10, 1948, in an effort to protect and acknowledge the essential human rights of individuals, such as the free speech, autonomy, and right to life. After 1948, the United Nations General Assembly has established additional treaties to further protect and promote human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, etc. From that point on, the UDHR and establishment of additional human rights treaties led to developments in international human rights law.
Although the UDHR has been supported by two legally binding documents such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the declaration by itself along with jurisdictions regarding international human rights law are non-legally binding. Due to this, many questions have been raised over how the non-legally binding nature of decisions regarding human rights impacts the willingness of countries to comply with international human rights law.
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Uganda: IBAHRI condemns anti-LGBTQI+ bill that expands use of the death penalty
Uganda: IBAHRI condemns anti-LGBTQI+ bill that expands use of the death penalty
The International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) strongly condemns Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which includes the death penalty for 'aggravated homosexuality'. The Ugandan Parliament passed the Bill overwhelmingly, with 389 votes to two, on 21 March 2023.
Described as 'probably among the worst of its kind in the world' by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, the draft Bill as proposed on 1 March 2023 included provisions criminalising identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, or any other sexual or gender identity beyond male and female (LGBTQI+) (Article 2(1)(d)); same-sex sexual acts (Article 2(1)(a)-(c)); and aiding and abetting homosexuality (Article 8). The final version of the Bill is yet to be officially published but these were some of the elements discussed in the Ugandan parliament ahead of it being passed.
The version amended and adopted during the parliamentary session on 21 March 2023 includes life imprisonment for consensual same sex activities and the death penalty for the crime of 'aggravated homosexuality'. According to the draft Bill, the crime of 'aggravated homosexuality' is committed where the offender is living with HIV; is a parent, guardian, or has authority or control over the person against whom the offence is committed; is a serial offender; applies, administers, or causes any drug, matter or thing to be used with intent to stupefy or overpower the person against whom the offence is committed; or if the victim is under the age of 18 or has a disability (Article 3(1)).
IBAHRI Co-Chair, and Immediate Past Secretary General of the Swedish Bar Association, Anne Ramberg Dr Jur hc, stated: 'The IBAHRI commends the courage and good conscience of MPs Fox Odoi-Oywelowo and Paul Kwizera Bucyana for voting against the Bill in the face of overwhelming opposition. We call on President Yoweri Museveni not to sign this Bill into law. The criminalisation of consensual same-sex sexual activities and the very act of identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex and any other category, as well as the imposition of the death penalty for "aggravated homosexuality", violates Uganda's international law obligations. Members of the LGBTQI+ communities in Uganda have already been blackmailed and lured into mob attacks. This Bill, if signed into law, will further entrench discrimination and prejudice against an already vulnerable community.'
Consensual adult relations should never be criminalised. Uganda is a State party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which upholds, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination (Article 2(1)), the right to privacy (Article 17), and equality before the law and equal protection of the law (Article 26).
While sexual orientation and gender identity are not expressly listed as prohibited grounds for discrimination, jurisprudence and authoritative interpretations by UN treaty bodies to which Uganda is a State party have established that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 'other status' includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
This is reiterated in Principle 2 of the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, which states: 'Everyone is entitled to enjoy all human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Everyone is entitled to equality before the law and the equal protection of the law without any such discrimination whether or not the enjoyment of another human right is also affected. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such discrimination.'
Principle 33 of the Yogyakarta Principles (plus 10) on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity states: 'Everyone has the right to be free from criminalisation and any form of sanction arising directly or indirectly from that person's actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.' The detention of LGBTQI+ persons on the basis of laws that criminalise same-sex sexual activity in private has been found to constitute a form of arbitrary detention by, inter alia, the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and the UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity have urged States to repeal such laws considering the clear causal link between the criminalisation of LGBTQI+ persons and their increased exposure to violence at the hands of law enforcement, prison staff and healthcare personnel.
