@helldustedstories : Angel had been thinking about his life a lot recently. He's not entirely certain why, except Charlie's whole endeavour had made him consider why he was here in the first place. Oh, he knew he should be, what with everything he'd done while he was alive. But that had started him thinking about other people in his life, people who should have gone to Heaven, if there was any justice in the world.

He knew it was a long shot, that Heaven was likely a pretty big place, and he didn't have any idea how much exorcists really interacted with the general populace. Plus, he doubted that any one angel knew all of the people that died and passed through the Pearly Gates. But....it couldn't hurt to ask, right?

"Hey, Vaggie," he greets her, lower set of arms leaning back casually against the bar, upper right hand holding a glass while the left rested in his lap. "How does Heaven keep track of everyone that dies? There some sort of an archive or somethin'?" He figured he would start there; that seemed like an innocuous enough question. And if she answered him..., maybe he'd ask what he was really trying to find an answer to.

For one blissful moment, the hotel doesn't seem to be falling down around them. The improvements were well underway, beyond just the repaired facade, but there was still work to be done. Honestly, it felt like there was always more work to be done, but she was far too happy to throw herself into it.

She had a lot to make up for. Still. Always.

Vaggie'd been dropping off a handful of tools to Alastor's summoned help when Angel speaks up, and she takes another moment to ensure the over-glorified plush toys are holding the hammers by the correct end before starting toward where he lingers at the bar. Unlike questions he's had for her in the past regarding Heaven, this one rings with an air of... sincerity? Or something close to it. Weird.

"Sort of, yeah. It's called Sefer HaChaim, or the Book of Life. Basically a big manifesto of all the people who have been, are still, and have yet to be. It's a book of 'the righteous.' Supposedly, there's a counterpart, the Book of Death, but... I've never seen it." Moving to lean against one of the bar stools, she takes a moment to dust her hands off on her shirt, "Pretty sure Saint Peter keeps track of it, these days. Why?"

unprompted !!

Use of Christian and Jewish Scriptures in the Writings of Ibn Barrajān

Ibn Barrajān quotes extensively from the Hebrew Bible, especially Genesis (chapters 1, 2, 3, 15, 18, 19, 22), and paraphrases a handful of passages from Exodus. Interestingly, the Torah (and especially Genesis) is cited more frequently than any other book of the Bible. In contrast to the Ikhwān who stress the Gospels in their Rasā’il, Ibn Barrajān never tires of reminding his reading that the Torah enjoys a special status among revealed scriptures mentioned in the Qur’an. He notes that the Torah is Qur’anically described as a discernment or ‘differentiation’ (tafṣīl) of all things: And We wrote for him [Moses] on the Tablets of everything an admonition, and a differentiation of all things (Q. 7:145). Ibn Barrajān takes this verse to mean that the Torah not only issues from God's all-embracing knowledge, but also that it fleshes out or unpacks God's undifferentiated (mujmal) knowledge as inscribed upon the Preserved Tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ). The Torah contains all knowledge of past, present, and future, and like the Qur’an it also contains predictions about what is to come. The Torah, in other words, is an important source of mystical inspiration and corresponds precisely to the ‘core’ of Qur’anic revelation. It is very likely that Ibn Barrajān came across commentaries upon the Torah in Arabic, specifically commentaries on Genesis and Exodus, since he claims to have consulted ‘commentaries upon some of the previously revealed Books’ in his discussion of Exodus (3:21-2). The extent to which these works were available in Arabic at the time does remain an open question. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that Ibn Barrajān had access to written or oral eastern commentaries authored by Jewish exegetes, like that of Sa‘adiya Gaon (d. 331/942), or the Iraqi Christian commentator Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043), or even local Biblical commentaries such as those produced by the contemporary, though younger, Jewish scholar Abraham ibn Ezra (d. c. 563/1167). Ibn Barrajān demonstrates a broad, albeit vague, familiarity with the Books of Prophets (kutub al-nubuwwāt), which he clearly distinguishes from the Torah. [...] What is hermeneutically significant is that Ibn Barrajān accords the status of divine revelation (waḥy) to the kutub al-nubuwwāt, which are not explicitly listed as revelatory in the Qur’an. Furthermore, Ibn Barrajān cites the kutub al-nubuwwāt to deepen his knowledge of the Qur’an and, in at least one instance, to correct a conventional interpretation accorded to Q. 2:243 by Sunnī exegetes (see his discussion of Ezekiel 37:1-10 in the Appendix below). [...] In terms of the New Testament, Ibn Barrajān quotes only from the Gospel of Matthew (chapters 4, 11, 13, 20, and 24). He does not evince any knowledge of the existence of Mark, Luke, and John (al-anājīl al-arba‘ {the Four Gospels}) and, similarly, there are no indications that he had access to an Arabic translation of the Diatessaron, such as Ibn al-Ṭayyib's so-called Arabic Gospel Harmony. He equates the Gospel (injīl) with Matthew, and emphasises that the Qur'an acclaims it as a source of guidance, light, and admonition (And We sent, following in their footsteps, Jesus son of Mary, confirming the Torah before him and We gave to him the Gospel, wherein is guidance, and light, and confirming the Torah before it, as a guidance and an admonition unto the godfearing. Q. 5:46), terms which the Qur’an also ascribes to itself (Q. 10:57 and Q. 4:174). The implication for Ibn Barrajān is evident: that one must seek the channels of guidance, light, and admonition in both the Qur’an and the Gospel. However, it is noteworthy that Ibn Barrajān does not accord the same status to the Gospels as he does to the Torah. While the Christian revelation is certainly a channel of guidance and light, it does not stand as a differentiation of the Preserved Tablet in the same way as the Qur’anically affirmed status of the Torah. To some extent, therefore, the Torah enjoys more interpretive weight in his writings than the Gospels. [...] Ibn Barrajān sometimes describes the Gospels not as the word of God, as understood in the Qur'anic context, but as a collection of statements made by Jesus. [...] Of all the Biblical books, the Psalms, which Ibn Barrajān usually equates with the Zabūr, inform his writings the least. It is not certain whether he had access to an Arabic translation of the Psalms or if he ever read them in their entirety. In any case, the Psalms do not deal with narrative Biblical material and supply few prooftexts for his purposes.

