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Amazon’s financial shell game let it create an “impossible” monopoly
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For the pro-monopoly crowd that absolutely dominated antitrust law from the Carter administration until 2020, Amazon presents a genuinely puzzling paradox: the company's monopoly power was never supposed to emerge, and if it did, it should have crumbled immediately.
Pro-monopoly economists embody Ely Devons's famous aphorism that "If economists wished to study the horse, they wouldn’t go and look at horses. They’d sit in their studies and say to themselves, ‘What would I do if I were a horse?’":
https://pluralistic.net/2022/10/27/economism/#what-would-i-do-if-i-were-a-horse
Rather than using the way the world actually works as their starting point for how to think about it, they build elaborate models out of abstract principles like "rational actors." The resulting mathematical models are so abstractly elegant that it's easy to forget that they're just imaginative exercises, disconnected from reality:
https://pluralistic.net/2023/04/03/all-models-are-wrong/#some-are-useful
These models predicted that it would be impossible for Amazon to attain monopoly power. Even if they became a monopoly – in the sense of dominating sales of various kinds of goods – the company still wouldn't get monopoly power.
For example, if Amazon tried to take over a category by selling goods below cost ("predatory pricing"), then rivals could just wait until the company got tired of losing money and put prices back up, and then those rivals could go back to competing. And if Amazon tried to keep the loss-leader going indefinitely by "cross-subsidizing" the losses with high-margin profits from some other part of its business, rivals could sell those high margin goods at a lower margin, which would lure away Amazon customers and cut the supply lines for the price war it was fighting with its discounted products.
That's what the model predicted, but it's not what happened in the real world. In the real world, Amazon was able use its access to the capital markets to embark on scorched-earth predatory pricing campaigns. When diapers.com refused to sell out to Amazon, the company casually committed $100m to selling diapers below cost. Diapers.com went bust, Amazon bought it for pennies on the dollar and shut it down:
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/13/18563379/amazon-predatory-pricing-antitrust-law
Investors got the message: don't compete with Amazon. They can remain predatory longer than you can remain solvent.
Now, not everyone shared the antitrust establishment's confidence that Amazon couldn't create a durable monopoly with market power. In 2017, Lina Khan – then a third year law student – published "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox," a landmark paper arguing that Amazon had all the tools it needed to amass monopoly power:
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox
Today, Khan is chair of the FTC, and has brought a case against Amazon that builds on some of the theories from that paper. One outcome of that suit is an unprecedented look at Amazon's internal operations. But, as the Institute for Local Self-Reliance's Stacy Mitchell describes in a piece for The Atlantic, key pieces of information have been totally redacted in the court exhibits:
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/02/amazon-profits-antitrust-ftc/677580/
The most important missing datum: how much money Amazon makes from each of its lines of business. Amazon's own story is that it basically breaks even on its retail operation, and keeps the whole business afloat with profits from its AWS cloud computing division. This is an important narrative, because if it's true, then Amazon can't be forcing up retail prices, which is the crux of the FTC's case against the company.
Here's what we know for sure about Amazon's retail business. First: merchants can't live without Amazon. The majority of US households have Prime, and 90% of Prime households start their ecommerce searches on Amazon; if they find what they're looking for, they buy it and stop. Thus, merchants who don't sell on Amazon just don't sell. This is called "monopsony power" and it's a lot easier to maintain than monopoly power. For most manufacturers, a 10% overnight drop in sales is a catastrophe, so a retailer that commands even a 10% market-share can extract huge concessions from its suppliers. Amazon's share of most categories of goods is a lot higher than 10%!
What kind of monopsony power does Amazon wield? Well, for one thing, it is able to levy a huge tax on its sellers. Add up all the junk-fees Amazon charges its platform sellers and it comes out to 45-51%:
https://pluralistic.net/2023/04/25/greedflation/#commissar-bezos
Competitive businesses just don't have 45% margins! No one can afford to kick that much back to Amazon. What is a merchant to do? Sell on Amazon and you lose money on every sale. Don't sell on Amazon and you don't get any business.
