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adropofhumanity · 5 months

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the 10 crises the world must not look away from:

1. SUDAN

24.8 million people in need of humanitarian aid. a still-escalating war brings sudan to the top of the watchlist. fighting has more than doubled humanitarian needs in less than a year and displaced 6.6 million people- bringing the country to the brink of collapse. more people are internally displaced within sudan than in any other country on earth. in darfur, human rights groups have reported mass killings and forced displacement along ethnic lines.

2. PALESTINE

3.1 million people in need of humanitarian aid (gaza and the west bank). gaza enters 2024 as the deadliest place for civilians in the world. i*****i airstrikes and fighting have had a direct and devastating impact on civilians that will continue to grow as hostilities persist into early 2024, at least. with more than 18,700 palestinians killed, 85% of the population displaced, and over 60% of gaza's housing units destroyed, people living in gaza will struggle to recover and rebuild their lives long after the fighting ends.

3. SOUTH SUDAN

9 million people in need of humanitarian aid. the war across the border in sudan threatens to undermine south sudan's fragile economy and could add to political tensions in the run-up to the country's first-ever elections. meanwhile, an economic crisis and increased flooding have impacted families' ability to put food on the table. a predicted fifth year of flooding could also damage livelihoods and drive displacement.

4. BURKINA FASO

6.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid. as the burkinabè military struggles to contain armed groups, violence is rapidly growing and spreading across the country. roughly 50% of the country is now outside government control.

5. MYANMAR

18.6 million people in need of humanitarian aid. the conflict in myanmar has spread significantly since the military retook political power in 2021. 18.6 million people in myanmar are now in need of humanitarian assistance - nearly 19 times more than before the military takeover. myanmar has seen decades of conflict, but in oct. 2023, three major armed groups resumed clashes with the government. over 335,000 people have been newly displaced since the latest escalation began.

7. MALI

6.2 million people in need of humanitarian aid. dual security and economic crises are driving up civilian harm and humanitarian needs. conflict between the military government and armed groups will likely escalate.

8. SOMALIA

6.9 million people in need of humanitarian aid. somalia faces heightened conflict and climate risks after a record drought. more recently, widespread flooding has displaced more than 700,000 people and will likely continue into early 2024.

9. NIGER

4.5 million people in need of humanitarian aid. a coup in july 2023 triggered massive instability that risks a rapid worsening of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country.

10. ETHIOPIA

20 million people in need of humanitarian aid. communities across the country are facing the twin threats of multiple conflicts and the likelihood of el niño-induced flooding. the nov. 2022 ceasefire between the government of ethiopia and the tigray people's liberation front (TPLF) continues to hold in northern ethiopia, but other conflicts, particularly in the central oromia region and in amhara in the northwest, are fueling humanitarian needs and raising the risk of a return to large-scale fighting.

11. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

25.4 million people in need of humanitarian aid. weak state capacity has exposed many congolese to one of the world's most protracted crises, driven by conflict, economic pressures, climate shocks and persistent disease outbreaks. now, a resumed offensive by the M23 armed group is driving up conflict and humanitarian needs. the country enters 2024 with 25.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance - more than any other country on earth. the magnitude of the crisis has strained services, created high levels of food insecurity and fueled the spread of disease.

— via my.linda__ on instagram

#palestine #gaza #sudan #somalia #ethiopia #congo #niger #mali #myanmar #burkina faso #south sudan

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mariacallous · 2 months

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In the waters of the South China Sea, Chinese coast guard vessels have clashed with Philippine ships. In the air above the Taiwan Strait, Chinese warplanes have challenged Taiwanese jet fighters. And in the valleys of the Himalayas, Chinese troops have fought Indian soldiers.

Across several frontiers, China has been using its armed forces to dispute territory not internationally recognized as part of China but nevertheless claimed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In August 2023, Beijing laid out its current territorial claims for the world to see. The new edition of the standard map of China includes lands that are today a part of India and Russia, along with island territories such as Taiwan and comprehensive stretches of the East and South China Seas that are also claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

China often invokes historical narratives to justify these claims. Beijing, for example, has said that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which it claims under the name of the Diaoyu Islands, “have been an inherent territory of China since ancient times.” Chinese officials have used the same words to back China’s right to parts of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese government also claims that its sovereignty over the South China Sea is based on its own historic maritime maps.

However, in certain periods since ancient times China has also held sway over other states in the region—Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam. Yet Beijing is currently not laying claim to any of these.

Instead, Beijing has embraced a selective irredentism, wielding specific chapters of China’s historical record when they suit existing aims and leaving former Chinese territories be when they don’t. Over time, as Beijing’s interests and power relations have shifted, some of these claims have faded from importance, while new ones have taken their place. Yet for Taiwan, Chinese claims remain unchanged, as the fate of the island state is tied to the very legitimacy of the CCP as well as the vitality of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s political vision.

Many of the CCP’s territorial claims have roots in the 19th and 20th centuries during the late rule of the Qing Dynasty. Following diplomatic pressure and repeated military defeats, the Qing Dynasty was forced to cede territory to several Western colonial powers, as well as the Russian and Japanese empires. These concessions are part of what are known in China as the “unequal treaties,” while the 100 years in which the treaties were signed and enforced are known as the “century of humiliation.” These territorial losses eventually passed from the dynasty to the Republic of China and then, following the Chinese Civil War, to the CCP. As a result, upon the CCP’s establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new Chinese state inherited outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors.