As highlighted by the UN Independent Expert, the combination of social prejudice and criminalisation has the effect of marginalising LGBTQI+ persons and excluding them from healthcare, education, employment, housing and access to justice. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has also noted that laws that criminalise homosexuality have the potential to engender violence against persons on grounds of their actual or imputed sexual orientation and has strongly urged states to enact and apply appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing violence targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identity.
Furthermore, under Article 6(2) of the ICCPR, the death penalty can only be imposed for 'the most serious crimes'. In its General Comment No 36 (2018), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that this must be read restrictively and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. Furthermore, the death penalty cannot be imposed contrary to the provisions of the ICCPR. As highlighted by the Committee, 'under no circumstances can the death penalty ever be applied as a sanction against conduct the very criminalization of which violates the Covenant', including homosexuality. Retaining the death penalty for such offences violates State parties' obligations under Article 6, read alone and in conjunction with Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, as well as of other provisions of the Covenant.
Finally, there is concern that the Bill will have a chilling effect on free speech and freedom of assembly and association, protected under Articles 19 and 21 - 22 of the ICCPR and Principles 19 and 20 of the Yogyakarta Principles, as, inter alia, media groups, journalists, publishers, and civil society organisations could face prosecution and imprisonment for the creation and distribution of any content that could be perceived as promoting sexuality.
The UN Human Rights Committee has held that limitations to such rights on the basis of morals must be exceptional, 'understood in the light of universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination' and cannot be imposed because of opposition to expressions of sexual orientation or gender identify.
IBAHRI Co-Chair Mark Stephens CBE commented: 'This Bill is an affront to the fundamental human rights of Ugandan LGBTQI+ persons and their communities. It leaves them vulnerable to blackmail and intimidation, and seriously impacts their ability to engage with civil society or seek medical attention. The Bill comes at a time when LGBTQI+ people in Uganda are already facing arrest, sexual violence, public stripping, and evictions on the basis of their sexuality. This is contrasted against the positive progress towards abolition in many other African States over the last couple of years, including Zambia, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Chad.'
The 2023 Bill is based on the Anti-Homosexuality Act (2014), which was nullified by the Constitutional Court of Uganda because the Ugandan parliament passed it without the necessary quorum. In the months after its passage in December 2013, there was a notable increase in human rights abuses against LGBTQI+ persons in Uganda.
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The Peruvian Crisis And The Rule Of Law
By Kalliope Clayton, Lipscomb University Class of 2024
January 21, 2023
Many people across the globe are puzzled by current events transpiring in Peru. Pedro Castillo, impeached president of the nation, attempted to dissolve Congress to avoid impeachment after wanting to seize control of the courts and Congress. The Peruvian Congress in October 2021 passed Law 31355 which regulates motions of confidence and limits the power of the president. [7] The constitutional crisis that led to Castillo’s actions began in November 2022. Castillo moved for a vote of confidence twice over another bill that would have repealed Law 31355 and removed legislative barriers to Castillo’s power agenda. Congress and the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal upheld the law, not voting on Castillo’s motion. This use of power combined with six pending investigations against Castillo has led to his impeachment. Those members of Congress who voted for the impeachment said Castillo’s “permanent moral incapacity” rendered him incapable of continuing to hold office. [10] This “moral incapacity” led to Castillo’s efforts to supersede the rule of law in restructuring the courts and ultimately dissolving Congress. Castillo will be on trial for rebellion and conspiracy after serving an 18- month pre-trial detention, although other Latin American nations view his ousting and detainment as a violation of international human rights law. [9] Nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Commission of Jurists, view the situation in Peru as the disintegration of the rule of law by Castillo’s attempt to disband Congress, dismantle laws, and efforts to absorb more power. [9] Castillo was originally elected as a man of the people which is why many have taken to the streets against his arrest. Pedro Castillo won the 2021 election on a more socialist platform of working to decrease poverty and provide more opportunities for the poor. [2] There is a stark division between the indigenous poor and country’s elites in Peru. Law is shaped and made by the elites of the country and the people of Peru want more indigenous representation among those in power. Since December 7, 2022, the date of the impeachment, over sixty people have died in the conflict. This ongoing international human rights issue of protests with the excessive use of force and arbitrary detainment has only worsened in the last almost two months of the conflict. Peru passed a law in 2019 that granted police “special protections against criminal prosecution.” [5] Many believe that this law has engendered abuse by the police and protected some from facing the consequences of violating human rights. The abuse of force by law enforcement during protests is also viewed as an obstruction of the rule of law as individual rights are violated. [9] Now, the Peruvian government has declared a state of emergency under the new president, Dina Boularte. Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2001 published that deviating from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) during a state of emergency “must be of an exceptional and temporary nature.” [4] The Peruvian demonstrations are protected legally under the ICCPR, which charges the government to promote the protection of peaceful demonstrations and restrain from inordinate intervention.
