listen this is nothing particularly against madrid i swear but I just feel like accusing another club of being fascist would work a lot better if your stadium isn’t literally named after one of franco’s generals

APEC Meeting and East Asia Summit, Catalonia and East Asia, and Papal visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh

APEC and East Asian Summit 

The TPP11 (TPP without the United States) was signed, finally, after the rounds of rather secretive negotiations. Unlike left-leaning people, my centrist self is supportive of free-trade agreements and regional integration in Asia-Pacific as long as the state still has the upperhand in the tussle with corporations. To my delight, Jacinda-mania of New Zealand wasn’t confined to the isles of Aotearoa. According to media, she apparently handled these summits well and helped bring Canada back to the TPP11 table . Poor Trump! The most well-known unconventional politician of our times, like the United States and TPP11, was kind of an outsider when it came to the trademark handshake of ASEAN, at the group photo time. 

Catalonia, East Asia, and Andorra Model for Myanmar’s restive hinterlands

Catalonia and East Asia What’s the connection between the Catalans and East Asians? Let’s cast our minds right back to 16th Century, and remember that it was from the Iberian Peninsula that many early Europeans in military garb, whatever was in business fashion back then or cassocks sailed to East Asia. Indelible marks of this encounter remain in enclaves of Southern European mixed-race descendants in Macao, Penang, Malaysia and a handful of villages in the Myanmar midlands to list a few. In language and linguistics too, keen observers may notice c – th sounds in the dialects in contact with those enclaves.

Enough history. Coming back to the 21st Century, separatist politics is common to Iberia and East Asia. Outer provinces of the Chinese mainland, jungles of Southeast Asia, the India sub-continent and the Southern Philippines are no strangers to separatism, just like Iberia . Do not forget General Franco’s military junta in Spanish history echoing the Myanmar, Thai, Filipino and Indonesian juntas. In geographical Catalonia, there is a tiny patch of sovereign land – Andorra tucked in the Pyrenes ranges . A geopolitical anomaly if you will. Ruled by two co-princes: whoever wins the popular vote in France and a man whom the Pope entrusts to lead the Catholic souls of the Diocese of Seu d’Urgel get Andorra as a common perk of their offices . Quite literally, the only patch in the nation of Catalonia to enjoy the privileges of being a state.

Having read Myanmar’s bilateral ties with Andorra in 2009 as a prelude to its later reproach with the Holy See this year, I would use Andorra as a model to pacify some insurgents along Myanmar borders if I were ever thus tasked. Take for example the Wa straddling the Myanmar-China border . We could perhaps hand the Wa warlords to the Americans to start, effectively securing stronger US support than ever before. After all, many of those warlords are on wanted lists of US law enforcement agencies . Once the strongmen are gone the powers that be in Naypyidaw must fill the vacuum quickly to stabilize the Wa lands.

Here’s how Andorra comes in to play. We could replace the warlords of the Wa with a co-principality just like Andorra – a Catholic bishop in Shan States and the Chinese President will do. Who knows? This arrangement could even catalyse a reconciliation between the Holy See and Beijing. In short, in exchange for giving up formal sovereignty over a tiny patch of Myanmar in Shan State, Naypyidaw can pull some wonderful diplomatic card tricks with many benefits to itself, not least among them could be the holy grail of stable borderlands, elusive stuff in Myanmar since 1948.

Pope of the Peripheries to visit Myanmar and Bangladesh 

Pope Francis will land in Myanmar in a fortnight to preach to, about and in these countries where there’re humanitarian crises. The most prominent of them are Rohingya fleeing Myanmar into Bangladesh right now as I type this article. True to his stated mission of ministering to the peripheries, the current pope has spoken about the Rohingya publicly to pilgrims in Rome at least three times. Whether overtly or cryptically, he almost certainly will bring the subject alongside overarching themes of “peace, love and harmony”, in either or both nations when he lands in Asia this week.