The only answer: raise prices on Amazon. After all, Prime customers – the majority of Amazon's retail business – don't shop for competitive prices. If Amazon wants a 45% vig, you can raise your Amazon prices by a third and just about break even.
But Amazon is wise to that: they have a "most favored nation" rule that punishes suppliers who sell goods more cheaply in rival stores, or even on their own site. The punishments vary, from banishing your products to page ten million of search-results to simply kicking you off the platform. With publishers, Amazon reserves the right to lower the prices they set when listing their books, to match the lowest price on the web, and paying publishers less for each sale.
That means that suppliers who sell on Amazon (which is anyone who wants to stay in business) have to dramatically hike their prices on Amazon, and when they do, they also have to hike their prices everywhere else (no wonder Prime customers don't bother to search elsewhere for a better deal!).
Now, Amazon says this is all wrong. That 45-51% vig they claim from business customers is barely enough to break even. The company's profits – they insist – come from selling AWS cloud service. The retail operation is just a public service they provide to us with cross-subsidy from those fat AWS margins.
This is a hell of a claim. Last year, Amazon raked in $130 billion in seller fees. In other words: they booked more revenue from junk fees than Bank of America made through its whole operation. Amazon's junk fees add up to more than all of Meta's revenues:
https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc_financials/2023/q4/AMZN-Q4-2023-Earnings-Release.pdf
Amazon claims that none of this is profit – it's just covering their operating expenses. According to Amazon, its non-AWS units combined have a one percent profit margin.
Now, this is an eye-popping claim indeed. Amazon is a public company, which means that it has to make thorough quarterly and annual financial disclosures breaking down its profit and loss. You'd think that somewhere in those disclosures, we'd find some details.
You'd think so, but you'd be wrong. Amazon's disclosures do not break out profits and losses by segment. SEC rules actually require the company to make these per-segment disclosures:
https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3524&context=lawreview#:~:text=If%20a%20company%20has%20more,income%20taxes%20and%20extraordinary%20items.
That rule was enacted in 1966, out of concern that companies could use cross-subsidies to fund predatory pricing and other anticompetitive practices. But over the years, the SEC just…stopped enforcing the rule. Companies have "near total managerial discretion" to lump business units together and group their profits and losses in bloated, undifferentiated balance-sheet items:
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/publications/2021/dec/crouching-tiger-hidden-dragons
As Mitchell points you, it's not just Amazon that flouts this rule. We don't know how much money Google makes on Youtube, or how much Apple makes from the App Store (Apple told a federal judge that this number doesn't exist). Warren Buffett – with significant interest in hundreds of companies across dozens of markets – only breaks out seven segments of profit-and-loss for Berkshire Hathaway.
Recall that there is one category of data from the FTC's antitrust case against Amazon that has been completely redacted. One guess which category that is! Yup, the profit-and-loss for its retail operation and other lines of business.
These redactions are the judge's fault, but the real fault lies with the SEC. Amazon is a public company. In exchange for access to the capital markets, it owes the public certain disclosures, which are set out in the SEC's rulebook. The SEC lets Amazon – and other gigantic companies – get away with a degree of secrecy that should disqualify it from offering stock to the public. As Mitchell says, SEC chairman Gary Gensler should adopt "new rules that more concretely define what qualifies as a segment and remove the discretion given to executives."
Amazon is the poster-child for monopoly run amok. As Yanis Varoufakis writes in Technofeudalism, Amazon has actually become a post-capitalist enterprise. Amazon doesn't make profits (money derived from selling goods); it makes rents (money charged to people who are seeking to make a profit):
https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/28/cloudalists/#cloud-capital
Profits are the defining characteristic of a capitalist economy; rents are the defining characteristic of feudalism. Amazon looks like a bazaar where thousands of merchants offer goods for sale to the public, but look harder and you discover that all those stallholders are totally controlled by Amazon. Amazon decides what goods they can sell, how much they cost, and whether a customer ever sees them. And then Amazon takes $0.45-51 out of every dollar. Amazon's "marketplace" isn't like a flea market, it's more like the interconnected shops on Disneyland's Main Street, USA: the sign over the door might say "20th Century Music Company" or "Emporium," but they're all just one store, run by one company.