Major economic inequality, as Peru experiences, is associated with negative human rights conditions, especially regarding discriminatory social outcomes. The arrest of leader Pedro Castillo was the catalyst for the international human rights problem we are seeing in Peru today. There is a bilateral legal dilemma: the issue of the repercussions the impeached president will face and simultaneously there is the conflict between the police and Peruvian protestors. Democracy best protects human rights and preserves peace through a check on leaders. Democracy and the rule of law are threatened when ‘fundamental rights' of conscience, expression, assembly, and association, and the political rights that belong to the people, are lost in the search for power in a nation. [1] What is next? How can the country caught deep in strife begin to function again? Alonso Gurmendi, a Peruvian international law professor, suggests an open dialogue between civil society and political and legal actors. To change the political and legal landscape of the country, the relationship between the people and government must shift as well. [6] Internationally, drafting a new constitution and new elections is the most proposed solution, but no action has been taken yet. [8]
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Kalliope Clayton is a junior at Lipscomb University studying International Affairs and Spanish, with a minor in French. Her passions for cross-cultural connection and international advocacy have led her to pursue a career in law after graduation. ______________________________________________________________
[1] Burnett, Robin. The Right of Peaceful Protest in International Law by Robin Burnett.
[2] Perona Calvete, Carlos. “Crisis in Peru.” The European Conservative, 16 Jan. 2023.
[3] “Comment by UN Human Rights Office Spokesperson Marta Hurtado on Peru.” OHCHR, 10 Jan. 2023.
[4] Scheinin, Martin, and Marta Achler. “International Standards Regarding the Handling of Demonstrations.” Just Security, 15 Mar. 2021.
[5] “Peru: Law Protects Abusive Policing.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020.
[6] Gurmendi, Alonso.“What Is Going on in Peru?” Opinio Juris, 13 Dec. 2022.
[7] “Peruvian Congress Will Debate the Third Vacancy Motion against President Castillo.” Peoples Dispatch, 2 Dec. 2022.
[8] Roy, Diana. “Why Was Peru's President Impeached?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 Dec. 2022.
[9] Lumina, Mulesa. “Peru: Authorities Must Respect the Rule of Law amid the Political Crisis.” International Commission of Jurists, 9 Dec. 2022.
[10] Press, The Associated. “Peru Swears in a New President amid Constitutional Crisis.” NPR, NPR, 7 Dec. 2022.
[11] “Peru Police Use Tear Gas to Clear Protests after Machu Picchu Evacuated.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 5 Jan. 2023.
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Nuclear Weapons Policies of Japan and South Korea Challenged
Nuclear Weapons Policies of Japan and South Korea Challenged
By Jaya Ramachandran, GENEVA (IDN)31 July 22, — The Basel Peace Office, in cooperation with other civil society organisations, has challenged the nuclear weapons policies of Japan and South Korea in the UN Human Rights Council, maintaining that these violate the Right to Life, a right enshrined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The two East Asian…
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Rights Violations: ECOWAS Court orders Nigerian government to amend cybercrime law
Rights Violations: ECOWAS Court orders Nigerian government to amend cybercrime law
The ECOWAS Court of Justice has ordered the Nigerian government to amend the controversial section 24 of its cybercrime law which is widely viewed as authorities’ weapon for muzzling citizens’ rights to freedom of expression.