However admirable is his people’s pope image, one should keep in mind some reservations against his papacy. First, as liberals in the free and relatively free parts of the world are disappointingly aware, on Catholic doctrines and other issues he is no revolutionary but will get on with keeping up with the modern world in glacial piecemeal fashion only . On the other hand, his sense and articulation of socioeconomic justice had earned him the moniker ‘Che in a cassock’ in some quarters. Yet, looking from socioeconomic and political perspectives Francis’s love of peripheries is not only financially burdensome to the tiny Catholic communities he visits, but also fan the globalization flames that the Catholic Church long ago started . His refusal to be separated by bullet-proof glass panels and his encounters with the slum-dwellers increase the security and logistic costs. Remember his visits are often to poor countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh. Even in the developed world, having the tiny Catholic minorities in places like Sweden cover the costs of a papal visit is not ideal and present challenges in fundraising. His trips to peripheries benefit the centre more through the processes and outcomes of globalization. The papal entourage and press details stay at hotels almost invariably owned by those in the Global North . It is the airlines from the Global North that transport the pope, his aides, the press detail, and the globally-mobile Catholics and papal fans to the peripheries -not airlines of developing states. In Myanmar, the souvenirs of the papal trips are made in neighbouring China and Thailand. These then are shipped by logistics and delivery companies, again from the developed states like DHL, FedEx, or TNT from Thai and Chinese factories to Myanmar shops – meaning Myanmar loses out on the production and shipment while the devotees fork out money to fund the trip and cover costs of manufacturing souvenirs.

Of course, there are also intangible benefits and costs in papal diplomacy depending on one’s values. But, for the purposes of this blogpost I am merely pointing why visiting the peripheries is neither always wise in tangible economic senses nor empowering to the people at the peripheries. The pope is hardly the only one falling into the trap of unwitting commodification of the poverty of these places through their actions. There are hordes of voluntourists from the rich world compounding the problems of the peripheries however genuine their intentions may be.

Lastly, did anyone miss? Pope Francis, dubbed the pope of the Global South, is also an overt colonialist ! Myanmar was part of this dark side of the pope, too. He is the one who annexed Sovereign Military Order of Malta when the Catholic order, a sovereign entity in the international system, was in a leadership crisis after its aid projects in Myanmar had strayed from Holy See’s line on Catholic teachings . Just because he’s the pope and the fact that SMOM lacks physical territory altogether, unlike Holy See possessing a token territory of Vatican, is no excuse for Francis’s overt takeover of another sovereign entity. What is good for big states rich in both hard-power and soft-power like United States, Russia, China, France, or United Kingdom is good for Holy See lacking hard-power yet still wielding a big amount of soft-power!