And because Amazon has so much control over its sellers, it is able to exercise power over its buyers. Amazon's search results push down the best deals on the platform and promote results from more expensive, lower-quality items whose sellers have paid a fortune for an "ad" (not really an ad, but rather the top spot in search listings):
https://pluralistic.net/2023/11/29/aethelred-the-unready/#not-one-penny-for-tribute
This is "Amazon's pricing paradox." Amazon can claim that it offers low-priced, high-quality goods on the platform, but it makes $38b/year pushing those good deals way, way down in its search results. The top result for your Amazon search averages 29% more expensive than the best deal Amazon offers. Buy something from those first four spots and you'll pay a 25% premium. On average, you need to pick the seventeenth item on the search results page to get the best deal:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/3645/
For 40 years, pro-monopoly economists claimed that it would be impossible for Amazon to attain monopoly power over buyers and sellers. Today, Amazon exercises that power so thoroughly that its junk-fee revenues alone exceed the total revenues of Bank of America. Amazon's story – that these fees barely stretch to covering its costs – assumes a nearly inconceivable level of credulity in its audience. Regrettably – for the human race – there is a cohort of senior, highly respected economists who possess this degree of credulity and more.
Of course, there's an easy way to settle the argument: Amazon could just comply with SEC regs and break out its P&L for its e-commerce operation. I assure you, they're not hiding this data because they think you'll be pleasantly surprised when they do and they don't want to spoil the moment.
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If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:
https://pluralistic.net/2024/03/01/managerial-discretion/#junk-fees
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Image: Doc Searls (modified) https://www.flickr.com/photos/docsearls/4863121221/
CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
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The world isn’t on track to meet its climate goals — and it’s the public’s fault, a leading oil company CEO told journalists.
Exxon Mobil Corp. CEO Darren Woods told editors from Fortune that the world has “waited too long” to begin investing in a broader suite of technologies to slow planetary heating.
That heating is largely caused by the burning of fossil fuels, and much of the current impacts of that combustion — rising temperatures, extreme weather — were predicted by Exxon scientists almost half a century ago.
The company’s 1970s and 1980s projections were “at least as skillful as, those of independent academic and government models,” according to a 2023 Harvard study.
Since taking over from former CEO Rex Tillerson, Woods has walked a tightrope between acknowledging the critical problem of climate change — as well as the role of fossil fuels in helping drive it — while insisting fossil fuels must also provide the solution.
In comments before last year’s United Nations Climate Conference (COP28), Woods made a forceful case for carbon capture and storage, a technology in which the planet-heating chemicals released by burning fossil fuels are collected and stored underground.
“While renewable energy is essential to help the world achieve net zero, it is not sufficient,” he said. “Wind and solar alone can’t solve emissions in the industrial sectors that are at the heart of a modern society.”
International experts agree with the idea in the broadest strokes.
Carbon capture marks an essential component of the transition to “net zero,” in which no new chemicals like carbon dioxide or methane reach — and heat — the atmosphere, according to a report by International Energy Agency (IEA) last year.
But the remaining question is how much carbon capture will be needed, which depends on the future role of fossil fuels.
While this technology is feasible, it is very expensive — particularly in a paradigm in which new renewables already outcompete fossil fuels on price.
And the fossil fuel industry hasn’t been spending money on developing carbon capture technology, IEA head Fatih Birol wrote last year on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter.
To be part of a climate solution, Birol added, the fossil fuel industry must “let go of the illusion that implausibly large amounts of carbon capture are the solution.”