Yousef Casewit (A Muslim Scholar of the Bible: Prooftexts from Genesis and Matthew in the Qur'an commentary of Ibn Barrajan of Seville, d. 536/1141)

Sefer HaChaim "The Book of Life" Talon Abraxas

Baal bechira 2

The Ohr HaChaim seems to be at odds with the Sefer HaChinuch which says there is no reason for a person to want revenge against anyone, since whatever the other person did to you was anyway decreed by G-d.

A lot of people think that the Ohr HaChaim argues with the Sefer HaChinuch. But it doesn’t have to be so.

First, the Chofetz Chaim (al HaTorah Mishpatim) proves from the Gemora that even if someone hurts you, it is still Min HaShamayim. The Gemora is talking about the fact that the Torah gives a doctor permission to heal. “Verapoh yerapeh” the posuk says. Explains the Gemora; You might have thought that since G-d decreed a person be ill, it would be forbidden to heal him since you are contradicting Hashem’s decree. But, the Chofetz Chaim points out, the posuk of verapoh yerapeh is referring in context to a person who is injured by being hit by another person. You therefore see, says the Chofetz Chaim, that even when one person hits another person it is a divine decree.

The Chovos HaLevovos also mentions that when one person harms another it can only be by divine decree. Rav Chaim Volozhen (Ruach Chaim) also explains along these lines the Mishna in Pirkei Avos, “He saw a skull floating on the water. He said to it: Because you killed someone were you killed – and the person who killed you will be killed nonetheless”. On the other hand, the Ohr HaChaim who says that a person can harm another even against the will of Hashem and that’s why Reuven was helping Yosef by lowering him into the pit, is really a Zohar, on the spot. The Ohr HaChaim does not quote it, but it’s there. The Metzudas Dovid in Daniel (3:26) similarly asks why Channia, Mishael, and Azaryah didn’t simply jump out of the fiery furnace when they had a chance. Even though they would have had to fight Nevuchadnetzar, still, by staying the fire they were as good as dead anyway so why not chance jumping out and fighting? He says that the fire is not a Baal bechirah and only burns when Hashem decrees. Nevuchadnetzar, on the other hand, is a Baal bechirah and could kill them even against Hashem’s wishes. The same idea as the Zohar and the Ohr HaChaim. There are numerous other sources with this idea as well, particularly in the Chassidishe Seforim.