References

admin. ‘South East Asia and in Far East Asia. List of Portuguese Colonial Forts and Possessions’. Colonial Voyage (blog), 20 February 2014. https://www.colonialvoyage.com/south-east-asia-far-east-asia-list-portuguese-colonial-forts-possessions/. ‘Andorra Country Profile’. BBC News, 2 November 2017, sec. Europe. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17028050. ‘Apostolic Journey of the Holy Father to Myanmar and Bangladesh [26 November - 2 December 2017]’. Vatican.va. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://localhost:4503/content/francesco/en/events/event.dir.html/content/vaticanevents/en/2017/11/26/viaggio-apostolico-myanmar-bangladesh.html. ‘Does Voluntourism Do More Harm than Good? | Voluntary Sector Network | The Guardian’. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2015/may/21/western-volunteers-more-harm-than-good. Gibson, Richard Michael. The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Drug Warlords of the Golden Triangle. John Wiley & Sons, 2011. ‘Govern d’Andorra’. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.govern.ad/. Hays, Jeffrey. ‘GOLDEN TRIANGLE DRUG LORDS: KHUN SA, LO HSING HAN, MISS HAIRY LEGS AND THE WA STATE ARMY | Facts and Details’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Myanmar/sub5_5g/entry-3078.html. ‘How Much Does It Cost for the Pope to Meet the Poor?’ Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed 26 November 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/25/how-much-does-it-cost-for-the-pope-to-meet-the-poor/. Kingsley, Patrick, and Raphael Minder. ‘Catalonia Separatism Revives Spanish Nationalism’. The New York Times, 5 October 2017, sec. Europe. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/europe/catalan-independence-referendum.html. Lind, Dara. ‘Junipero Serra Was a Brutal Colonialist. So Why Did Pope Francis Just Make Him a Saint?’ Vox, 24 September 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/9/24/9391995/junipero-serra-saint-pope-francis. ‘List of Active Separatist Movements in Asia’. Wikipedia, 22 November 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_Asia&oldid=811527481. MillsReporter, Christian. ‘President Macron Assumes New Title– as Co-Prince of Andorra’. Royal Central (blog), 16 May 2017. http://royalcentral.co.uk/europe/president-macron-assumes-new-title-as-co-prince-of-andorra-82297. ‘Myanmar Mission Review Facebook Page’. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.facebook.com/MyanmarMissionReview/. ‘Patrick Gower: Jacinda Ardern Helps Keep TPP Alive’. Newshub, 11 November 2017, sec. Politics. http://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2017/11/patrick-gower-jacinda-ardern-helps-keep-tpp-alive.html. ‘Pope Francis: Che Guevara in a Cassock? | RealClearPolitics’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://www.realclearworld.com/2014/10/03/pope_francis_che_guevara_in_a_cassock_161860.html. ‘Pope Francis in Myanmar-2017 Facebook Page’. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.facebook.com/PopeinMyanmar/. ‘Pope Seizes Power from the Knights of Malta, Brutally Ending 900 Years of Their Sovereignty’. Coffee House, 25 January 2017. https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/pope-seizes-power-knights-malta-brutally-ending-900-years-sovereignty/. ‘President Trump Learns the Art and the Awkwardness of the ASEAN Handshake’. USA TODAY. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/11/13/president-trump-learns-art-and-awkwardness-asean-handshake/857955001/. ‘Principado de Andorra’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://www.bisbaturgell.org/index.php/es/principado-de-andorra. ‘Saying No to Burma’s Druglords’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://www2.irrawaddy.com/opinion_story.php?art_id=282. ‘Self-Administered Division and Self-Administered Zone | Myanmar President Office’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=cabinet/self-administered-division-and-self-administered-zone. Service, Catholic News. ‘Bishops Fear Any Mention of Rohingya by Pope Will Bring “Chaos”’. Accessed 26 October 2017. https://catholicregister.org/home/international/item/26244-bishops-fear-any-mention-of-rohingya-by-pope-will-bring-chaos?platform=hootsuite. Thackray, Jemima. ‘Beware of the Two Faces of Pope Francis: He Ain’t No Liberal’, 22 January 2015, sec. Women. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11362224/Pope-Francis-he-aint-no-liberal.-Beware-of-his-two-faces.html. ‘The Pitfalls Of Debating The Pope’s Liberal Politics’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://thefederalist.com/2017/06/30/the-pitfalls-of-debating-the-popes-liberal-politics/. ‘The Reality of Voluntourism and the Conversations We’re Not Having’. Accessed 26 November 2017. https://www.themuse.com/advice/the-reality-of-voluntourism-and-the-conversations-were-not-having. ‘The United Nations and Decolonization’. Accessed 26 November 2017. http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/. ‘TPP 11 Forge Ahead with Renamed Trade Pact after Close Call’. The Japan Times Online, 11 November 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/11/business/economy-business/eleven-trade-ministers-reach-deal-tpp-without-u-s/. ‘U Saw Hla Min Appointed as Ambassador to the Principality of Andorra’. THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR. 15 October 2009, XVII:182 edition.