The court gave the decision on March 25, 2022 in Accra, Ghana, a statement by the court’s information unit stated on Monday.
In the decision, the court ruled that the…
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#Accra#African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)#cybercrime law#Cybercrime law human rights#ECOWAS Court of Justice#Ghana#International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).#Keikura Bangura.#Nigerian government#Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP)#Weapon
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A Small Selection of Human Rights
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1. The right to life (Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 6 I ICCPR)
2. The right to legal personhood (Art. 6 UDHR) and a nationality (Art. 15 UDHR, Art. 24 III ICCPR)
3. The right to liberty (Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 9 ICCPR), including the right to be free from slavery and servitude (Art. 4 UDHR, Art. 8 ICCPR)
4. The right to freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 5 UDHR, Art. 7 ICCPR)
5. The right to food (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
6. The right to housing (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
7. The right to medical care (Art. 25 I UDHR) / to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Art. 12 I ICESPR)
8. The right to clothes (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
9. The right to necessary social services (Art. 25 I UDHR)
10. The right to social security (Art. 22 UDHR, Art. 9 ICESCR) including social insurance (Art. 9 ICESCR) and to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood beyond one’s control (Art. 25 I UDHR)
11. The right to work, just and favourable working conditions, protection against unemployment, equal pay for equal work, a remuneration that ensures for oneself and one’s family an existence worthy of human dignity and the right to form and join trade unions (Art. 23 UDHR, Art. 6, 7, 8 (a) ICESCR)
12. The right to leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and paid holidays (Art. 24 UDHR, Art. 7 (d) ICESCR)
13. The right to education (Art. 26 I UDHR, Art. 13 ICESCR)
14. The right to a fair trial (Art. 10 UDHR, Art. 14 ICCPR) and to seek remedy for a violation of their rights before a court of law (Art. 8 UDHR, Art. 2 III ICCPR)
15. The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Art 11 I UDHR, Art. 14 II ICCPR)
16. The right to freedom of movement (Art. 13 UDHR, Art. 12 I ICCPR)
17. The right to own property (Art. 17 UDHR)
18. The right to freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19 UDHR, Art. 19 ICCPR)
19. The right to freedom of religion (Art. 18 UDHR, Art. 18 ICCPR)
20. The right of incarcerated people to be treated with dignity and respect (Art. 10 I ICCPR)
#human rights#I am so very sick of ppl whose country signed but did not ratify the ICESCR#acting like 'human right' is an empty term being thrown around willy nilly#when talking about INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHTS#like hey idiot when people say 'x is a human right'#it's because it's LITERALLY CODIFIED AS SUCH#please do try to keep up#this is not a discussion on whether ppl SHOULD be entitled to x#THEY ALREADY ARE#pretty much the ENTIRE REST OF THE WORLD agrees on this#we are not asking for your opinion on whether it SHOULD be a right. it is. we are INFORMING you that it is.