There doesn’t have to be any disagreement. For sure, Hashem can, and sometimes does protect people even from Baalei Bechirah, like when Moshe Rabbeinu’s neck turned to stone. Or on Chanukah, Rabim b’Yad m’atim. So here’s the question: If Hashem decides to protect Yosef from his brothers, Yosef will be protected; if He decides to let the brothers kill him, he will die. So why's that different than the snakes and scorpions?

The answer is that Hashem’s decision to protect or not protect people is not random, but follows certain rules. Hashem takes into consideration the person’s merits, zechus avos, other zechusim, and various different factors then decides what to do. At times, there are circumstances that upset the balance. Like for instance a Makom Sakanah, where Hashem will not afford a person his otherwise warranted level of protection. Or the Halachah that prohibits us to walk on a bridge together with a Rasha. If Hashem decides to punish the Rasha, by collapsing the bridge, we will c”v be in danger. But let’s try to understand this. If Hashem wants an innocent person to live he will live; if he wants him to die he will die, so why should the fate of the Rasha accidentally affect the life of the Tzadik because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time? The answer is of course Hashem can save him, but just like there is such a thing as a natural Makom Sakanah where there is a specially strict system of life and death, so too there are situations, such as being on a bridge with a Rasha, that are similarly dangerous such that Hashem uses a more strict system to determine whether a person lives or dies. So no matter what, a person’s fate is in the hands of Hashem. It’s just that there are certain circumstances that even if a person would normally be given life, under those circumstances, his Zechusim would not be enough to save him. So it’s the same thing with Baalei Bechirah vs. non-Baalei Bechirah. The system Hashem uses to determine life and death based on a person’s merits was designed for non-Baalei Bechirah situations. When a Baal bechirah is involved, it’s like being on a bridge with a Rasha, or a simple Makom Sakanah and the usual system of what kind of zechusim you need to live is no longer applicable. Of course Hashem can save you, but it's harder to be saved from baalei Bechirah just like it's harder to be allowed to live when walking in a makom Sakanah.

So there need not be a Machlokes here. The Ohr HaChaim, the Zohar, the Metzudas, and all the other seforim that say a Baal bechirah can over ride Hashem’s plan only need to mean that they can invalidate Hashem’s usual method of running the world the way a Makom Sakanah can. So it’s true that a Baal bechirah can kill someone even if he doesn’t deserve to be killed, the same way that walking on a bridge can kill someone who otherwise would not deserve to be killed. But just as the collapsed bridge and the death of all who are on it is totally Hashem’s doing, so too death at the hands of a Baal bechirah is totally Hashem’s doing. You would need a greater level of zechusim, even greater than what you would normally need for a miracle, to be saved from a Baal Bechirah. And your usual zechusim would not help. The usual manner of the way the world runs would not apply. Instead, there would be a stricter system. So Reuven did help Yosef by putting him into the pit, because against snakes and scorpions, because Yosef’s zechusim as a perfect Tzadik would certainly spare him from snakes, but when dealing with baalei bechirah, Hashem doesn’t necessarily save even someone with perfect zechusim; Chananiah Mishael and Azariah were smart for facing the fire instead of Nevuchadnetzar for the same reason.

Just a reminder, the Ohr HaChaim is merely duplicating the Zohar ad loc, so let's refer to this as the Zohar's opinion. It's not a question of "upsetting the balance." It's a question of Hashem shifting His level of method of judgment from the mode that He usually uses to one that is stricter when Baalei bechirah are involved. Nobody questions the fact that when someone kills himself it is G-d that decided, allowed, and caused the person to be successful. Had G-d not wanted the guy to kill himself, he wouldn't have been able to, since he needed G-d's help to do it. However, also, nobody disagrees that G-d does not want this guy to kill himself, since He said Thou shalt not kill! So which is it? Does G-d want this guy to be killed or not? The answer is that for sure G-d would have preferred that this guy not kill himself. In that sense we say G-d did not want this guy to kill himself. However, after the guy used his free will to decide to kill himself, G-d now willingly and proactively decrees that this guy's decision should become reality. Nobody forced G-d to do this. In this sense we say G-d wanted the guy to get killed. It's two different definitions of "want". Look at it this way: G-d willingly makes this guy to kill himself now that the guy decided to do it. But G-d would have preferred that the guy not make that decision. When we drive a car it is not considered a Sakanha since Shomer Pesayim Hashem, but if we jump off a roof, or drive wildly, then yes, we upset the balance and G-d now responds to our wildness by shifting His method of dealing in the world and now deals with you stricter. The only thing that disturbs the balance is bechirah. If a person is disturbed and cannot control his actions it is not a Bechirah decision.