When Rich Places Want to Secede

The crisis kicked off by Catalonia’s contested October 1 secession vote has come to a head. Following police violence, imprisonments, and mass protests, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced last weekend that he would pursue Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to replace Catalonia’s leaders and impose direct rule over what is the country’s most productive region. On Friday, the Spanish parliament approved the measure, just after its Catalan counterpart formally declared independence.A major reason cited for the crisis? As Catalan protesters cried, “Madrid nos roba”—“Madrid is robbing us”—by which they mean the federal government is taking more than it gives in transfer payments. Catalonia, the northeastern region that includes Barcelona and holds 16 percent of the Spanish population, accounts for about a fifth of Spain’s $1.2 trillion economy and about a quarter of all Spanish exports and industry. Most crucially, it pays Madrid $12 billion more in taxes per year than it gets back.As a relatively rich region with its own independence movement, Catalonia's not alone: A small set of secession movements in historically productive areas, most visibly in Europe, say they’d be better off on their own, and more are pointing to Catalonia's example to regain momentum. Belgium’s Flanders region, one of the birthplaces of modern commerce and the host to a separatist party that made gains after the global financial crisis, boasts a GDP per capita 120 percent higher than the EU average. If the German state of Bavaria were its own country, as the Bavarian Party wishes, its economic output would crack the top 10 of EU member states, according to its government. And last weekend, two deep-pocketed northern Italian regions that are home to each Milan and Venice, passed nonbinding referenda for greater autonomy. In Europe, resentments of paying to cover less productive countrymen are longstanding, but recently they seem to have intensified as a swirl of nationalist sentiments has swept the continent.The common wisdom used to be that separatist movements mostly came from weak minorities that rallied around racial or ethnic injustices. “With globalization, that changed significantly,” said Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics (LSE). “Virtually everywhere in the world,” movements have swapped out the “identity card” for the “economic card.”Erin Jenne, a professor of international relations at Central European University, agrees. Economic inequality is one of a few factors that can keep independence movements simmering, but they won’t boil over without a catalyst—usually some external circumstance like a major political crisis, or an offer from another country to provide military support to a region with separatist aspirations, she said. After all, inequality between regions is baked into the entire concept of modern nationhood—if subsidizing poorer parts of a country were motivation enough to split off, every region would have done it by now.Last weekend’s referenda in Italy’s regions of Lombardy and Veneto show how these economic tensions seldom come free of matters of ethnic identity. The initiatives, which more seek financial autonomy than outright secession, are sponsored by the Northern League, a populist anti-immigrant party. Paolo Grimoldi, a League official, said the regions were tired of “giving 80 billion euros to the state coffers.” Politico has argued that the votes were a symbolic tribute to a northern Italian dream of the ‘90s: a fully seceded, Celtic-inflected ethno-state called Padania that would cut the dead weight of “Roma ladrona”—“Thieving Rome.”But movements to secede can be a gamble. Independence talk in places like Quebec and Catalonia has historically made businesses and consumers feel queasy—after pro-secession parties took action, the regions have seen relocations of corporate headquarters, and even drops in home prices in Quebec and bank deposits in Catalonia. Plus, there are economic perks to staying together: Trade is easier across internal borders, and diversified regions diffuse risk.Catalonia, for example, has built up some of its own institutions, but it has a long way to go before it has all the systems of a national government, and the limited evidence that exists suggests secession doesn’t necessarily fling open the gates of economic growth. A huge portion of Catalonia’s trade is either domestic or with the European Union, says Rodríguez-Pose, of LSE. If the region were to break off, not only would Spain lose 20 percent of its GDP overnight—Catalonia could see, Rodríguez-Pose says, “rapid impoverishment” depending on the scale of conflict.Jenne, of Central European University, has published research indicating that economic issues are often not as strong of motivators as other factors, such as how densely a group is concentrated in its territory, or whether a region eager to split off is offered military support by another nation. But that doesn’t stop groups all over the world from using regional inequality as a negotiating tool. The U.S. has seen it, too: In February, California argued that its role as a “donor state”—that it sends more money to the federal government than it receives—gave it leverage over the Trump administration’s threats to withdraw federal funding following its actions to declare itself a “sanctuary state” for immigrants. California is indeed a “donor,” but not by much: The state gets 99 cents back in federal spending for every dollar it contributes through taxes, below the nationwide average of $1.22. There’s an initiative in the state to put secession on the ballot in 2018, and Silicon Valley floats talk of breaking off to form an independent nation (sometimes literally floating).Similarly, after Brexit, the Texan Nationalist Party pushed to mimic the U.K. Independence Party’s tactics, billing Texas’s $1.6 trillion economy as the “World’s 10th Largest.” Texan lawmakers, though demurring on secession, started to adopt the economic language of the fringe group.Of course, there have been hundreds of these movements in American history, and few expect these recent ones to amount to much. Calls for secession happen for all sorts of reasons, and rarely gain majority support—although Catalonia’s vote overwhelmingly passed, it drew just 43 percent of eligible voters, with many opponents staying home.Still, “you never really know what you’re going to get when you enter into these negotiating processes,” said Jenne. She pointed to the relatively peaceful “Velvet Divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Slovakia, the weaker region, was “absolutely shocked” when the Czechs bought into their calls for secession, she said. After the decade or so it took the weaker Slovakia to recover, “it has done relatively well,” said Rodríguez-Pose. “So it can happen.” But that’s about as good as can be hoped, he said: “If secession takes place with conflict, then recovery times are much, much worse—and it can take a generation, if not longer.”Crackdowns like Spain’s can risk inflaming that sort of conflict, and Catalonia’s push for independence likewise threatens its economic well-being. Movements around the world are watching Spain in the coming days to see just how just how the crisis unfolds—and whether their turn could be next. Read the full article