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Vocabulaire français : Les Langues Minoritaires
D’après la conférence de Philippe Blanchet qui se trouve ici
langue polynomique (f) — polynomic language
glottophobie (f) — glottophobia
discrimination à prétexte linguistique — linguistic discrimination
aveuglement idéologique — ideological blindness
insécurité linguistique (f) — linguistic insecurity
système excluant (m) — exclusive system
illégitimité — illegitimacy
illégalité — illegality
peine de prison (f) — prison sentence
politique linguistique (f) — linguistic policy
dictature linguistique (f) — linguistic dictatorship
discours public (m) — public discourse
organisation sociale (f) — social organisation
les forces de l’ordre — law-enforcement officials
communauté (f) — community
locuteur ( -trice ) — speaker
s’approprier une langue — adopt a language
être profondément marqué(e) — to be deeply affected/impressed by
(la) Charte Européenne des langues régionales et minoritaires — European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML)
(le) Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
(la) Convention relative aux Droits de l’Enfant — Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
(la) Charte Européenne des Droits Fondamentaux — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)
(la) Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles — Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
interpeler — to address abruptly
se placer en — to consider oneself as (« la France se place en seul tenant du langage réellement légitime »)
opérer une distinction — to create a distinction
moyenâgeux — mediaeval
ressources culturelles (f) — cultural resources
droits linguistiques (m) — linguistic rights
liberté d’expression (f) — freedom of expression
homogénéité (f) linguistique/culturelle — linguistics/cultural unity
unicité ethnonationalle (f) — ethninationalist uniqueness
langue régionale — regional language
langues d’Oïl — langues d’Oïl, "the French languages"
langues d’Oc/l’occitan — Occitan
langues d’outre-mer — overseas languages (?)
le corse — Corsican
le breton — Breton
le basque — Basque
le catalan — Catalan
S’il vous plaît, corrigez-moi s’il y’a des erreurs !
#la france#contenu original#vocabulaire#vocabulaire thématique#les langues régionales#les langues minoritaires#français#langue française#french language#linguistic discrimination#french langblr
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Pakistan: Surge in Targeted Killings of Ahmadis
excerpt (from here):
Since July 2020, there have been at least five apparently targeted killings of members of the Ahmadiyya community. In only two of the cases have the police taken a suspect into custody. Pakistani authorities have long downplayed, and at times even encouraged, violence against Ahmadis, whose rights to freedom of religion and belief are not respected under Pakistani law.
On November 20, a teenage assailant is alleged to have fatally shot Dr. Tahir Mahmood, 31, as he answered the door of his house in Nankana Sahib district, Punjab. Mahmood’s father and two uncles were injured in the attack. The police reported that the suspect “confessed to having attacked the family over religious differences.”
On October 6, two men on a motorcycle stopped the car of Dr. Naeemuddin Khattak, 57, a professor at the Government Superior Science College, and fired five shots, killing him. His family said he had a “heated argument over a religious issue” with a colleague a day before. Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya, a community organization, issued a statement saying Khattak had previously received threats and was targeted because of his faith.
On July 29, an alleged 19-year-old assailant killed Tahir Ahmad Naseem, 57, inside a high-security courtroom. Naseem was facing trial for blasphemy accusations. In a video that circulated on social media, the suspect states that Naseem was a “blasphemer.”
Successive Pakistani governments have failed to protect the human rights and security of the Ahmadiyya community. The penal code explicitly discriminates against religious minorities and targets Ahmadis by prohibiting them from “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.” Ahmadis are banned from declaring or propagating their faith publicly, building mosques, or making the Muslim call for prayer.
The authorities arbitrarily arrest, detain, and charge Ahmadis for blasphemy and other offenses because of their religious beliefs. The police have often been complicit in harassment and bringing fabricated charges against Ahmadis or have not intervened to stop anti-Ahmadi violence. The government’s failure to address religious persecution of Ahmadis has facilitated violence against them in the name of religion.
“Pakistan was part of the consensus at the UN General Assembly that required that states take active measures to ensure that persons belonging to religious minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law,” said Ian Seiderman, legal and policy director at the International Commission of Jurists. “The Pakistani government has completely failed to do so in the case of the Ahmadis.”
The Pakistani government also promotes discriminatory practices against Ahmadis. For example, all Pakistani Muslim citizens applying for passports are obliged to sign a statement explicitly stating that they consider the founder of the Ahmadi community an “imposter,” and consider Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.
Pakistani laws against the Ahmadiyya community violate Pakistan’s international legal obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Pakistan ratified in 2010, including the rights to freedom of conscience, religion, expression, and association, and to profess and practice one’s own religion.
#pakistan#tw murder#ahmadis#discrimination#persecution#human rights#religious persecution#genocidal processes#muslim
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