He noted that capturing and storing current fossil fuel emissions would require a thousand-fold leap in annual investment from $4 billion in 2022 to $3.5 trillion.
In his comments Tuesday, Woods argued the “dirty secret” is that customers weren’t willing to pay for the added cost of cleaner fossil fuels.
Referring to carbon capture, Woods said Exxon has “tabled proposals” with governments “to get out there and start down this path using existing technology.”
“People can’t afford it, and governments around the world rightly know that their constituents will have real concerns,” he added. “So we’ve got to find a way to get the cost down to grow the utility of the solution, and make it more available and more affordable, so that you can begin the [clean energy] transition.”
For example, he said Exxon “could, today, make sustainable aviation fuel for the airline business. But the airline companies can’t afford to pay.”
Woods blamed “activists” for trying to exclude the fossil fuel industry from the fight to slow rising temperatures, even though the sector is “the industry that has the most capacity and the highest potential for helping with some of the technologies.”
That is an increasingly controversial argument. Across the world, wind and solar plants with giant attached batteries are outcompeting gas plants, though battery life still needs to be longer to make renewable power truly dispatchable.
Carbon capture is “an answer in search of a question,” Gregory Nemet, a public policy professor at the University of Wisconsin, told The Hill last year.
“If your question is what to do about climate change, your answer is one thing,” he said — likely a massive buildout in solar, wind and batteries.
But for fossil fuel companies asking “‘What is the role for natural gas in a carbon-constrained world?’ — well, maybe carbon capture has to be part of your answer.”
In the background of Woods’s comments about customers’ unwillingness to pay for cleaner fossil fuels is a bigger debate over price in general.
This spring, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will release its finalized rule on companies’ climate disclosures.
That much-anticipated rule will weigh in on the key question of whose responsibility it is to account for emissions — the customer who burns them (Scope II), or the fossil fuel company that produces them (Scope III).
Exxon has long argued for Scope II, based on the idea that it provides a product and is not responsible for how customers use it.
Last week, Reuters reported that the SEC would likely drop Scope III, a positive development for the companies.
Woods argued last year that SEC Scope III rules would cause Exxon to produce less fossil fuels — which he said would perversely raise global emissions, as its products were replaced by dirtier production elsewhere.
This broad idea — that fossil fuels use can only be cleaned up on the “demand side” — is one some economists dispute.
For the U.S. to decarbonize in an orderly fashion, “restrictive supply-side policies that curtail fossil fuel extraction and support workers and communities must play a role,” Rutgers University economists Mark Paul and Lina Moe wrote last year.
Without concrete moves to plan for a reduction in the fossil fuel supply, “the end of fossil fuels will be a chaotic collapse where workers, communities, and the environment suffer,” they added.
But Woods’s comments Tuesday doubled down on the claim that the energy transition will succeed only when end-users pay the price.
“People who are generating the emissions need to be aware of [it] and pay the price,” Woods said. “That’s ultimately how you solve the problem.”
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kp777 · 1 year
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By Declan Harty
POLITICO
03/06/2023 09:13 AM EST
From the article:
Dozens of Democratic lawmakers are stepping up pressure on SEC Chair Gary Gensler to push ahead with a landmark climate risk disclosure rule that’s facing fierce opposition from Wall Street to Washington.
Led by Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Sheldon Whitehouse, as well as Reps. Jamie Raskin and Dan Goldman, more than 50 lawmakers urged Gensler in a letter that was shared with POLITICO to not back down on a proposal to force companies to disclose information about their carbon footprints. The proposal would cover, in some cases, the greenhouse gas emissions generated by companies’ vast networks of suppliers and customers, known as Scope 3.
POLITICO previously reported that Gensler has considered scaling back the Scope 3 requirement — the rule’s most contentious feature because it’s so sweeping — over concerns about a wave of litigation that is likely to hit the SEC once the rule is finalized. The Wall Street Journal has also reported that the agency is weighing whether to pull back on another financial reporting component of the rule given the coming courtroom fights.