But despite the humiliation the Qing Dynasty’s losses had caused, the CCP proved willing to compromise and reduce its territorial aims during times of high internal unrest. Following the Tibetan uprising in 1959, for instance, the CCP negotiated territorial settlements with countries bordering the Tibet region, including Myanmar, Nepal, and India. Similarly, when unrest rocked the Uyghur region in the 1960s and ‘90s, Beijing pursued territorial compromises with several bordering countries such as Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the CCP also pursued territorial settlements with Mongolia, Laos, and Vietnam in the hopes of securing China’s borders during times of domestic instability. Instead of pursuing diversionary wars, the CCP relied on diplomacy to settle border and territory disputes.

But China has changed quite a lot since then. In recent years, the CCP has avoided the inflammatory domestic political chaos of previous decades, and its once-tentative hold over border regions, such as Tibet and the Uyghur region, has been replaced by an iron grip. With this upper hand, the CCP has little incentive to pursue peaceful resolutions to remaining territorial disputes.

“China’s national power has increased significantly, reducing the benefits of compromise and enabling China to drive a much harder bargain,” said M. Taylor Fravel, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In this context, the CCP has expanded its irredentist ambitions. After the discovery of potential oil reserves around the Senkaku Islands, and the United States’ return of the islands to Japan in the 1970s, Beijing drew on its historical record to lay claim to the islands, even though it had previously referred to them as part of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands. Similarly, though Beijing and Moscow settled a dispute over Heixiazi Island, located along China’s northeastern border, in 2004, the 2023 map of China depicted the entire island (ceded, along with vast Pacific territories, by the Qing Dynasty to the Russian Empire in 1860) as part of its domain, much to the ire of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Collin Koh Swee Lean, a senior fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, argues that the Chinese mapping of Heixiazi Island shows that Beijing holds on to certain core interests and simply waits for the opportune time to assert them.

“Given the current context of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s increased dependence on China, it might have appeared to Beijing that it has the chips in its pockets because, after all, Moscow needs Beijing more than the other way around,” Koh said on the German Marshall Fund’s China Global podcast.

This raises the question of whether territorial disputes that were settled during times of CCP weakness can be revisited and become subject to irredentist ambitions should power balances shift in China’s favor.

According to Steve Tsang, the director of the China Institute at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, there is currently a limit to how far the CCP will push territorial claims against Russia, since President Xi will need Russian support to sustain his grand ambitions for Chinese leadership on the global stage.

Although it would be a long shot, even Russia may not be safe from these ambitions indefinitely. Given that large swaths of Russia’s Pacific territories were part of China until 1860, “China could claim back the Russian Far East when it deems the time is right,” Tsang said. Such control would grant Beijing unrestricted access to the region’s abundance of coal, timber, tin, and gold while moving it geographically closer to its ambition of becoming an Arctic power.

While there is plenty of historical evidence pointing to former Chinese control over the southeastern portion of the Russian Far East, the historical record is less unequivocal about Chinese control over Taiwan. Anything resembling mainland Chinese control over Taiwan was not established until after 1684 by the Qing Dynasty, and even then central authority remained weak. In 1895, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to the Empire of Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War, and by the time Chinese authority was restored in 1945, Taiwan had undergone several decades of Japanization.

These details have not prevented the CCP from claiming that Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. Yet more than any other irredentist claim, Xi has made unification with Taiwan a major component of his vision to rejuvenate the Chinese nation.

Unification, however, has little to do with ancient history and more to do with the challenge that Taiwan presently poses to Xi’s aims, according to Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor who teaches about Chinese foreign policy at the National University of Singapore.

“The CCP pursues a Chinese nationalism that emphasizes unity and homogeneity centered around the CCP leadership while they also often claim that their single-party rule is acceptable to Chinese people,” Chong said.

In contrast, Taiwan holds free elections in which multiple political parties compete for the favor of a people that have increasingly developed an identity distinct from mainland China.

“The Taiwanese experience is a clear affront to the CCP narrative,” Chong said.

Control over Taiwan is also attractive to Beijing because it is key to unlocking the Chinese leadership’s broader ambition of maritime hegemony in waters where almost half of the world’s container fleet passed through in 2022.

As with the case of Taiwan, the CCP’s historical arguments regarding its claims on island groups and islets in the East and South China Seas are likewise much weaker than many of its land-based claims.

Instead, Chinese territorial intransigence in the maritime arena is more about a strategic shift in the value of the seas around China, Fravel said.

Today, it has been estimated that more than 21 percent of global trade passes through the South China Sea. And beneath these waters are not only subsea cables that carry sensitive internet data but also vast estimated reserves of oil and natural gas.

Although it may say otherwise, Beijing’s unwillingness to let up on its tenuous territorial maritime claims suggests that China is pursuing long-held ambitions and global aspirations rather than attempting to reverse past losses. So long as the CCP wields its historical record selectively and changeably to serve its aims—and is willing to back its claims up with military action—China’s neighbors will remain at risk.

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tentacion3099 · 6 months

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Myanmar 2021 - Protesters pratice shield formations before clashes with the police

#myanmar #protests #tactics

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rarepears · 1 year

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Did you read my fic? Did you like it? Do you have any suggestions for future chapters or feedback?