The crisis kicked off by Catalonia’s contested October 1 secession vote has come to a head. Following police violence, imprisonments, and mass protests, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced last weekend that he would pursue Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to replace Catalonia’s leaders and impose direct rule over what is the country’s most productive region. On Friday, the Spanish parliament approved the measure, just after its Catalan counterpart formally declared independence.

A major reason cited for the crisis? As Catalan protesters cried, “Madrid nos roba”—“Madrid is robbing us”—by which they mean the federal government is taking more than it gives in transfer payments. Catalonia, the northeastern region that includes Barcelona and holds 16 percent of the Spanish population, accounts for about a fifth of Spain’s $1.2 trillion economy and about a quarter of all Spanish exports and industry. Most crucially, it pays Madrid $12 billion more in taxes per year than it gets back.

As a relatively rich region with its own independence movement, Catalonia's not alone: A small set of secession movements in historically productive areas, most visibly in Europe, say they’d be better off on their own, and more are pointing to Catalonia's example to regain momentum. Belgium’s Flanders region, one of the birthplaces of modern commerce and the host to a separatist party that made gains after the global financial crisis, boasts a GDP per capita 120 percent higher than the EU average. If the German state of Bavaria were its own country, as the Bavarian Party wishes, its economic output would crack the top 10 of EU member states, according to its government. And last weekend, two deep-pocketed northern Italian regions that are home to each Milan and Venice, passed nonbinding referenda for greater autonomy. In Europe, resentments of paying to cover less productive countrymen are longstanding, but recently they seem to have intensified as a swirl of nationalist sentiments has swept the continent.

The common wisdom used to be that separatist movements mostly came from weak minorities that rallied around racial or ethnic injustices. “With globalization, that changed significantly,” said Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics (LSE). “Virtually everywhere in the world,” movements have swapped out the “identity card” for the “economic card.”