Many Seforim talk about the Ohr HaChaim. The Be'er Mayim Chaim in Chayei Sarah on the posuk V'ekod V'eshtachaveh explains with this principle that even though Hashem arranges shiduchim, a person with his bechirah can reject his proper zivug. The Divrei Yoel in Ekev explains with this principle that even Hashem does not give a person a Nizayon more than he can handle, however, a Baal Bechirah can, meaning that a Baal bechirah who tries to influence you to do an aveirah may present you with a Nisayon stronger than that which Hashem would have given you, that is, a Nisayon too hard for you to handle. This is why it is so important to avoid bad influences, much more than other Nisyonos. Rabbi Mattisyahu Solomon shlita, the mashgiach of Lakewood, in his Matnas Chaim (Vol. I, "Ais lischok") writes that it always bothered him that the Tur writes that Shabbos HaGodol is called by that name because the Jews miraculously got away with shechting the Egyptian god as a Korban Pesach. He asks, why is this miracle any more impressive than all the miracles that the Jews had in Egypt when they were spared from the Makos for instance? According to this Zohar, Rabbi Solomon's questions disappears, since all the other miracles involved the Jews being saved from animals and other non-Baalei Bechirah. The fact that the Jews were saved from the Egyptians who were Baalei Bechirah is a much greater miracle. I had an idea that this Zohar is the meaning of the posuk in Mishle (17:12) "Better to encounter a bear bereaved of its cubs than to meet a fool in his foolishness". A fool is a Baal bechirah, and can harm you worse than a crazy bear, who, no matter how bad a mood he is in, is not a Baal bechirah and only listens to Hashem. There are countless places where this Zohar and the OhrHaChaim is discussed.

The Sefer HaChinuch says that you should not be angry at someone for doing something to you because Hashem caused it. This is true even if the damage came through a Bechirah-loophole as you may call it, since even in such a case, Hashem clearly acted to make the Bechirah-choice come true. if someone shoots someone else, even though it does not show the usual mode of Mishpat, but the point of the Chinuch is, if Hashem allowed the gun to shoot, and the bullet to reach its target, etc. etc., why be angry at the shooter? Hashem Himself contributed to the shooting. The Sefer haChinuch was talking about whether you should be angry at someone; the Ohr HaCham is talking about whether the normal indications of guilt and innocence are in effect. The answer is no, the usual scales of guilt and innocence are not in effect, but you should still not be angry at the person, since Hashem did make him be successful. In other words, if someone shoots someone else, the victim may not be as guilty as he normally would have to be in order to sustain such damage through a non-Baal bechirah, but despite his not being so guilty, Hashem still was involved in his being shot. But even according to those who say it is part of Hashem's plan, it doesn’t mean that Hashem involved the murderer. The murderer involved himself. The person would indeed have died of natural causes, but the murderer wanted to murder him and decided to murder him, and so the murderer did. That is why he gets punished - because he independently decided to commit the murder. Yes, G-d knew he would decide this, but so what? That doesn’t make the murderer any less evil. The decision to murder and the attempt to murder someone is what makes someone evil - and this murderer did all that. In a case where you put yourself in danger, the danger is given permission to attempt to hurt you because if you violate the Mitzvah of V'Nihsmartem, by putting yourself in a sakanah, the punishment is, you can get hurt. So you did that to yourself with your Bechirah, and Bechirah is not pre-determined.