Reading it makes me REALLY want to know how the fuck did Shen Jiu and Yue Qingyuan make up. What in the world could make Yue Qingyuan finally man up and do more than apologize and make sad puppy eyes at Shen Jiu????

Feedback? There's that scene where Shen Yuan is solicitating suggestions on what he should bring back - just who are those old men, bakers, etc. and why would they be crowded alongside the peak lords when Shen Yuan is saying goodbye? Wouldn't such farewells normally be reserved for family/friends? Not random strangers just elbowing their way in to pip in suggestions?

I'm excited to see Shang Qinghua and Shen Yuan's relationship be explained, especially when factoring the whole age gap being more explicitly here and mama bear!Shen Jiu lurking behind, still being sus AF about Shang Qinghua' spy status.

Also can't wait to see Shen Yuan's personality being revealed more in depth. Seeing how Shen Yuan's reaction to the group of women dressed in only one layer and not being jealous (wishing that he could do the same BlueThursday style) is interesting and certainly different from canon!Shen Yuan. Did Shen Jiu beat in ancient China standards of modesty? Is this the influence of growing up in Cang Qiong since he was a babe instead of immediately manifesting an adult body with Adult Decision Making Powers to Make Wrong Decisions?

Would also love to see the other trade routes being explored and explained. Like how cinnamon, native to Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), the neighboring Malabar Coast of India, and Myanmar (Burma) made its way up to China and Cang Qiong. (Oh! Are there any demon traders? Or Shang Qinghua used Mobei Jun as a pack mule to get his much desired SPICES because no one is going to stop him from getting his American white girl styled pumpkin spiced latte!)

Oh! Luo Binghe being assumed to be mixed race between Roman and Ceres person - would the latter be assumed to be a slave woman? (What country is even Ceres?? My mind immediately jumped to Central Asia area for whatever reason.) I wonder how assuming such a background would influence Luo Binghe's mindset - would he be interested in Shen Yuan because he's exotic? Is he going to be concerned that Shen Yuan wouldn't fall in love outside of the Han(?) race? How are values and cultures going to clash between the two?

Oh damn, this got way too long. But to conclude, yes I enjoy it a lot! Not sure if you did a lot of research or you just know way too much about this... era? Genre? period? Ancient Rome stuff? in general, but it's fantastic. I have so many questions that I desperately need answered! Hope I didn't overwhelm you hehehe...

[Unigunflutist's fic on AO3]

#ao3 #svsss #svsss ideas #svsss au #shen qingqiu #shen jiu #mxtx #the scum villain's self saving system #shang qinghua #Shen Jiu becomes a silk merchant instead of a Qing Jing disciple AU

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radiofreederry · 1 year

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#cityrumble Asia Round One: Yangon v Delhi

The capitals of Myanmar and India clash in round one of #cityrumble Asia! Will it be Yangon or Delhi which advances to the next round of the competition?

#cityrumble

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warningsine · 5 months

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The junta has detained more than 170 civilians in Rakhine State since fighting resumed between its troops and Arakan Army (AA) last month, according to data collected by civil society organizations (CSOs) in the western state.

A former lawmaker said the purpose of the arrests is to create fear.

“The regime can’t defeat the AA, so it has been arresting and prosecuting civilians to instill fear,” explained U Aung Thaung Swe, a former Lower House lawmaker from Rakhine’s Buthidaung Town.

He also accused the regime of trying to starve Rakhine State residents. “It imposes travel restrictions and cuts off delivery of food to starve the local population … They do not hesitate to commit any war crime,” he explained.

A member of a Sittwe-based CSO told The Irrawaddy that the number of civilians arrested in Rakhine could be higher than the data collected shows. He estimated that more than 200 civilians had been detained since fighting erupted between the AA and junta troops.

“Some of the detainees are business owners and wealthy people. [Their] families do not want their arrests known … There are also cases in which family members dare not post [on social media] about arrests, or they don’t have access to the internet,” he explained.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been arrested for leaving camps that are running out of food. On Dec. 17, junta troops arrested 13 Rohingya from Kyauktalone IDP camp after they entered Kyaukphyu Town for food.

“We are running out of food, but the military does not allow us to enter the town,” a resident of the camp told The Irrawaddy. The camp opened in 2012 to temporarily house Rohingya people displaced by sectarian violence in the state.

“When [camp residents] tried to enter town through another entrance point [besides the main one], they were arrested by soldiers on patrol. We don’t know where they are,” the camp resident said.

The regime has reportedly demanded ransoms of 30 million kyats (about US$ 14,300) for the release of detained business owners. It has also charged ethnic Rakhine detainees under the Unlawful Association Act for alleged ties to the AA.

On Dec. 14, junta troops arrested 54 boat crew members at a port in Sittwe. Only four of them were released after paying fines.

Data collected by CSOs found that 174 civilians had been detained from Nov. 13 to Dec. 17 in 11 of the state’s 17 townships.

The number of civilians arrested by township are: 50 from Sittwe, 33 from Kyaukphyu, 30 from Thandwe, 21 from Buthidaung, 17 from Taungup, six from Maungdaw, five each from Mrauk-U and Ponnagyun, three from Pauktaw, and two each from Ramree and Rathedaung.