Erin Jenne, a professor of international relations at Central European University, agrees. Economic inequality is one of a few factors that can keep independence movements simmering, but they won’t boil over without a catalyst—usually some external circumstance like a major political crisis, or an offer from another country to provide military support to a region with separatist aspirations, she said. After all, inequality between regions is baked into the entire concept of modern nationhood—if subsidizing poorer parts of a country were motivation enough to split off, every region would have done it by now.

Last weekend’s referenda in Italy’s regions of Lombardy and Veneto show how these economic tensions seldom come free of matters of ethnic identity. The initiatives, which more seek financial autonomy than outright secession, are sponsored by the Northern League, a populist anti-immigrant party. Paolo Grimoldi, a League official, said the regions were tired of “giving 80 billion euros [each year] to the state coffers.” Politico has argued that the votes were a symbolic tribute to a northern Italian dream of the ‘90s: a fully seceded, Celtic-inflected ethno-state called Padania that would cut the dead weight of “Roma ladrona”—“Thieving Rome.”

But movements to secede can be a gamble. Independence talk in places like Quebec and Catalonia has historically made businesses and consumers feel queasy—after pro-secession parties took action, the regions have seen relocations of corporate headquarters, and even drops in home prices in Quebec and bank deposits in Catalonia. Plus, there are economic perks to staying together: Trade is easier across internal borders, and diversified regions diffuse risk.

Catalonia, for example, has built up some of its own institutions, but it has a long way to go before it has all the systems of a national government, and the limited evidence that exists suggests secession doesn’t necessarily fling open the gates of economic growth. A huge portion of Catalonia’s trade is either domestic or with the European Union, says Rodríguez-Pose, of LSE. If the region were to break off, not only would Spain lose 20 percent of its GDP overnight—Catalonia could see, Rodríguez-Pose says, “rapid impoverishment” depending on the scale of conflict.

Jenne, of Central European University, has published research indicating that economic issues are often not as strong of motivators as other factors, such as how densely a group is concentrated in its territory, or whether a region eager to split off is offered military support by another nation. But that doesn’t stop groups all over the world from using regional inequality as a negotiating tool. The U.S. has seen it, too: In February, California argued that its role as a “donor state”—as in, it sends more money to the federal government than it receives—gave it leverage over the Trump administration’s threats to withdraw federal funding following its actions to declare itself a “sanctuary state” for immigrants. California is indeed a “donor,” but not by much: The state gets 99 cents back in federal spending for every dollar it contributes through taxes, below the nationwide average of $1.22. There’s an initiative in the state to put secession on the ballot in 2018, and Silicon Valley floats talk of breaking off to form an independent nation (sometimes literally floating).

Similarly, after Brexit, the Texan Nationalist Party pushed to mimic the U.K. Independence Party’s tactics, billing Texas’s $1.6 trillion economy as the “World’s 10th Largest.” Texan lawmakers, though demurring on secession, started to adopt the economic language of the fringe group.

Of course, there have been hundreds of these movements in American history, and few expect these recent ones to amount to much. Calls for secession happen for all sorts of reasons, and rarely gain majority support—although Catalonia’s vote overwhelmingly passed, it drew just 43 percent of eligible voters, with many opponents staying home.

Still, “you never really know what you’re going to get when you enter into these negotiating processes,” said Jenne. She pointed to the relatively peaceful “Velvet Divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Slovakia, the weaker region, was “absolutely shocked” when the Czechs bought into their calls for secession, she said. After the decade or so it took the weaker Slovakia to recover, “it has done relatively well,” said Rodríguez-Pose. “So it can happen.” But that’s about as good as can be hoped, he said: “If secession takes place with conflict, then recovery times are much, much worse—and it can take a generation, if not longer.”

Crackdowns like Spain’s can risk inflaming that sort of conflict, and Catalonia’s push for independence likewise threatens its economic well-being. Movements around the world are watching Spain in the coming days to see just how just how the crisis unfolds—and whether their turn could be next.

from The Atlantic http://ift.tt/2gPDPiB