Understand that, even according to the Ohr HaChaim and Zohar, that a Baal Bechirah can override the default plan Hashem had for you, they definitely agree that if Hashem wants he can intervene and save you form the Baal Bechirah - He can even turn your neck to stone if He will it. It’s only that the level of intervention needed on the part of Hashem is difficult to merit - "zeiin inun dnitzli mibaalei bechirah". However, Bitachon can provide that merit needed for even proactive intervention by Hashem. So according to them [it’s not just that]  that because Hashem is protecting me therefore I have bitachon, but rather, since I have bitachon therefore Hashem is protecting me.

How does the ohr hachaim / Zohar camp deal w/ the pasuk: "Hashem Li Lo Irah, Mah Yaaseh Li Odom" ?

That was the Brisker Rav's proof against the Ohr HaChaim.

I would venture to say that the Ohr Hachaim would hold something like Rav Yisroel Salanter's idea of Bitachon (not like the Chazon Ish) - that Bitachon can enable someone to obtain something they otherwise would not have obtained. So if you have Bitachon that you will get a gold watch, you will.

Therefore, even according to the Ohr HaChaim and Zohar, that a Baal Bechirah can override the default plan Hashem had for you, they definitely agree that if Hashem wants he can intervene and save you form the Baal Bechirah - He can even turn your neck to stone if He will it.

It’s only that the level of intervention needed on the part of Hashem is difficult to merit - "zeiin inun dnitzli mibaalei bechirah".

However, Bitachon can provide that merit needed for even proactive intervention by Hashem.

So the Posuk according to them is not saying that because Hashem is protecting me therefore I have Bitachon, but rather, since I have Bitachon therefore Hashem is protecting me.

Prophecy and the Virtue of Hope

In current political discourse (particularly in the Obama era) hope is arguably an overused term. Yet, as Vincent Crapanzano (2003) observes, the social and psychological sciences have given it relatively little attention. He attributes this disinterest to the passivity and resignation that are associated with hope and which run counter to "today's aggressive individualism [and] consumerism that cultivates an instant gratification that is at odds with the waiting-time of hope." But whereas the not-yet of secular hope seems fully in line with the premises of linear temporality, in al-Hagga Mona's stories futurality carries a different weight. In them, the future is and will be. As a number of Egyptians pointed out to me, foreseeing is different from expecting. We might expect things as a result of what we read in newspapers; based on the information we receive we form ideas about what the future will hold, and these predictions might be right or wrong. Through dream-visions, by contrast, one gains an actual glimpse of the future. Dream-visions do not merely predict future events; future events also enact dream-visions. Muslim literatures on the nature of dream-visions illuminate the blurred line between present and future, anticipation and prophecy, dream-dreamt and dream-coming-true. One of the many dream manuals sold on Cairo's streets explains that a dream-vision happens in three stages: (1) it is on the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh al mahfūz) on which all fate is inscribed; (2) it appears on the "mirror of the dreamer's mind"; and (3) it occurs in the "world of real life." This three-stage model exceeds an exclusively linear trajectory; it suggests that dream-visions are embedded within multiple temporalities. They are timeless -inscribed on the Preserved Tablet- and occur at particular moments: the moment when they are dreamed and the moment when they come true. Precisely because dream-visions imply a future that will be and that simultaneously always already is, they offer a space of hope that exceeds mere wishful thinking. Al-Hagga Mona's stories invite their listeners to enter into this space. [...] Yet even though dream visions prophetically announce the future, the future is not set in stone. I will address the issue of unfulfilled hopes and failed prophecies presently; here I simply want to underscore that al-Hagga Mona's narrative does not presume a fixed future. In her words, "God willing" the Egyptians will prevail, and her son calls upon God to "make it turn out well." The future is prophetically announced but still remains out of reach. Thus, the dream-telling, similar to the genre of prayer, is ultimately an act and expression of faith, one that recognizes God's power but that also acknowledges that this power exceeds human knowledge and cannot be petitioned or controlled. Whether intended as such by al-Hagga Mona or not, her stories rupture the premises of secular, linear, "man-made" history by acknowledging God's power, by speaking of saints from the past who are keeping an eye on wars unfolding in the present, by referring to angels who link the present to an eschatological future, and by evoking a future which occurs not simply after the present but is also inherent in it. The stories offer an alternative perspective on well-known historical events while at the same time insisting on the limits of human agency and understanding.

- Amira Mittermaier (“Invisible Armies: Reflections on Egyptian Dreams of War”)