Junta troops and the AA are fighting in northern Rakhine State as well as neighboring Paletwa Township in Chin State. The two sides also clashed in Ramree and Taungup townships in southern Rakhine State on Monday.

The regime habitually dismisses reports of civilian arrests in Rakhine State as fake news designed to create misunderstandings between it and local communities.

#myanmar #news tag

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samlarej · 6 months

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BURMA - The Burmese junta only controls part of the country. The regime appears to have lost Chinese support.

Across Myanmar there have been significant numbers of violent attacks, including shootings and IEDs since a coup in February 2021. Attacks, including in Yangon and Naypyitaw, primarily continue to target military or regime-affiliated locations such as government buildings and checkpoints, and military-owned businesses. However, attacks may impact civilian bystanders, including in areas regularly frequented by foreign nationals, such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls and serviced accommodation complexes.

There is conflict and significant violence across much of Myanmar, involving air strikes, artillery bombardments, landmines and armed clashes. While normal daily life has resumed in many urban centres, armed groups are likely to try to carry out attacks. Shootings and explosions are common, particularly around times of increased political tension. There have been attacks against military personnel, state infrastructure (e.g. police stations, traffic police huts, ward administration centres and electricity company offices), and businesses perceived as affiliated with the military. Areas frequented by foreigners (e.g. lodging/hotels, shopping areas and restaurants) could also be targeted.

There are increasing reports of attacks on the Yangon-Mandalay Expressway and National Highway 1 linking Yangon to Mandalay.

If you are in Yangon, Naypyitaw, Bago, Ayarwaddy or Southern Rakhine, remain vigilant, exercise caution and seek local advice. You should ensure you are aware of local rules, norms, and restrictions, especially if travelling to townships under martial law. You should seek advice from local tour operators before travelling.

In Yangon, the townships currently under martial law are Hlaing Thayar, Shwe Pyithar, North Okkalapa, North Dagon, South Dagon and Dagon Seakkan, but these are subject to change.

There is a small risk to foreigners of arbitrary arrest and detention, though this is much higher for journalists and activists. The criminal justice process followed in such cases falls below international standards. Minor infractions of the law can provide grounds for arrest. Myanmar does not recognise dual nationality.

The authorities in Myanmar are particularly sensitive to all forms of independent reporting and journalistic activity. Terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Myanmar. You should remain vigilant and follow the advice of local authorities.

The banking sector has seen widespread disruption with many banks closed and some ATMs empty. While higher-end hotels and restaurants do tend to accept card payment, foreign cards are increasingly being declined.

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southeastasianists · 9 months

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Myanmar's junta on Sunday (Aug 27) ordered the expulsion of Timor-Leste's top diplomat in the country over a meeting his government held with a banned shadow administration.

The Southeast Asian nation has been locked in crisis since the military seized power in February 2021, ending a brief experiment with democracy and sparking violent clashes.

The military has designated the shadow administration known as the National Unity Government (NUG) - dominated by exiled lawmakers working overseas to overturn the coup - as a terror organisation.

Last month, Timor-Leste's President Jose Ramos-Horta met with NUG foreign minister Zin Mar Aung in the capital Dili.

On Sunday, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the "irresponsible actions" of Timor-Leste, ordering the country's Charge d'Affaires in Yangon "to leave no later than Sep 1, 2023".

The ministry said in a Facebook post that Timor-Leste was "encouraging the terrorist group to further committing their violations in Myanmar".

Timor-Leste condemned the expulsion order, reiterating in a statement "the importance of supporting all efforts for the return of democratic order in Myanmar".

Dili also urged the junta to "respect human rights and seek a peaceful and constructive solution to the crisis".

#Southeast Asia #Burma #Myanmar #East Timor #Timor Leste

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fatehbaz · 2 years

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The Gando creatures -- the westernmost population of mugger crocodiles in Iran -- are a last outpost, bordering a “no-man’s land” without crocodiles stretching between southeastern Iran and the Nile crocodiles of Egypt. Muggers (Crocodylus palustris), the iconic freshwater crocodile of South Asia, are now extinct within Myanmar, Bhutan, and, likely, Bangladesh. There are about 500 muggers still surviving within Iranian borders, with a few also surviving in southern Pakistan; they are in unique peril, compared to the healthier muggers in India and Sri Lanka, given local drought conditions. Following the highly-publicized disappearance of the Zayandeh-Roud river in the metropolitan and cultural center of Isfahan, in late 2021, drought continues to endanger riparian corridors across Iran. But good news: Muggers continue to appear in drought-stricken Iranian refugia and in habitat near major metro areas near Pakistan’s Indus mouth.

From 29/30 July 2022, at Thatta, near Haleji Lake between Karachi and Islamabad:

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From 16 January 2022, in Iran.

Excerpt:

One would not usually associate Iran and its snow-clad mountains, arid deserts, high plateaus, lush green Hyrcanian forests and the Persian Gulf coast with crocodiles. But Sistan and Baluchestan, the country’s second-largest province by area, that borders Pakistan and Afghanistan, is home to the animals. [...] The BBC December 28, 2021 described how conflict had increased between crocodiles and humans in Sistan-Baluchestan due to extreme scarcity of water. Asghar Mobaraki, Iran’s foremost expert on crocodiles, noted in an academic article last year:

The (crocodile) population in southeastern Iran remains severely vulnerable to extreme climatic events, such as periodic droughts and floods. Iranian crocodiles are therefore directly impacted by climate change and are in critical need of immediate study to evaluate this threat. [...]