The lawmakers say investors are demanding the information — and that Wall Street’s top regulator needs to “issue a strong climate risk disclosure rule as quickly as possible.” They called the idea of preemptively curtailing the rule’s Scope 3 and financial reporting components to head off legal risks “deeply misguided.”
“The proposed rules are necessary and overdue,” they wrote to Gensler on Sunday, adding that if the SEC waters down the plans the agency “would be failing its duty to protect investors.”
Read more.
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dear-future-ai · 2 years
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What does this tiktokbot want me to do with this information?
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cultml · 1 year
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rjzimmerman · 2 years
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What is big agriculture, represented by the Farm Bureau and large industrial farms, reluctant to disclose? What are they afraid of? My guess is the spread into popular media of the harm industrial agriculture has done to the Earth, the costs of rectifying that harm, and the effect of those costs on the financials of big ag.
Excerpt from this story from Inside Climate News:
As drought continued to grip huge stretches of American farmland last week, decimating some crops and forcing farmers to plow under others or sell off livestock, a small, but critically related bureaucratic step advanced in Washington.
Over the past year the Securities and Exchange Commission, the country’s top financial regulator, has proposed rules that would help investors get better, more transparent information about companies’ “green” investing claims and would push large, publicly traded companies to reveal the impacts of climate change on their businesses. Last week, the SEC received the last comments from the public on one of these proposed rules.
Advocates for these changes say they’re crucial for investors and for the country’s future financial health, and argue that the SEC’s mandate demands that it require companies to reveal their exposure to climate risks. These long-awaited rules have been largely welcomed by green investing groups and even by giant financial institutions and asset managers, including the world’s largest, BlackRock.
The oil and gas industry does not agree, nor do the industry’s most reliable allies: agribusinesses and the powerful lobbying groups that represent them, including the American Farm Bureau Federation.
They argue that the SEC is reaching beyond its purview, and have filed voluminous comments, citing an array of technical and regulatory qualms. But agribusiness has an especially heightened interest in the issue and has deployed its influence to try to stymie the SEC’s efforts.  
One of the SEC’s proposed rules would require large, publicly traded companies to report the greenhouse gasses they emit directly from their operations, from the energy they purchase and from their supply chains. These supply chain emissions, known as Scope 3 emissions, comprise the bulk of greenhouse gases that agribusinesses emit—about 90 percent. And, while hundreds of businesses of all kinds already disclose their emissions to the SEC and via other disclosure platforms, food and agribusiness companies have been slow to do that. Of the 50 largest food and beverage companies, only 16 percent report their Scope 3 emissions, according to one analysis.
Soon after the SEC issued these proposed disclosure rules in March, the agribusiness lobby and its allies in Congress kicked into gear. In early April, Sen. John Thune of South Dakota and 10 fellow Republicans sent a letter to President Joe Biden, saying that the rules would limit farmers’ access to credit.
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bighermie · 1 year
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nationallawreview · 1 year
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Regulatory Update and Recent SEC Actions
REGULATORY UPDATES Recent SEC Leadership Changes On January 10, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) announced the appointment of Cristina Martin Firvida as director of the Office of the Investor Advocate, effective January 17, 2023. Ms. Martin Firvida was most recently the vice president of financial security and livable communities for government affairs at the American…
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mitchipedia · 2 years
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"Wishing now that he hadn’t made the deal isn’t enough of a reason to let Musk out of it, said Judge Liman." By Richard Lawler at The Verge
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dencyemily · 3 months
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XRP ETF Plans in Limbo as BlackRock Steps Back Due to Regulatory Challenges
BlackRock, the global asset management giant, is reportedly adopting a cautious stance by refraining from supporting an XRP exchange-traded fund (ETF) in the current regulatory climate. Fox Business reporter Charles Gasparino shared the news on Twitter, revealing that BlackRock has no immediate plans for a Spot XRP ETF. The decision is closely linked to the prevailing uncertainty in the regulatory landscape, notably the ongoing legal clash between Ripple Labs, the force behind XRP, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Larry Fink, BlackRock's CEO, chose not to comment on the matter during a recent interview, emphasizing the regulatory uncertainty as a significant barrier. The crucial question revolves around whether XRP should be categorized as a security or a commodity. While Judge Torres' 2023 ruling provided some clarity by stating that XRP sales on exchanges do not constitute an "investment contract," the asset remains in a regulatory gray area.