The province is home to the Baloch people, who make up the majority and overlap into the neighbouring Balochistan province of Pakistan. The province is also home to Chabahar on the Persian Gulf, where India is building a huge port. [...]

“The crocodile found in Iran is the same species that is present throughout the Indian subcontinent, the mugger crocodile or Crocodylus palustris. Regional differences are possible, depending on factors such as resource availability,” Sideleau said.

He noted:

The Iran muggers represent the westernmost population of mugger crocodiles and the westernmost population of crocodiles before you reach the Nile crocodile (Crocodylus niloticus) in Africa. There is a “no man’s land” with no crocodilian species from Iran to Egypt, where Nile crocodiles are currently found in Lake Nasser, the reservoir created by the Aswan High Dam. This “no man’s land” is almost certainly due to the aridity of the region and the lack of habitat.

“Crocodiles in Sistan-Baluchestan are known by the Balochi term ‘Gando’, meaning ‘moving on a belly’,” Mobaraki told DTE.

“We estimated that there are 500 gandos in Iran currently, almost all of them in Sistan-Baluchestan,” Mobaraki said.

“An estimated 500 wild muggers remain within the southeastern part of Iran, in Sistan and Baluchestan Provinces (the Gandou Protected Area). They occupy ponds along two large rivers, namely Bahu-Kalat and Kaju, two dam reservoirs (Pishin and Zirdan), small artificial water dams, and some manmade local ponds in villages,” the article written by Mobaraki last year, noted.

He agreed with Sideleau’s view that the gandos of Iran were scientifically considered to be the same as the muggers of the Indian subcontinent. “But the Iranian populations are in an extreme habitat. Hence, they seem to be a bit polymorphically different. They are smaller than their Indian relatives,” Mobaraki said.

Iran had been in the news over climate change in November 2021, when the residents of Isfahan, the country’s third-largest city, had clashed with authorities over the ‘disappearance’ of the city’s river, the Zayandeh-Roud. [...] The Iran Meteorological Organization has estimated that some 97 per cent of the country is dealing with drought at some level, according to media reports.

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The preceding headling, image, caption, and text excerpt were published by: Rajat Ghai. “Yes, there are crocodiles in Iran and they are in trouble due to climate change.” DownToEarth. 16 January 2022.

The other two species of crocodilian in South Asia are the saltwater crocodile and the unique gharial. The saltwater crocodile has been eliminated throughout most of its Indian/South Asian distribution range, while the gharial has been driven to extinction in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Bhutan and now only lives in a couple of specific river systems in Nepal and the Ganges corridor of India. Though now apparently locally extinct in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, small populations of muggers persist in Pakistan and Iran. Former historical distribution range and current distribution range:

#crocodile fan blog #mugger crocodile

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beardedmrbean · 2 years

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Oct. 25 (UPI) -- An airstrike by Myanmar's ruling military has killed up to 80 people at a music festival in the country's mountainous northern state of Kachin, local media and international organizations said, drawing widespread condemnation.

Three fighter jets bombed the festival on Sunday, independent news outlet Myanmar Now reported Monday, killing at least four well-known Kachin performers, as well as civilians and officers of the Kachin Independence Army, an ethnic rebel group that controls the area and has clashed with the Myanmar military for decades.

The festival was held to celebrate the 62nd anniversary of the group's political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization.

Some 80 people were killed and 100 injured by the aerial attack in Hpakant Township, according to Kachin News Group, which also reported that government security forces were blocking wounded people from leaving the area to receive medical treatment.

The casualty figures have not been independently verified, but the bombing would appear to be the deadliest airstrike since the military overthrew a democratically elected civilian government and seized power in a February 2021 coup.

The United Nations on Monday said it was "deeply concerned and saddened" by the attack.

"What would appear to be excessive and disproportionate use of force by security forces against unarmed civilians is unacceptable and those responsible must be held to account," it said in a statement.

Myanmar's National Unity Government, a government-in-exile composed of ousted lawmakers and politicians, called the attack a violation of International laws and said the military has conducted 240 airstrikes targeting civilian populations since the coup, resulting in more than 200 deaths.

"The act of the terrorist military clearly violates international laws as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which stipulate that civilians must be protected from attack at all times," the NUG said in a statement.

A military airstrike last month on a village, including a school, in the Sagaing region of northwestern Myanmar killed at least 11 children.

Rights group Amnesty International said the bombing on Sunday was the latest in a series of unlawful air attacks by the military and called on leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, who are meeting this week to discuss Myanmar, to step up efforts to resolve the crisis.

"We fear this attack is part of a pattern of unlawful aerial attacks by the military, which have killed and injured civilians in areas controlled by armed groups," Amnesty International deputy regional director Hana Young said.

"This attack highlights the need to overhaul the approach to the crisis in Myanmar," she said in a statement. "ASEAN has to step up and formulate a more robust course of action so that military leaders end this escalating repression."

Ambassadors and diplomats from Australia, Canada, Britain, the United States, the European Union and EU member states with a presence in Myanmar issued a joint statement Monday condemning the attack.

"Indiscriminate attacks which include civilian victims continue to cause extraordinary harm and suffering across the country," the statement said. "This attack underscores the military regime's responsibility for crisis and instability in Myanmar and the region and its disregard for its obligation to protect civilians and respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law."

Myanmar's military government acknowledged the airstrike but called the reports of the massacre of civilians "fake news" and claimed it was battling armed rebels under international rules of engagement.

"As security forces, they are required to fight insurgents, which is necessary for regional stability and peace," Myanmar's Ministry of Information said in a news release.

In February 2021, Myanmar's military overthrew the elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on widely debunked charges of voter fraud, detaining the former democracy activist and other high-ranking officials.

Civil disobedience and nationwide protests sprung up immediately after the coup, which the junta have brutally suppressed and have hardened into an internal conflict that some describe as a full-fledged civil war.

Human rights investigators at the United Nations released a report in August outlining the junta's "systematic crimes against humanity."

#nunyas news #yikes

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mariacallous · 10 months

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Joshua Hangshing’s 7-year-old son died less than an hour after being shot in the head. But it wasn’t the bullet that killed him.

On June 4, Hangshing set off from a relief camp in the Kangpokpi district of the northeastern Indian state of Manipur. He and his family had moved there for safety after fighting broke out the month before between the state’s majority Meitei community and the minority Kuki-Zo. Clashes had erupted that day just a mile away from the camp, so Hangshing ventured out to fetch water in case they needed to take shelter for a prolonged period.

As he returned to the camp, he saw Tonsing, his youngest child, waving gleefully at him from a first-floor window. Then Tonsing fell, shot in the head. “It couldn’t have been a stray bullet,” Hangshing says. “I suspect it was a sniper.”

Tonsing was still breathing when Hanshing reached him, but he had lost a lot of blood. When an ambulance arrived, Hanshing stayed behind while his wife went with their son to the nearest hospital, 10 miles away in the capital city of Imphal. They were halfway there when they were ambushed by militants, who set fire to the ambulance. Tonsing and his mother, Meena, were burnt alive.

The brutal murder of two innocent people is the kind of horror that should have made the news across India, even across the world. But Hanshing’s story is only coming out now, months on, because of an internet blackout covering the whole of Manipur. At least 180 people have died, and more than 60,000 people have been made homeless. Villages have been set alight and neighbors have lynched neighbors as the authorities fail to control the escalating violence. For three months, hidden from the eyes of the world, Manipur has burned in the dark.

The relationship between the predominantly Hindu Meitiei community, which makes up 53 percent of Manipur’s population, and the Kuki community, which accounts for 28 percent and is largely Christian, has long been frosty.

But the situation has deteriorated rapidly this year. A military coup and civil war in neighboring Myanmar has led to thousands of refugees moving into Manipur. Many of the new arrivals are of Kuki-Chin-Zo ethnicity, who are culturally and ethnically close to the local Kuki population. Some in the Meitei community have seen this as a threat to their political dominance. In late March, a court in Manipur awarded the Meitei “tribal status”—a protected status that gives them access to economic benefits and quotas for government jobs, and allows them to purchase land in the hillside areas where Kuki tribes are concentrated.

Kuki groups say giving the majority community access to minority protections will strengthen the Meitei’s stronghold over the state. Meitei groups accuse Kukis of importing weapons from Myanmar to fight a civil war. On May 3, some from the Kuki community staged a rally in Churachandpur district to protest the court ruling. After the protest, an Anglo-Kuki War memorial gate—marking a war between Kukis and the British in 1917—in Churachandpur was set on fire by Meiteis, which triggered riots that killed 60 in the first four days.

It was just the start of a wildfire of violence that would spread across the state, with barbaric murders, beheadings, gang rapes, and other crimes. Outnumbered, the minority Kukis have suffered most.

But as the fighting began, on May 4, the Indian government did what it has done time and time again when faced with internal conflict. It shut off the internet.

The national government has the power to order telecom providers to stop providing fixed-line and mobile internet, using an emergency law. It did it 84 times in 2022 and 106 times in 2021, according to Access Now, a nongovernmental organization that tracks internet disruptions.

Most of the shutdowns were in the disputed territory of Kashmir, but they have been applied across the country. In December 2019, internet shutdowns were imposed in parts of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Assam, and Meghalaya after protests over a proposed citizenship law that would have rendered hundreds of thousands of Muslims stateless. In January and February 2021, the internet was disrupted around Delhi, where farmers were protesting agricultural reforms.

The justification for these shutdowns is that it stops disinformation from spreading on social media and helps keep a lid on unrest. In May, in Manipur, the government said the blackout was “to thwart the design and activities of anti-national and anti-social elements and to maintain peace and communal harmony … by stopping the spread of misinformation and false rumors through various social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. … ” It didn’t work.

On the first day of the shutdown, a Meitei mob went on a rampage in Imphal, seeking out Kukis to attack. As the violence spread, two young Kuki women in their early twenties huddled in their room above a carwash, where they worked part time. But the mob found them. Witnesses told the women’s families that seven Meitei men barged into their room and locked the door from inside. For two hours, the door remained shut. People outside could hear the screams of the women, which became muffled with time. When the door opened, the two women were dead. The families are certain their daughters were raped before being murdered.