BlackRock's hesitance to embrace an XRP ETF aligns with the company's risk-averse investment approach, particularly when dealing with assets entangled in legal disputes. The potential exposure to risks associated with launching an ETF for an asset amidst a lawsuit underscores the importance of regulatory clarity in BlackRock's decision-making process.
The resolution of Ripple's legal battle with the SEC holds the key to determining XRP's broader acceptance as an investment vehicle. A favorable outcome could pave the way for increased institutional adoption, potentially including the introduction of XRP ETFs. However, with the legal proceedings ongoing, a conclusive resolution may be months or even years away.
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johanbetter · 4 months
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New Blog:
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gwgaccountant · 6 months
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In my Advanced Financial Accounting class, we were taught about the SEC. Among its divisions and offices is the Office of the Chief Accountant, which mainly serves to advise the commissioners about accounting and auditing matters which are relevant to securities law. It also works with private groups like the FASB and AICPA.
But most importantly for Tumblr, there is indeed a specific person whose title is Chief Accountant. His name is Paul Munter. [citation] That is such an amusingly specific yet superficially grandiose title. Chief Accountant.
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Digital World Acquisition Corp., the blank-check company looking to take Trump Media and Technology Group public, has changed its listed address to a UPS Store in Miami.
The change from a Miami office building to a UPS address came with DWAC's regulatory filing on Friday disclosing that some investors pulled out tens of millions of dollars.
The company said it had lost $138.5 million of the $1 billion in financing from private investors in public equity, also known as PIPE, to fund Trump Media after the merger. The contractual obligation for those investors to contribute to former President Donald Trump's media company after the deal had expired last Tuesday, allowing them to pull their funding.
One of the former private investors told CNBC that it pulled financing from DWAC because of the many legal obstacles facing the company. The investor, who declined to be named due to the sensitive nature of the matter, was also underwhelmed by the popularity of Trump Media's Truth Social app as measured by Donald Trump's follower counts.
Trump had more than 80 million followers on Twitter. On Truth Social, which he founded after he was banned from Twitter following the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection, he has 4.1 million. The app is also currently barred from the Google Play store.
Representatives from DWAC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
After DWAC failed to garner enough shareholder support to extend its deal deadline earlier this month, CEO Patrick Orlando contributed $2.8 million from his company Arc Global Investments II to push back the deadline to December.
The merger delay comes as Trump Media and DWAC are the subject of a Securities and Exchange Commission probe into whether alleged discussions between the two companies prior to the merger violated securities laws.
Trump himself is also the subject of multiple investigations, including civil allegations of fraud from New York's attorney general, as well as criminal investigations relating to the removal of sensitive documents from the White House, his involvement in the Jan. 6 Capitol insurrection and attempts to influence the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.
DWAC's address change was first reported by the Financial Times.
Shares of DWAC were trading around $17 after hours Monday, down significantly from their $97 peak in March of this year.
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kp777 · 2 months
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US regulators approve watered down climate disclosure rule
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The SEC would literally tell you it's not legal to have your own product if they could.
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faultfalha · 9 months
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In a dissent that Labyrinthine in its construction, SEC Commissioner Peirce argued against the proposed rules on Cybersecurity Disclosure. Claiming that the measures would only serve to confuse and mislead investors, Peirce's dissent was a maze of Borgesian proportions. While the majority of the Commission felt that the rules were a necessary step in ensuring that investors were kept aware of the cyber risks faced by public companies, Peirce felt that they would do more harm than good.
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