The father of one of the women, whom WIRED is not identifying in order to protect the identity of his daughter, says he was told by a nurse at a hospital in Imphal that his child had been killed. Nearly three months after her death, her body is still in Imphal, along with dozens of unclaimed bodies rotting in the city hospitals because the Kuki families in the hills can’t go to Imphal Valley to claim them.

“It was her dream to become a beautician and start her own parlor. She always wanted to be financially independent,” the father says. She had finished her course in Imphal and was tantalizingly close to living her dream. About two months before the incident, she had rented a place in the city where she could open her beauty parlor. “She took up a part-time job to support her dream,” her father says. “She was excited about her future.”

The violence between the two communities has spiraled. Nearly 4,000 weapons have reportedly been stolen from the police, according to local media. Some Kukis have accused the police—many of whom are from Meitei communities—of standing by while Kukis are being attacked, and even of supporting Meitei extremist groups. Hangshing’s wife and son were killed despite a police escort. “How did the mob burn down the ambulance in police presence?” he says. “What did the police do to protect my wife and son?”

The police in Imphal declined to comment.

Today there is almost complete separation between the two communities, both of whom have their private militias protecting their territories. Kuki areas in Imphal are completely deserted. Meiteis in Kuki-dominated districts have been driven out of the hills.

At a relief camp opened in a trade center in Imphal, Budhachandra Kshetrimayum, a Meitei private school teacher, says his village, Serou in the Kakching district, was attacked by Kuki militants on the night of May 28. “The firing started out of nowhere,” he says. “They barged into the village and began torching the Meitei houses.”

Kshetrimayum had two options: either stay inside and be burned with his house, or run to the house of a local lawmaker for safety and risk being shot dead on the way. He chose the latter. “Luckily, I survived the firing and reached his house, where several other Meiteis were hiding,” he says. “His bodyguards were on the roof, firing back at the Kukis so they couldn’t come and get us.”

The next morning, Kshetrimayum found his house reduced to rubble.

Not too far from his home lived the widow of a leading fighter for India’s independence against Great Britain. “When I went closer, I realized that they had burnt the house with his 80-year-old wife inside it,” he says. “I could see her skull amid the debris. Since that night, I have been living in relief camps. I wear other people’s clothes. I eat other people’s food. I am a refugee in my own state.”

These aren’t isolated stories. Across the state, I heard eyewitness accounts of lynchings and murders, rapes, riots, and the burning of homes. After largely ignoring the crisis in Manipur for weeks, over the past couple of weeks, journalists from across India have descended on the state, thanks to a single video that leaked out from under the shroud of the blackout.

It’s not clear how the footage got out. But the 26-second video was posted on Twitter on July 20. It shows two Kuki women in Kangokpi being stripped and paraded naked by a mob. The women’s families say they were later gang-raped.

The video shook the conscience of India and shed light on the gravity of the situation in the state. It compelled Prime Minister Narendra Modi to speak about Manipur for the first time, 77 days after the violence broke out. “Any civil society should be ashamed of it,” he said.

After the police arrested one person accused of participating in the attack, N. Biren Singh, the chief minister of Manipur, tweeted that strict action would be taken against all the perpetrators. But the incident had happened months before, on May 4, the first day of the blackout. The husband of one of the women in the video claims that the police were on the spot when it happened, but did nothing to stop it. In other words, the police were compelled to take action after the video went viral. And this is just one sexual assault—one of many crimes—that’s happened in Manipur since May. The perpetrators in other cases are roaming free because there is no video to shame the authorities into pursuing them.

"The video that went viral is just the tip of the iceberg,” says TS Haokip, president of the Kuki-Zo Intellectual Council, an NGO formed by Kuki writers and teachers. “It is one case in which the state has acted because it went viral and caused a great deal of embarrassment to the state. But what about other victims who have suffered in obscurity?"

Indian authorities say that internet shutdowns like Manipur are done to preserve the peace, to stop misinformation spreading online and reassert control. Experts say they have the opposite effect. They allow impunity for crimes and for those who fail to pursue them. Had locals in Manipur been able to draw attention to the situation as it got out of control, the anarchy that followed might have been avoided. But the silence over the state meant the national government could feign ignorance. Human rights groups said they couldn’t collect evidence of violations or distribute them to colleagues overseas.

The blackouts cause further disruption to an economy made fragile by the violence, and hinder aid groups as they try to collect funds for relief work.

Young Vaiphei Association, a nonprofit organization, operates five relief camps in Churachandpur district, housing 5,000 people. Lainzalal Vaiphei, convener of the relief committee, says they’ve had to raise funds door-to-door. “But because the state is in a limbo, people have suffered economically as well. They don’t have money to donate.” Had the internet been operational in Manipur, the organization could have tapped donors from outside the state through social media, and raised money for medicines. “We are barely managing our resources,” Vaiphei says.

In such a volatile atmosphere, shutting down communications doesn't stop misinformation. Rumors always spread fast in conflicts; blacking out the internet often just means that there’s no way to verify whether the accounts that are spreading them are genuine.

“The disinformation still spreads but it is not being countered,” says Raman Jit Singh Chima, Asia policy director at Access Now. Most fact-checkers are independent journalists or operate in small newsrooms. Even if they can fact-check a doctored video or a false claim, they have no way to spread their work widely.

This can help fuel violence, creating monopolies on information and allowing more extreme voices to dominate. “Shutdowns like these actually benefit the perpetrators in a conflict situation,” Chima says. “Whoever is more powerful or networked on the ground gets to set the narrative.”

As the two women in the July 4 video were paraded around the village, the inebriated men around them shouted, “We will do to you what your men did to our women.” The men claimed to be “avenging” a Meitei woman who had been allegedly raped and killed in the Kuki-dominated district of Churachandpur. A photograph claiming to be of her dead body wrapped in a plastic bag had made the rounds in Manipur. Except the woman in the photograph was from Delhi. The story was a fabrication.

The violence in Manipur has ruptured communities and left families with no way back to their old lives. For Neng Ja Hoi, a relief camp in K Salbung of Churachandpur district is now her home. On May 3, her husband, Seh Kho Haokipgen, was lynched while guarding their village of K Phaijang. Violence broke out and the police fired teargas. “He fell down during the commotion,” says Neng. “He somehow managed to get up but his vision was blurred because of the teargas. He ran for his life but he ran toward the Meitei mob, which beat him to death.”

Neng hasn’t really come to terms with her husband’s passing. “He was a religious pastor, and he traveled quite a bit for work,” she says, cradling her 11-month old baby, tears rolling down her face. “I tell myself he is still on one of his long religious journeys. He was the sole breadwinner of the house. How will I look after my kids?”

She sleeps in a tent in a small room with her three children. Her few possessions are crammed on a bench nearby. “I grabbed whatever I could from our house and ran with the kids,” she says. “They will grow up here.”

The warring sides have drawn something akin to battle lines in Manipur. Abandoned homes, charred vehicles, and scorched shops line the borders between communities. Both groups have set up bunkers in deserted villages. The only people here are volunteers from “village defense forces” with guns, guarding the territory from people who used to be their neighbors. The military is deployed in the buffer zone. Venturing into enemy territory is a death sentence.

That is exactly why Joshua Hangshing didn’t get in the ambulance with his son Tonsing. He is a Kuki. If he had accompanied his son to Imphal, there was no chance the two would have survived. But a hospital in a Kuki area was two hours away. With a bullet in his head, Tonsing had to be taken to the nearest possible facility. Hangshing’s wife, Meena, was a Meitei Christian. Even though she belonged to the minority among the majority Hindu Meiteis, the couple thought her presence in the ambulance would keep them safe.

As we talk about the breakdown in trust between communities, Hangshing reminisces about meeting Meena in the mid-2000s. He was working in Imphal, and Meena would pass his office to attend singing classes. “She had a lovely voice,” he says with a wistful smile. For them, it was love at first sight. It didn’t matter that they belonged to different ethnicities. “Her mother was against it initially,” he recalls. “But she came around.”

He has now moved to Kangpokpi Town, away from his village, which is too close to the border with Imphal. He doesn’t think he’ll go back. But he hopes that reconciliation between communities is possible. “If everybody who has suffered starts thinking about revenge, the cycle of violence will never stop,” he says. “The Bible has taught me to forgive.”

On July 25, the state partially lifted the blackout, allowing some fixed-line connections back online—with restrictions. However, most people in the state rely on mobile internet. Apar Gupta, a lawyer and founder of the campaign group the Internet Freedom Foundation, said the changes only benefit a “tiny” number of privileged people. “It is my firm belief the internet shutdown is to serve state interests in avoiding accountability and contouring the media ecology than any evidentiary law and order objective," Gupta tweeted. Manipur is still mostly in the dark. And while the violence has subsided as both sides stay within their territory, it hasn’t died out completely. In the border zones, shots still ring out. It’s still smoldering, and could burst back into flames at any time.

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usafphantom2 · 1 year

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Rebels destroy 3 fighters in attack on Myanmar air base

Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 11/21/2022 - 4:00 p.m. in Military

Three Myanmar Air Force combat planes were destroyed in an attack on an air base in the Magwe region, organized by Karen rebels.

The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), joined forces with allies of the resistance to fire three improvised rockets at the air base on November 16, hitting at least two MiG-29 fighters and killing at least eight soldiers.

“We can confirm that two MiG-29 and another fighter were destroyed and at least eight soldiers were killed,” Padoh Saw Taw Nee, KNU spokesman, told The Irrawaddy.

The Eagle Popular Defense Force also stated that its members coordinated with KNLA and other resistance groups to fire three improvised 170 mm rockets at the air base and shoot troops with rifles.

Myanmar MiG-29 fighters. (Photo: Thet AUNG / AFP)

The group commander, Saw David, said: "This attack is a revenge for the atrocities in the states of Karen and Kachin. If they kill a civilian, we will kill 10 soldiers from the junta. These board aircraft were used to massacre innocent civilians."

After the attack, the troops of the military junta were positioned in the city of Magwe, reinforcing security and controlling passengers, according to residents.

The Magwe Air Base was attacked twice recently – in August 2021 and April 2022.

Almost 6,000 Myanmar board soldiers have been killed in clashes in Karen state since last year, including about 369 deaths in October.

Tags: Military AviationMAF - Myanmar Air Force / Myanmar Air ForceMiG-29 Fulcrum

Fernando Valduga

Aviation photographer and pilot since 1992, he has participated in several events and air operations, such as Cruzex, AirVenture, Dayton Airshow and FIDAE. It has works published in specialized aviation magazines in Brazil and abroad. Uses Canon equipment during his photographic work in the world of aviation.